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“There was a contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his comrades, 
Captain Scott, Dr Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers.”2 
 
An analysis of the presentation and portrayal of Petty Officer Edgar Evans, 
the first man to perish in Captain Scott’s pole party of 1912. 
 
Introduction 
 
Between the 17 February and 31 March 19123, the five British explorers who 
reached the South Pole on 17 January 1912, perished on the return journey. The 
news did not reach Britain, or even the closest inhabited land, New Zealand, 
until the following February. When the news came through, as a group of five 
they were raised as heroes, with particular attention played to Captain Oates 
and Captain Scott. The Antarctic five consisted of, Captain Robert Falcon Scott, 
the leader of the expedition, Dr. Edward Wilson, chief of scientific staff, 
Lieutenant Henry Bowers, Captain Lawrence ‘Titus’ Oates4 and Petty Officer 
Edgar Evans. P.O Evans held unique status, he was the first man to die, the only 
member of the Antarctic five not of officer status and the only one several 
contemporary press and publishers put forward as a scapegoat. 
 
This dissertation is based upon the results of my research undertaken over a 
period of three months. I have examined the published diaries and memoirs of 
Edgar Evans’ fellow travellers, including, Scott’s Journals, Thomas Griffith 
Taylor’s With Scott – the Silver Lining, and Frank Debenham’s The Quiet Land. 
Along with unpublished and thus un-adapted journals and letters, from both the 
lower ranks of the expedition and those of officer status, including the journals 
of P.O Keohane, P.O Williamson and Frank Debenham. I have also examined 
newspaper articles dated from 1901 to 1938. These articles are from various 
newspapers aimed towards the lower classes, such as The Daily Mirror and Daily 
Mail, and newspapers aimed towards the upper classes, such as The Pall Mall 
Gazette and The Times. Around 60% of the articles examined are from 
scrapbooks of the Terra Nova Expedition (1910-13), and scrapbooks of the 
                                                 
2
 The Daily Mail, 12 February, 1913 
3
 The exact date of Scott’s death is unknown, though the last entry in Scott’s diary was dated 29 March 1912.  
4
 Oates was a Captain in the Inniskilling Dragoons Cavalry Regiment, but signed on the expedition as a 
‘Midshipman’ as the expedition was short of funds and could not afford to pay him a higher wage.  
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Discovery (1901-04) expedition, held at the archives of the Scott Polar Research 
Institute.5 There are problems with analysing newspaper reports, for there is the 
age-old dilemma, “whether the press simply reported what of interest to the 
public or whether it created that interest.”6. This query has a further effect on 
scrapbooks, for is the scrapbook a typical representation of the coverage? Or, 
were only specific articles cut out and kept as a memory of the presentation of 
exploration?  
 
However, although the sources are not problem-free, an analysis of the press’ 
perception of Edgar Evans is the most effective way to examine how he was 
popularly presented, as halfpenny dailies regularly reached audience figures of 
1,000,000.7 Additionally, the use of scrapbooks in an analysis of Evans’ 
presentation is not as problematic as using scrapbooks as a basis for a study on 
the presentation of exploration in general. For the cut-out-articles would not 
perhaps be a genuine reflection of exploration’s entire representation. However, 
I am analysing the presentation of an individual within a group, so articles in 
scrapbooks will not only show how specific newspapers perceived Evans, but 
also, how one person wishes to remember Evans. Furthermore, the majority of 
scrapbooks viewed contain at least 100 articles from a dozen different 
newspapers and magazines, thus the research has not been restricted to Evans’ 
presentation in two or three newspapers of similar audiences and political bias’. 
 
These particular documents and texts have been examined as they show the 
construction of individuals’ images. For as Cubitt declares, “formal rituals and 
official procedures constitute…only the most explicit part of a society’s hero-
worshipping and hero-producing activity. Equally important are the ways in 
which heroic reputations are developed through the generally less formal 
practices of social, cultural and economic life – through story-telling and 
entertainment through gossip and news reporting, and through the circulation of 
                                                 
5
 Scrapbooks have been analysed rather than going to Colindale to examine whole newspapers, for 
scrapbooks also enable one to assess collecting practices and an individual’s wanted recollection of an event. 
6
 B. Riffenburgh, The Myth of the Explorer, p.1 
7
 ibid, p.152 
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literature.”8 This dissertation will examine Edgar Evans’ image construction via 
those less formal practices.    
 
Scholarly work on Victorian and Edwardian heroism particularly the ‘imperial 
heroes’ has changed direction over the last twenty years. As Max Jones states, 
“The historian’s role is no longer to act as judge, asking ‘How great was this 
individual?’ Instead scholars should ask ‘Why did a past society raise this 
individual as a hero.’”9 To take Jones’ question a step further, why was this man 
not raised as a hero, in the same way as his comrades? I will therefore be using a 
methodological symmetry, much like the ‘strong programme’ whereby failure is 
looked upon through the same lens as success, with the notion that similar social 
factors contribute to both successful and unsuccessful theories. Evans’ presented 
“failure”10 must be viewed in the same context as the presented heroism of 
Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers.  
 
Figure 1 The Antarctic Five at the Pole on 17 January 1912. Dr Wilson took the photograph 
for the string attached to the camera can be seen in his right hand. 
                                                 
8
 G. Cubitt, ‘Introduction’ Heroic Reputations, p.4 
9
 M. Jones, ‘What Should Historians Do With Heroes’, History Compass, p.441 
10
 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
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Due to the fact that Evans was a Petty Officer, and therefore the only one not of 
commissioned officer status, there will obviously be class issues presented and 
examined, such as the differing perceptions of manliness, and accusations that 
his lack of education rendered him un-fit for exploration. However, as this paper 
will make clear, it is not sufficient to say that Evans’ presentation was purely 
and simply caused by his class, there is more to understanding the construction 
of Evans’ image, than class, for it is too sweeping.  
 
The consensus is that the ‘hero’ is such because he is presenting an ideal image. 
As Orrin. E Klapp states, “the hero in social life is… more than a person; he is an 
ideal image, a legend, a symbol.”11 This has been echoed by Max Jones, “the 
hero is the ideal man or woman”12. It is this that frames the understanding of the 
presentation of Petty Officer Edgar Evans.  
 
As the hero is representative of the ideal, it can also be assumed that he was 
representative of the masculine ideal. It is the general consensus, that one of 
the principal components of the masculine ideal, during the early twentieth 
century, was self-control.13 However, there are obvious problems with examining 
concepts of masculinity and manliness, for there has only been a limited amount 
of analysis on working-class masculinity. Recent leading lights in the field such as 
John Tosh have tended to concentrate on middle and upper class masculinity.14 
Additionally, Stephen Heathron believes that the little that is known about 
working-class gender suggests, “masculinity was tied to respectable employment 
and physical labour”15. Thus it is likely that Evans’ masculinity was defined not 
only by his class, but also by his occupation. However, if scholarly research on 
working-class masculinity is lacking, there has been even less analysis on the 
masculinity of mariners. The main contributors to this field include, Mary 
Conley’s, From Jack Tar to Union Jack and J.D Glasco’s ‘The Seaman Feels Him-
self a Man’. Conley argues that Edwardian sailors were respected for their 
                                                 
11
 O.E. Klapp, ‘The Creation of Popular Heroes’ p.135 
12
 M. Jones, ‘What Should Historians Do With Heroes’ p.440 
13
 J. Tosh, ‘What Should Historians Do With Masculinity’ p.183, G.L. Mosse, ‘Shell-shock as a Social 
Disease’ p.101, M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.245. 
14
 For example, J. Tosh, A Man's Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England  
15
 Heathorn, ‘How stiff were Victorian Upper Lips’, History Compass, p.2 
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domesticity16, and Glasco contends that during the eighteenth century, a sailor’s 
masculinity was complex but often linked to their level of maritime skill.17 These 
two ideas will be further examined in this paper.  
  
Michael Lieven, in his examination of hero making during the Zulu War proclaims, 
“the roots of the hero are in dramatic narrative”18. This has clear links to the 
heroism of the Antarctic Five whose story was told by ‘mediators’, a term firstly 
used by John M. MacKenzie. Mackenzie has contributed greatly to the field of 
imperial heroism. He put forward in ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, the widely 
accepted theory that it is not so much the exploits of the individual that count, 
for it is the ‘mediators’, those who work to keep the hero in the minds of the 
public that create a hero.19  Since mediators are necessary for the establishment 
of a heroic reputation, they must also play a role in the creation of an un-heroic 
reputation. However, in the case of the Antarctic five, the ‘mediators’ are not 
individual people, they are texts, Scott’s ‘message to the public’ and press 
reports. Both played a significant role in the creation of Evans’ image and 
reputation.  
 
Scholars analysing Victorian and Edwardian heroes have tended to concentrate 
on military figures, such as, the Havelock heroes20and General Gordon21. Whilst 
the original focus of naval heroism began with the apotheosis of Captain Cook, 
scholars analysing Victorian naval heroes, have focused on Nelson and Franklin.22 
MacKenzie, C.I Hamilton and Robert MacDonald have all shown that there was a 
definite link between Christianity and military heroism.23 However, Christianity 
was also a key component in the construction of a non-military hero, David 
Livingstone. MacKenzie and Jones contend that Livingstone became to be 
                                                 
16
 M. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack, specifically chapter 4, ‘Strong men for a strong navy’ 
17
 J.D Glasco, ‘The Seaman Feels Him-self a Man’pp40-52 
18
 M. Lieven. ‘Heroism, Heroics and the Making of Heroes: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879’ p.419 
19
 J. M McKenzie, ‘Heroic myths of Empire,’ p.114 
20
 R. Mackenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, M. Jones, ‘What should historians 
so with heroes’  
21
 R. MacKenzie, Heroic Myths of Empire’, G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, M. Jones, ‘What should historians 
so with heroes’, R. MacDonald, The Language of Empire  
22
 C.I. Hamilton, Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’, H. Lewis-Jones, ‘Heroism displayed’: 
revisiting the Franklin Gallery at the Royal Naval Exhibition, 1891’,  
23
 C.I. Hamilton, Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’, J. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, R. 
MacDonald, ‘Deeds of Glory’ in The Language of Empire 
 11 
regarded as a hero because he could be used to present differing ideals, such as 
the lower class man who educated himself, thus an advocate of self-
improvement, the Christian missionary and symbol of empire.24 MacKenzie’s 
research has also shown that being able to present several ideals turned the 
individual, with the help of mediators into “mythic status”25. The same principal 
can be applied to the Antarctic five, for as a group they were a symbol of the 
strength of British character, they were also promoted as having sacrificed their 
lives for the cause of science, advocating a quest for knowledge. Additionally as 
individuals, Wilson, Bowers, Scott and Oates became proponents of how to 
behave, and perhaps most importantly, how to die in a perceived heroic manner. 
 
There has been little scholarly analysis of Edgar Evans’ image construction. The 
only article analysing Evans is from the medical field, and concerned with the 
cause of his death.26 Whilst the majority of publications about the British 
Antarctic Expedition, (1910-13), have not been analytical studies, but 
biographical in approach, either of the expedition member, or, of the expedition 
itself. With as R. Fiennes’ Captain Scott, (2003), Michael Smith’s I’m Just Going 
Outside (2000), C.H. Lagerbom’s The Fifth Man (1999) and G. Seaver’s Edward 
Wilson of the Antarctic (1933), as just a handful of examples. However, in the 
last five years, Max Jones’ The Last Great Quest (2004) and Stephanie 
Barczewski’s Antarctic Destinies (2007) have analysed the presentation and the 
aftermath of Scott’s final expedition. Both have put forward their views on early 
twentieth century heroism. Jones’ work should be seen as groundbreaking for no 
scholar before had analysed the reaction to the expedition by the press27, when 
in fact the newspapers’ had such a critical role in the transfer of knowledge in 
early twentieth century society, newspaper reports are the key component of 
the popular presentation of exploration.  
 
However, despite the valuable analysis, there are limitations to the texts. In 
Antarctic Destinies, a 300-page book, Evans gets four pages concerning the press 
                                                 
24
 J.M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths’, p.125, M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.24 
25
 J.M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’ p.l22 
26
 Rogers, ‘The death of Chief Petty Officer Evans’ The Practitioner, 1974 
27
 Riffenburgh’s investigation of the British and American press’ presentation of exploration in The Myth of 
the Explorer stopped in 1910, thus leaving the presentation of Scott’s last expedition un-examined. 
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attacks upon him and a similar amount in The Last Great Quest. Therefore, the 
gap between the image of Scott, Wilson, Bowers and Oates and that of Evans is 
only briefly dealt with. Furthermore, Jones declares that Evans was not attacked 
on a wide-scale and thus accusations towards Evans should not be exaggerated,28 
a point I will oppose in Chapter 3. Barczewski asserts that class caused the 
difference in Evans ‘and Oates’ presentation,29 whereas I will contend that there 
was more to understanding Evans’ presentation than his socio-economic status. 
Additionally, neither Jones nor Barczewski examine how Evans was portrayed in 
the diaries of his fellow travellers. In consequence, the derogatory comments by 
the press aimed at Edgar Evans are not analysed in the wider context of Evans’ 
image construction.  
 
Lisa Bloom’s (1995), Gender on Ice attempts to analyse heroism and Scott’s last 
expedition. However, much of her secondary reading is taken from Roland 
Huntford, thus limiting the ability to form a rounded argument. This is because 
Huntford’s book, Scott and Amundsen, is a greatly inferred text, wherein Scott is 
essentially presented as villainous, whilst Amundsen is presented as an almost 
saint-like being. Therefore, anyone who solely quotes Huntford and looks to no 
other evidence or scholarly work limits the plausibility of his or her own 
argument.  Moreover, Bloom does not look into the presentation of exploration 
by the British press when the news of the Antarctic five’s death came through, if 
one does not know what traits and exploits were presented as heroic, how can 
one comment on what was considered heroic at the time.  
 
Although there has been no scholarly analysis of scrapbooks there have been 
studies on memorialisation. The majority of work on memorials has focused on 
military memorials30. Susan Seymour and Rupert Calvolcoressi’s examination of 
naval memorials in ‘Landscape Parks and the Memorialisation of Empire’, 
demonstrates that the lower ranks were commemorated, though it was still in 
fitting within an aristocratic framework.31 Similarly, Nicholas Penny’s ‘Amor 
                                                 
28
M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.112 
29
 S. Barczewski, Antarctic Destinies, p.177 
30
 Such as Cooke’s ‘Hyde Park Holocaust Memorial’, Craske’s ‘naval and military heroes’, and Jordan and 
Rogers ‘Admirals as Heroes’ 
31
 S. Seymour and R. Calvocoressi, ‘Landscape Parks and the Memorialisation of Empire’, p.113 
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Publicus Posuit’ shows that the image of Jack Tar was used in memorials but only 
to show devotion to a fallen commander, they were examples.32 This can be 
linked to John Price’s research into non-military heroism. Price investigated the 
Watt’s Memorial for Self-Sacrifice in ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’, and has shown 
that the working classes, who were commemorated for their heroism, had their 
image adapted by the press to promote specific ideals33. Evans had few 
individual memorials, very rarely had his image adapted to be promoted as a 
heroic individual, and was seldom presented as an example for those to follow.  
 
In ‘What Should Historians do with Heroes’, Max Jones proclaims that based upon 
one of Cubitt’s theories on heroism, that a hero is someone who is an object of 
emotional investment34. Believing that there is a range of indictors to gauge the 
level of heroism, Jones points to, biographies, media representations, and 
references in personal testimonies, commercial exploitation, memorial services, 
memorial funds and public monuments as the determinant factors35.  I shall 
investigate four of these indicators; personal testimonies, media 
representations, public monuments and biographies, whilst also analysing what 
factors affected Evans’ presentation. This dissertation will show the chronology 
of Evans’ image, presenting his fellow travellers opinions of him before his 
death, the role of Scott’s ‘message’ and the press reports, his companions’ 
opinions of Evans’ death and Evans’ commemoration in memorial form in both 
stone and ink. Showing that just as heroism is a constructed state, an un-heroic 
image is also a constructed state. There are four main factors that affected and 
defined Evans’ image, firstly the circulation of knowledge, secondly inscriptions, 
artefacts and diaries, thirdly print culture including the use of images and lastly, 
the negotiation of masculinity.   
 
In chapter 1 I shall analyse the image of Evans, as presented by his fellow 
travellers before he died. I will then give a brief chronology of the press’ 
presentation of Evans, and answer several questions, including, why was Evans 
open to attack? I will then analyse the reports that promoted Evans as a hero 
                                                 
32
 N. Penny, ‘Amor Publicus Posuit’; Monuments for the People and of the People’, pp797-800 
33
 J. Price, ‘Watts Memorial’, pp.268-269  
34
 G.Cubitt, Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, p.3 
35
 M. Jones, What Should Historians Do With Heroes’ p.441 
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within the group, articles that accused Evans of going insane, failing because of a 
lack of education and failing because of his physicality. Whilst also assessing how 
the portrayal of Evans reflected contemporary views on masculinity.  
 
The second chapter will be a comparison between the presentation of Captain 
Oates, the proclaimed, ‘gentleman hero’, and Edgar Evans. Ideals of masculinity 
will also be assessed and I will question Barczewski’s claim that the reason the 
two were presented differently was purely an issue of class; it will become clear 
that the manner of Evans’ death was a key factor in his subsequent projection. 
Geoffrey Cubitt has argued that heroism can occur when “a life is encapsulated 
in a particularly dramatic moment”36. It is through this one moment that the 
presentation of the heroism of Captain Oates can be assessed in comparison with 
Edgar Evans.  
 
The third chapter will focus on how Evans’ presentation developed throughout 
the century, I will investigate two of Jones’ indicators of heroism, memorials and 
biographies and adding another factor, scrapbooks, to see how society and 
individuals wished to remember and present Evans. Additionally, if memorials 
are “memory in the guise of representation”37, what does this show about how 
people wanted to commemorate Evans? I will also build upon Barczewski’s 
suggestion that the fact Evans was attacked is more significant than the number 
of accusations, and I will contend that there are other, less direct ways that 
show the contemporary perception of Evans’ un-heroic status.  
 
                                                 
36
 G. Cubitt, (ed) Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, p.13 
37
 C. W. J. Withers ‘Memory and the history of geographical knowledge: the commemoration of Mungo 
Park’ p.3, taken from Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, p.161 
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Figure 2 Evans poses for Herbert Ponting, the self-proclaimed ‘camera artist’. Evans made all 
of the sledges with fellow Petty Officers Crean and Keohane, and so it is very likely that the 
sledge behind Evans is a result of his handiwork. 
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Edgar Evans 
Edgar Evans (1876-1912) was born in Rhossili, Wales. When he was 15 he joined 
the Royal Navy. He advanced from seaman on HMS Trafalgar to physical 
education instructor on HMS Excellent, to able seaman on HMS Vernon, and to 
leading seaman on HMS Pembroke. In 1899 he joined Lieutenant Scott on HMS 
Majestic38. At the age of twenty-five, he applied to, and was accepted on to, 
Scott’s first Antarctic expedition, The National Antarctic Expedition, (1901-04), 
as a Petty Officer. After returning to Wales he married his cousin, Lois Beynon. 
He then worked as a gunnery instructor and won the Torpedo Cup several 
times39, before re-joining Captain Scott for the British Antarctic Expedition 
(1910-13). Evans was one of four men chosen by Scott to march to the South 
Pole. All five perished on the return journey, Evans left a widow and three young 
children.   
 
Out of the five Evans was the first to die, collapsing on 17 February 1912. Evans’ 
death is still a matter of mystery. Scott believed Evans had a fall, which later 
caused a brain haemorrhage. Whilst some have suggested scurvy, which weaken 
his blood vessels, thus when Evans fell and hit his head, this caused a brain 
haemorrhage40. Though Susan Solomon believes he suffered high altitude 
cerebral oedema41. A month after Evans’ demise, Captain Oates walked out of 
the tent to his death, with the immortal words, “I am just going outside I maybe 
some time.”42 Scott, Wilson and Bowers died in their tent at the end of March 
1912.  
 
When the news reached England in February 1913, following the publishing of 
Scott’s ‘message to the public’, which proclaimed Evans’ role in the disaster as 
the “astonishing failure… of the strongest man”43. Henceforth Evans became 
known as ‘the strong man’. However, Evans was not just a one-dimensional 
figure as the name ‘strong man’ implies.  
                                                 
38
 G.C. Gregor, Swansea’s Antarctic Explorer, p.77 
39
 According to Frank Debenham’s journal Evans stated he had won the cup 5 times, though Evans’ 
biographer G.C. Gregor has stated Evans won it twice. 
40
 A.F. Rogers, ‘The Death of Petty Officer Evans’ The Practitioner, April 1974, and R. Huntford, Scott and 
Amundsen, p.505 
41
 S. Solomon, The Coldest March, pp.228-231. 
42
 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.410 
43
 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
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Chapter 1 
“In a show like this we have no scared namby pamby’s”44.  
 
In order to analyse the construction and establishment of Evans’ image, it is first 
necessary to examine how Evans’ fellow travellers viewed him prior to his death. 
Thus, before Scott’s opinions of his ‘failure’ were published and before the 
accusations by the press. The remainder of the first chapter will deal with Evans’ 
representation by the press in 1913. A brief chronology is given to show how 
Evans’ image developed. This chapter then focuses on the newspaper reports 
that suggest Evans failed mentally, along with the reports that suggest Evans’ 
failure was caused by his physicality. I contend that newspaper reports and 
Scott’s ‘message’ were the key mediators in Evans’ subsequent projection and 
status, questioning his manliness and creating a vulnerable legacy.  
 
The opinions of Evans’ fellow travellers  
In January 1911 Evans was told by Scott to accompany three scientists on the 
Western Sledge Journey. 45 The scientists, Thomas Griffith-Taylor, Frank 
Debenham and Charles Wright had never been to Antarctica before, and so 
Evans’ job was essentially to show the men how to sledge and camp. Evans 
demonstrated how to put up and pull down the tent, how to cook for four men, 
how to fix boots, and he kept their spirits up with a stream of anecdotes, 
chocolate and card games. In Griffith-Taylor’s journal he promotes Evans as, “an 
ideal sledge-mate”46, an “expert steersman”47, who kept them in good humour; 
“Evans as usual enlivened us with Navy yarns”48. These comments show Evans as 
a man of skill, whilst being fully aware of his responsibilities by ensuring the 
morale of the group remained high. Similarly Captain Scott promoted Evans as, 
“the most invaluable asset to our party”49, hailing his craftsman-like skill; “a 
new pair of sealskin overshoes for ski made by Evans have been a complete 
                                                 
44
 Henry. R. Bowers letter to Emily Webb Bowers, 22 June 1910, MS 1505/1/1/3/89 
45
 T. Griffith-Taylor was the official leader, but as Evans was there to teach Debenham, Wright and Griffith-
Taylor how to survive tent-life, Evans became the unofficial leader. 
46
 Griffith-Taylor collection, (ed) W. Hanley, p.87 
47
 ibid, p.100 
48
 ibid, p.97 
49
 R. F. Scott, Journals, p.363 
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success”50, “Evans has made a lining for one of the tents; it is secured on the 
inner side of the poles and provides an air space inside the tent”51. There was far 
more to Evans than simple seaman who was there for his strength alone. 
Particularly as Evans was presented as a craftsman, that is in essence a show of 
self-discipline and control, two traits advocated by Victorian freethinkers Carlyle 
and Kinsley52.  Although self-control may only have been a key component of the 
masculine ideal for the middle-upper classes, the men praising Evans’ skill were 
from that social standing, thus it is highly probable that to Scott and Griffith-
Taylor, Evans represented a display of supreme masculinity. It could be argued 
that Evans was a favourite of Scott, and as such Scott’s comments would be 
positive. However, Scott was heavily responsible for Evans’ subsequent un-heroic 
representation and so Evans was not so favourable that he was beyond criticism.  
 
In Frank Debenham’s unpublished diary there were frequent comments about 
him and Evans larking about. Debenham regularly made a note of Evans’ sayings. 
For example, when dealing cards Debenham gave Evans a bad hand to which 
Evans replied, “Right o my old blossom, wait till I’m cook again I’ll pizen you”53. 
This was not simply a patronising note of look at how the lower ranks talk, for he 
expresses how well they get on, immediately after the incident Debenham 
recorded, “we really are a very jolly sledging party and it is practically all due to 
Evans”54. It seems from Debenham’s original diary that he looked up to Evans. 
This statement is inferred because Debenham makes no references to the 
comments used by Griffith Taylor or Charles Wright, as he does with Evans, 
whom he mentions every day, writing down Evans’ opinions and popular sayings. 
Debenham states, “Evans has the most frequent falls and after one he peers out 
of his hole at me to see if I’m laughing and that always breaks me up.”55 
 
“Evans and I have started a feud…Ripping chap!”56 “Evans and I whirled away the 
time singing and generally acting the giddy ox. Amongst other things he proposed 
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to me.”57 Evans was essentially breaking down the class barriers that have often 
been associated with the regime of Scott’s expeditions. The quotes also show 
that Evans possessed qualities that the educated men admired.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 [Left to right: Evans, Griffith-Taylor and Debenham in early 1911.] Debenham stated 
in his journal that Evans would make him laugh just as the photograph was taken, resulting in 
the two of them “grinning like apes” 58, though here is looks like they have managed to keep 
a straight face. 
 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to illustrate how the Seamen and Petty 
Officers viewed Evans. This is because, only a minority kept journals, and those 
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who did often wrote rather short entries59, and generally made no mention of 
their thoughts and feelings about their fellows. Often just stating the time, 
weather, food consumed and where they camped, whilst any extraordinary 
events were also noted. For as Evans proclaimed having seen a whale, “Hoorey, 
got something to put in the diary.”60 Additionally, one should acknowledge that 
journals could have been lost or destroyed, or they may have remained in family 
possession. 
 
It should though be clear that from the evidence available, Evans was seen as an 
asset to the expedition and to his fellow travellers. He was a leader, not only 
shown by the fact that he became the unofficial leader of the western sledge 
journey, but as a gunnery instructor his team won the Torpedo cup several 
times. He was a skilled craftsman, making successful sledges, crampons, sleeping 
bags, and tent linings, he was devoted to his leader and broke down social 
boundaries. Yet these virtues stated by his fellow explorers have, by and large, 
been lost, hidden or misrepresented by the mediators. 
 
A chronology of the press’ presentation of Evans 
To aid the readers understanding of the construction of Evans’ image, I have 
written 4 key dates to show a brief chronology of Evans’ presentation by the 
British press. 
 
On 10 February 1913, the news of the fate of the Antarctic five was first 
published. There were no accusations being put forward on this date for 
knowledge of the disaster is minimal.61  
 
From 11 February 1913 Captain Scott’s ‘message to the public’62 was printed63. In 
the ‘message’, Scott calls Evans’ breakdown an “astonishing failure of…the 
                                                 
59
 With the exception of Petty Officer Thomas Williamson 
60
 F. Debenham, diary, 13 February 1911. Rather ironically this was noted by Debenham in his diary and not 
recorded by Evans. 
61
 Westminster Gazette, 10 February 1913, Extra late Pall Mall Gazette, 10 February 1913, MS 1453/40 
62
 See Appendix for the entire ‘Message to the public’ 
63
 Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Mail, Westminster Gazette - 11 February, Daily Mirror, Daily Graphic, Daily 
Sketch, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Morning Post- 12 February 12
,
 The Times Weekly – 14 February 
 21 
strongest man”64. From this date on Evans was known as the ‘strong man’, and 
theories were put forward by the press concerning Evans’ role in the disaster, 
such as, “did he fail physically or mentally?”65 From 11 February for several days 
there were also articles about Evans with a sympathetic tone, for Evans’ wife 
Lois was quoted.66  
 
From 15 February 1913, Commander Edward Evans’67 interview, whereby he 
stated that the accusations that Edgar Evans went insane were untrue, was 
extensively reported68. However, some newspapers as late as 21 February were 
stilling projecting the view that “Evans [had] lost his reason”69. There were two 
images of Evans being offered, “the strong man of Captain Scott’s Southern Party 
whose accident was the beginning of the disaster”70, in conjunction with, “the 
strong man of Scott’s band of heroes”71.  
 
Throughout the remainder of 1913, Evans was still offered as a hero within the 
group, but his un-heroic reception as an individual continued. The Daily Mirror 
presented the publication of Scott’s Journals as a means to “clear up the 
mystery of Evans’ death”, the article concurs,“there is no mystery at all Evans 
died a natural death following great exhaustion.” However, Evans’ image is not 
re-constructed as heroic, for the article continues, “the following extracts show 
how the various stages of the sturdy seaman’s fate dogged them”72. Evidently 
Evans was still a controversial figure.   
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Figure 4 [Left to right] Bowers, Oates, Evans, Scott and Wilson at the South Pole, 17 January 
1912 
 
Scott’s ‘message to the public’ 
Why did the press attack Evans? 
 
From the chronology it is clear that the primary reason Evans was open to attack 
stems from the fact that the first, and most influential mediator, Captain Scott, 
had lambasted Evans in the ‘message to the public’. From that point on Evans’ 
legacy became vulnerable.  
 
The ‘message’ was a note written by Scott as he, Bowers and Wilson awaited 
death in their tent; it was an attempt to explain the reasons for the disaster. 
Scott blamed the loss of pony transport, the weather, the soft snow and he then 
claims that they would have made it home “in fine form and with surplus food, 
but for the astonishing failure of the man whom we least expected to fail. Edgar 
Evans was thought the strongest man of the party.”73 However, Scott went on to 
state that the journey had shown, “that Englishmen can endure hardships, help 
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one another and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past…had we 
lived I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance and courage of 
my companions which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman.”74   
 
Scott’s ‘message’ was not just a note; it was an unofficial document that 
became the basis for Evans’ un-heroic reputation and the others heroic 
depiction. Notes are essentially filling in for official documentation, therefore it 
was not an official statement produced by Scott; it was his own private thoughts 
and opinions.75  
 
To be declared a ‘failure’ by his leader twice is indisputably not a representation 
of a state of heroism. However, ‘failure’ is not the only significant word in 
Scott’s pronouncement of Evans’ role in the disaster. Qualifying the ‘failure’ 
with the word ‘astonishing’, presents the notion that Evans’ ‘failure’ was 
unpredicted, Evans should not have failed, and he was therefore unreliable. This 
is a key statement, for self-control and self-discipline were often viewed as the 
epitome of masculinity, particularly for the middle to higher classes. Thus 
unreliability was not a virtue it was an indictment. As Showalter states, in 
reference to the First World War, “chief among the values promoted within the 
male community of the war was the ability to tolerate the appalling filth and the 
stink of the trenches, the relentless noise, and the constant threat of death, 
with stoic good humour, and to allude to it in phlegmatic understatement. 
Indeed, emotional repression was an essential aspect of the British masculine 
ideal.”76 Evans was presented as having an unpredictable failure; this was clearly 
not a representation of a masculine ideal, let alone a heroic ideal. 
 
Scott’s ‘message’ along with Oates’ self-sacrificing moment, “I’m just going 
outside I may be sometime”77 were, as Jones’ research has found, the only two 
extracts directly quoted from Scott’s Journals that were telegraphed back to the 
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press in England.78 Those two extracts from Scott’s Journal’s provided the basis 
for the story told to one and a half million children in elementary schools on 15 
February 191379.  The message was also printed in a small 7 page booklet 
entitled ‘The People’s Tribute to the Heroes of the Antarctic’, which was a 
“penny contribution…enabling the humblest of us to participate”80 in the fund-
raising. The ‘message’ was evidently publicised throughout the social hierarchy. 
The public would not see Scott’s comments praising Evans until the end of the 
year, when Scott’s Journals were published on 6 November 1913. Therefore, the 
image of Evans that was offered in newspapers throughout Britain in February 
1913, stemmed from the image presented by Scott; a strong man, dying first and 
contributing to the fate of the other four.  
 
Evans’ state of mind 
Many newspapers ran stories that questioned Evans’ state of mind, From15 
February 1913, The Observer, Western Mail, South Wales Echo, Daily Graphic 
and The Times Weekly Edition all ran a very similar story expressing concerns 
about Evans’ mental state. “It would seem from what has escaped some of the 
survivors that Evans lost his reason for the time being under the great stress of 
fatigue and privation and was incapable of obeying orders, or assisting his hard-
pushed companions in the weary work of pulling the sledge. Indeed it became 
necessary in the end to lay him on it.”81  This article declares that the evidence 
for Evans’ mental breakdown stems from his comrades, though there were also 
reports that the men did not talk to the press. For example, in another interview 
Commander Evans had stated, “members of the expedition were not anxious to 
be interviewed.”82 So although possible, it is unlikely that one of his companions 
would have made such an accusation, for claiming that Evans had ‘lost his 
reason’, was a term used to insinuate insanity. The press were making a serious 
indictment since the attribution of mental health issues would have been seen as 
a major social stigma, and consequently a long way from a heroic image.  
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The image presented by those newspapers of Evans being carried on the sledge 
itself a tool of labour, shows a lack of ability to operate on space, his demise 
represented a failed, ‘bodily force’. For as Valentine states, “Connell…argues 
[men] are expected to be able to exhibit bodily skill in terms of their 
competence to operate on space, or the objects in it, and to be a bodily force in 
terms of their ability to occupy space”83.  In the reports of his failing mentality 
and physically Evans was clearly presented as showing an inability to operate not 
only the technology of the object (the sledge), but also an inability to orientate 
within the Antarctic space. However, in the accounts of his fellows before he 
reached the Pole, Evans was the embodiment of bodily force and by crafting 
objects, leading and teaching men, he had clearly occupied space with 
authority.  
 
Mark Jackson believes, that Edwardian perceptions of feeble-minds “were closely 
framed by broader social and cultural concerns, particularly about race, class 
and gender.“84 Evans’ presented mental instability was also framed by those 
cultural concerns. For the early twentieth century was a time when the theory of 
‘separate spheres’ for men and women was a still a popular belief. It would 
therefore be reasonable to assume that there were views of separate spheres too 
for male and female mentality, since hysteria and nervous dispositions were not 
seen masculine traits, they were characterized as effeminate. And the 
appearance of effeminate traits was seen as danger to the manliness of the race, 
for example, hunting was encouraged at public schools for it was seen as an 
“antidote to effeminacy”85. To give another contemporary example, the 
following letter, written by an ex-military man was printed in The Daily Sketch: 
 
“MORAL GERMICIDE – Returned Exile Shocked at London’s Effeminate Men” 
 “After eighteen years in India I return to England and what do I find? An 
improvement in her modes of locomotion? Perhaps. But where are her sons? 
 …There is a brigade of microbes (I cannot think of any other term) with 
painted faces, high-heeled boots and bangles infesting London. 
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 I went into a hairdresser’s in Piccadilly for a shave and to my 
astonishment and disgust was asked if I would have my face massaged! With a 
reply more forcible than polite I seized my overcoat and a hat (unfortunately not 
my own) and hurried along the streets thinking: What has England come to? 
 In the boy scouts we certainly have the making of men – not that these 
men will remain in Britain unless something is done to improve the masculine 
standard. They will away to the colonies and live with men. 
 KADER – Birmingham86 
 
The letter clearly shows that displays of femininity were seen as unmanly, and so 
the Antarctic five may have been viewed as antidotes to the accusations of the 
declining manliness of the nation. The letter does though have a satirical tone, 
for it seems people were well aware that the testing ground for the manliness of 
British subjects was in the colonies, away from Britain. Although it cannot be 
assumed this voice was the voice of many, for it could be the voice of one 
region, occupation, or age. It should be acknowledged that during the Victorian 
and Edwardian period there was an emphasis on creating brave boys to defend 
the empire. This accounts for the prominence of frontier and military stories in 
boys’ literature, wherein; “the imperatives of empire elaborated a militaristic 
and robust hypermasculinity which found its apotheosis in…the boys’ adventure 
story.”87 This implies the shocked opinion put forward in the letter was not an 
individual perception, there was a popular desire to enhance the manliness of 
the male British nation, and Evans’ presented mental instability reflected the 
fears of un-manliness. 
 
It is the general consensus that the First World War acted as a catalyst for 
advancing the understanding of mental health and developing psychological 
therapy, whilst also calling into question popular beliefs on degeneration.88 
However, medics first had to recognise that shellshock was not a sign of 
weakness and degeneration, and it appears from Elaine Showalter’s investigation 
into male hysteria in The Female Malady (1985), that a class distinction was 
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introduced.  “Doctors noticed that war neurosis took different forms in officers 
and regular soldiers... [There was a] tidy distribution of symptoms and diagnosis 
is consistent with late Victorian moralistic and class orientated attitudes to 
hysteria and neurasthenia in women.”89 Showalter continues, “the hysterical 
soldier was seen as a simple, emotional, unthinking, passive, suggestible, 
dependant and weak – very much the same constellation of traits associated with 
the hysterical woman – while the complex and overworked neurasthenic officer 
was much closer to an acceptable, even heroic male ideal.”90 
 
Evidently Showalter’s research shows that the lower ranks were fitted to a 
feminine model, leaving the privations of the higher ranks to be viewed within a 
heroic ideal.  The fact that a distinction was sought out shows there was a 
concern that a state, which had traditionally been seen as a feminine trait and 
defect, could be pinned to men of officer status. This implies that in the pre-war 
and thus pre-distinction phase, Evans’ class was not the cause of accusations 
about his presented mental instability, for the class distinctions were yet to be 
introduced.  Therefore, Evans’ breakdown was seen as a demonstration of a lack 
of will power, an accusation of femininity, not one solely tied to social status. 
The accusations questioned his masculinity, which would have affected the 
likelihood of Evans being promoted as a heroic individual.  
 
It seems fitting to have compared the diagnosis of shellshock, a military 
syndrome, with the supposed mental breakdown of Edgar Evans. This is because, 
as George Mosse claims, “war is a test of manliness, those who had shell-sock 
failed the test”91. In pre-war Britain, Antarctic exploration was the supreme test 
of manliness, those who were projected as slowing down their comrades, losing 
their mind and having to be carried on a sledge, failed the test.  
 
However, although hysteria and mental breakdown were seen as essentially 
feminine, there has traditionally been a connection between sailors and 
femininity. Quintin Colville states, “ratings were associated with feminised 
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qualities such as the love of domesticity, sentimentality, emotional spontaneity 
and immaturity; connotations further borne out by the requirement of ratings to 
wash and repair their own clothes.”92 So there was a link already, inferring that 
sailors had a masculinity of their own, and thus is not comparable to other 
occupations, or those within the same class. Additionally, Conley has proclaimed 
that there was a genuine respect for the domesticated sailor, for cleaning 
products were often advertised by images of sailors.93 However, whereas 
feminine qualities such as domesticity can be praised within or outside the 
seaman’s world, a mental breakdown was not a praise-worthy state in a 
seaman’s world of masculinity or any other.   
 
 
Figure 5 Edgar Evans at the sewing machine, like all Petty Officers would have been a skilled 
sewer, for a Royal Naval mariner sewing was a necessity as they needed to mend their own 
clothes. 
 
Reports questioning Evans’ mental state continued to be printed.  The Daily 
Express ran an article entitled, “The problem of Seaman Evans – why he “failed” 
the expedition – was he handicapped by his strength? – Did Seaman Edgar Evans- 
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the cheery giant of the party fail physically or mentally?” The article quoted an 
‘eminent mental specialist’, who asserted, “it is the uneducated man he said 
who would feel most acutely the mental strain and dreary, monotonous life amid 
eternal snows...To an educated man this strain would be bad enough, but he 
would be able to stimulate his brain from his store of learning. Contrary to 
popular belief, educated men endure long terms of imprisonment – most of the 
rigours of which would be reproduced and intensified among the hardships of the 
Antarctic – better than the uneducated man. The absence of stimulus in an 
uneducated man, such as presumably Seaman Evans would have been – might 
have been succeeded by a kind of self-mannerism, followed by mania and 
delusion that he was being kept from food and home, both close at hand. Such a 
breakdown may have been the ‘failure’ of which Captain Scott speaks. Or it may 
have been physical failure. It is not always the biggest and most athletic man 
who endures privation best.”94 
 
The fact that the press sought out a ‘specialist’ to offer his opinions shows that 
the press were accepting Scott’s initial criticism of Evans, and were not looking 
to provide evidence that proved otherwise. The newspaper had sought an 
educated man, a voice of medical authority, who was effectively verifying 
Scott’s statement, and thus attempting to turn it from interpretation to factual 
analysis. Evans was therefore officially labelled unsuitable for exploration. The 
Express’ ‘specialist’ was evidently questioning Evans’ mental capability, 
asserting that Evans had a lack of education, essentially implying that Evans’ 
financial and social circumstances rendered him unfit for exploration. However, 
when Evans had returned from Scott’s first Antarctic expedition the Discovery 
(1901-04), the press declared, “the crew is composed entirely of absolutely 
picked men, each one of them noted for a high standard of intelligence.95 Whilst 
another claimed, “they have been specially selected for their physique, 
constitution, seamanship, and for their capacity in entertaining their fellows.”96 
Additionally, Evans’ mental state was not an issue before January 1912, as 
Bowers stated in a letter to his sister, “in a show like this we have no scared 
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namby pambys – Thank goodness”97. Whilst Scott claimed in his Journals Evans 
had a “really remarkable headpiece”98 and Ponting recalled, “Evans, always 
quick-witted”99. Evidently these were a long a way from the reports that Evans’ 
lack of education made him a liability on the expedition.   
 
The day before Evans died, Scott had stated, “Evans has nearly broken down in 
the Brain we think.”100 Which could account for the press accusations, yet these 
comments were not published until November 1913, some nine months later. 
Additionally on the day Evans died, Evans had announced, “As he always did, 
that he was quite well”101 and he started the day pulling the sledge in his 
harness. He was clearly not a perpetual delirious mess as some of the press 
reports implied.  
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Figure 6 this photograph is a section from a larger image showing Evans building a sledge102. 
Frank Debenham, the co-founder and first director of the Scott Polar Research Institute, was 
a member of Scott’s last expedition and claimed Evans was, “the most useful man down 
here.”103 
 
It was when Evans was blamed that the press became selective and ignored 
evidence that proved Evans could be self-disciplined. Figure 6, above, is of major 
significance for it shows Evans’ skill. Evans was not a trained carpenter, yet 
along with his fellow Petty Officers he made all of the sledges, showing his 
capacity for learning and engineering. This has implications for a man of skill and 
master of a craft shows a presence of self-discipline, control of mind and body. 
Yet this photo was not chosen by the press to represent Evans. Perhaps a display 
of a hard working, adaptable and skilled mariner was not the image the press 
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wanted to project once conventions had been established. On the other hand, it 
may simply be that this image was not available to the press. That though is 
extremely unlikely as, from 21 May 1913 the photographs taken by the five at the 
South Pole were available, with The Daily Mirror having exclusive rights to show 
the photographs first. If the last photographs of the Pole Party were accessible 
from that date it can be assumed that from 21 May at the very latest, all the 
photographs of Evans taken prior to the Pole would have also been available to 
the press. In fact the image chosen to represent Evans in that particular issue 
was an image that highlighted his strength, not his self-discipline. The 
photograph used can be seen in figure 7 below.  
 
Figure 7 Edgar Evans poses with a pickaxe slung over his shoulder. Underneath the portrait 
the captain in the Daily Mirror read, “Petty Officer Evans, ‘the strong man of the party,’ who 
was the first to die. ‘He died a natural death, but left us a shaken party with the season duly 
advanced’ wrote Captain Scott.”104 
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Interestingly The Daily Chronicle on 13 February 1913, printed an article 
claiming, “Evans accompanied Captain Scott on his first attempt to reach the 
Pole ten years ago, and the leader then praised him highly. There is no word of 
commendation for him on this occasion.”105 One cannot help but wonder if the 
press did actually probe, or, just accepted the evidence at face value. The only 
official account they were given was through Commander Evans and this included 
Scott’s ‘message’ and a report of the disaster, Commander Evans was 
interviewed in April 1913, but during this interview declared that Evans had 
behaved, “magnificently throughout the expedition”106. However, during this 
interview Commander Evans also cast judgement over Evans. The Birmingham 
Gazette explains, Commander Edward Evans was “told of some of the rumours 
which were circulated regarding the fate of Seaman Evans… Poor Evans behaved 
magnificently throughout the expedition he said and his astonishing failure, as 
Captain Scott described it, was due to the continuous hardships encountered. 
Evans was possessed of tremendous strength, but it would seem that his staying 
power was not equal to that of his tent-mates.”107  
 
The comment from Lieutenant Evans, accusing Evans as lacking ‘staying power’ is 
not a technical or medical explanation for Evans ‘failure’. It is an accusation 
based upon contemporary popular language that infers and implies rather than 
offering a definite and constructive explanation. Paul Fussell’s, The Great War 
and Modern Memory, (2000) investigates the adaptation of words to hide a 
greater meaning.  “Not to complain is to be - manly” “actions are – deeds” “to 
be cheerfully brave is to be – plucky” “to be earnestly brave is to be – 
gallant”108. The language used in Great War was, “the language is that which 
two generations of readers had been accustomed to associate with the quiet 
action of personal control and Christian self-abnegation (‘sacrifice’), as well as 
with more violent actions of aggression and defence.”109 The language used 
defined and identified several generations, and it was this language that was 
prominent in the projections of the exploits of the expedition. By questioning 
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Evans’ ‘staying power’, it implies Evans had a lack of mental strength and thus a 
lack of self-control. Additionally Commander Evans’ comments show that even 
Edgar Evans’ fellow travellers viewed him in a differing light to the rest of the 
Antarctic five, a point I will further examine in chapter 2.  
 
Major Raymond. E. Priestley, who was part of Scott’s 1910-13 expedition, 
declared in his paper ‘The Psychology of exploration’ in the section ‘polar 
madness’ that “one factor worth mentioning is that it appears to be the most 
unelastic temperaments and minds that succumb. The higher strung and more 
sensitive the organisation the better it will withstand extraordinary strain.”110 
However, Debenham, who often quoted Evans in his diary, states that Evans had 
said “a man who takes things as they come and doesn’t worry can enjoy the Navy 
as he does.”111 He clearly did not posses an ‘unelastic temperament’. 
Additionally, although Priestley’s statement is based upon his opinions and 
observations in the Antarctic, Priestley would not have spent very much time at 
all with Evans. Priestley was not part of any of the geological party’s that were 
accompanied by Evans, and Priestley spent nine months with the Northern Party, 
whilst Evans was on the Southern Journey. It was reported by the press that P.O 
George Abbott, a member of the Northern Party suffered a mental breakdown112, 
so it is likely Priestley’s comments were written in reference to Abbott and not 
Evans.  
 
Evans’ physicality and popular opinion 
The ‘message to the public’ had essentially set the standard for criticising Evans, 
it also had a major contribution in the construction of Evans’ image for it put 
forward the notion that Evans’ strength was his key, and defining trait. In 
consequence, the vast majority of press reports from 11 February 1913 refer to 
Evans as ‘the strong man of the party’. For example, The Illustrated London 
News declares Evans as, ‘the strong man of Captain Scott‘s Southern party whose 
accident was the beginning of the disaster.”113 The Daily Sketch calls Evans, “the 
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strongest who died first”114 The Morning Post; “the strong man…whose 
unaccountable breakdown was the first symptom”115. One article from The Daily 
Mirror, 12 February 1913 entitled “The Strong Man Who Fell”, proclaims,  “It is 
one of the paradoxes of Nature a London physician stated yesterday, “that 
splendidly developed, huge-framed stand adverse conditions, such as extreme 
cold, starvation, or prolonged thirst, much worse than smaller men of infinitely 
inferior physique. That it is a fact, however has been proven again and again in 
wars, where the little, more or less scrawny, underdeveloped men stand the 
rigours and hardships of a campaign much better than their so called stronger 
fellows.”116 
 
These are clearly attacks on Evans, stemming from his physique, which here has 
been rendered unsuitable for exploration. To be pronounced as a ‘paradox of 
nature’, or be put forward as having had an ‘unaccountable breakdown’ is 
obviously not a representation of an ideal. The Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch 
were newspapers aimed towards the lower classes, inferring that it was not 
solely an attack on Evans’ class, for it is unlikely a newspaper whose audience 
was generally made up of the working classes117 would attack those of a similar 
socio-financial state. This then questions the claim that Evans’ class can function 
as an unproblematic explanation for the derogatory comments put forward by 
the press. The quote also shows that the press had again sought out a ‘physician’ 
to put forward opinions on Evans’ failure, showing the willingness of the press to 
find an official to authenticate, and not disprove, Scott’s ‘message’. Evans was 
yet again officially labelled unsuitable for exploration. 
 
However, one must question the reliability of the evidence of the ‘experts’ who 
were asked by the press to comment upon the photographs of Evans and give 
reasons for Evans’ ‘failure’. This is because from 11 February until 13 February 
the photographs used in most newspapers of Petty Officer Evans were actually 
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that of Petty Officer Johnson118.   Although no scholars or biographers have 
brought up this issue before, there is affirmative evidence that the photographs 
do not match. Underneath a small portrait Edgar Evans in The Daily Sketch, an 
article states that the portrait “sent out by a photographic agency as that of 
Evans, and published in the Daily Sketch and other newspapers, was in reality a 
picture of Petty Officer Johnson, another member of the expedition, who is alive 
and well.’119 This raises doubts over the evidence of ‘experts’ such as the 
‘London physician’ who declared, “Seaman Evans, from his photograph, must 
have been a tremendously powerful man as far as bone and muscle are 
concerned.”120 Although it is common consensus that Evans was a strong man, if 
the experts’ sole interpretation of Evans’ was based upon one photograph of the 
wrong man, it does suggest that some of their inferences may be erroneous. 
 
This case of mistaken identity could have been due to the fact that Henry 
Robertson Bowers stated in a letter to his sister, that Johnson was “the strongest 
seaman”121.  And so in trying to find photos of Evans, the photographic agency 
simply saw the photograph and assumed it was Evans, who, after all was well 
recorded by Scott and every paper in the nation as the ‘strong man’.  Though 
perhaps it is most likely it was simply mislabelled in the first place, for 
underneath one photograph in The Daily Mirror in May 1910, Evans was labelled 
as Johnson, and Johnson as Evans122. To add insult to injury, Bowers also states, 
“we also got rid of our strongest seaman Johnson who exchanged with a man on 
the ‘Powerful.’ He was the champion Boxer man and had begun to threaten and 
bully his mess-mates”123. So, not only was the wrong photograph used, it was 
also a photograph of a man who had been removed from his position for bullying 
his fellows.  
 
Mark Jackson’s research has shown that during the Victorian and Edwardian 
period in the medical, anthropological and educational field, links between mind 
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and body were, “neither novel or isolated.”124 In consequence this infers that the 
theories put forward about the failure of the ‘strongest man’ were actually 
comments about his mental state. However, these links between mind and body 
were affected by fears of degeneration and fears of “imperial decline.”125 So the 
links were caused by insecurities. Additionally some press reports distinguish 
between the two; mind and body were seen as separate. For example The Daily 
Express and The South Wales Echo, ran the same article, “Did Seaman Evans the 
cheery giant of the party fail physically or mentally?”126 So it appears that when 
Evans was presented as failing physically this was not necessarily an assault on 
his mental state.  
 
Because of the limited probing by the press that hid or ignored the image of 
Evans as a man of skill, Evans was presented as being defined by his physicality. 
Therefore the loss of Evans’ strength could also be seen as a loss of his masculine 
identity. It appears that Evans did also view his physical stature as part of his 
masculine identity. For although Colville states, “uniform was of crucial 
significance in defining the understandings of class and masculinity held by 
servicemen.”127 Apsley Cherry-Garrard has recalled that, “[Captain] Oates hated 
swank – so much so that he erred on the other side almost perversely, and was 
rough and ready to the last degree. Taff [Edgar] Evans nearly had a fight with a 
sailor on the quay at Dunedin, because they spoke disrespectfully of Oates 
slovenly dress and slouching gait.”128 Taking Judith Butler’s theory that gender is 
performed, that “stylisation of the body, is a set of repeated acts within a highly 
regulatory framework”129, Oates was clearly pushing the limits of the gender 
identity of a man of the landed gentry. Or, perhaps Oates harboured a resistance 
to the effeminacy associated with the gentleman travellers.  Cherry-Garrard’s 
recollection also shows the framework of manliness Evans worked within, 
attempting to defend Oates’ honour with a physical brawl. Implying Evans 
viewed his physical stature as part of his masculine identity.  
                                                 
124
 M. Jackson, The Borderline of Imbecility, p.36 
125
 M. Jackson, The Borderline of Imbecility, p.37 
126
 Daily Express, 12 February, South Wales Echo, 12 February 1912, from S. Barczewski, Antarctic 
Destinies, p.176, 
127
 Q. Colville, ‘Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer’ p.106 
128
 Copy of typewritten page bound after p228 into the Very Rev. George Seaver’s personal copy of Cherry-
Garrard’s The Worst Journey in the World’. MS 1012;D 
129
 J. Butler, Gender Trouble, p.43 
 38 
 
 
 
Figure 8 (This a section from a larger photograph)130 Oates can be seen here ‘slouching’ on 
the side ship whilst Lieutenant Rennick leads one of the ponies out.  
 
There has though been little scholarly research on lower class occupation defined 
masculinity, as J.D Glasco proclaims, “little research has been done to examine 
the seamen’s definitions of their masculine identities”131. Although Glasco’s 
observations that, “in the seaman’s world, a man’s position in the gendered 
hierarchy, his manliness, depended primarily on his maritime skill”132, were 
based upon the mutinies of 1793. If masculinity was occupation defined, it is 
possible the late nineteenth and twentieth century mariners would have 
maintained the view. Seeing that Evans was proclaimed as the “most useful man 
                                                 
130
 The entire photograph can be seen in the appendix. 
131
 J.D Glasco, ‘The Seaman feels Him-self a man’, p.41/42 
132
 J. Glasco, ‘The Seaman feels Him-Self a man’, p.46 
 39 
we have down here”133, his maritime skill level was high, and expectably so from 
a Petty Officer 1st class. This would imply that he was respected for his abilities, 
and as such there were no doubts about his manliness. Confirming the theory 
that it was only the press, set-up by Scott’s ‘message’, who questioned Evans’ 
manliness, whilst greatly ignoring, or not looking for, any contradictory 
evidence. 
 
One wonders if the projection of the failure of the ‘strong man’ was a means of 
reclaiming a sense of masculinity for the upper classes. However, physical 
strength was also a trait the upper classes strived to achieve during this period, 
since the movement Muscular Christianity came into prominence. Muscular 
Christianity emphasised strength of body not just the strength of mind. It was a 
belief sported by those of the upper classes for it was prominent in the public 
schools during this time. This implies that the ‘failure’ of a strong man would not 
necessarily be an attack on his social standing.  
 
However, it should be acknowledged that the emphasis on Evans’ physicality in 
his representation was also a product of a tradition of viewing sailors as strong 
men. It was a state of his occupation not his socio-financial status. The image of 
the tough Jack Tar had been present for centuries, for example Fulford states of 
the eighteenth century sailors, “British sailors, like British ships, exemplified the 
national virtue of oaklike strength.”134 This can be complemented by Thirgood’s 
research into oak, he has shown that the ‘hearts of oak’ traditional view of 
sailors is a link to the qualities of oak itself, for oak was a metaphor for strength, 
“the open-grown character of English oak contributed to the vaunted superiority 
of the ‘hearts of oak’, used in British men-of-war. Throughout the wooden ship 
era, English oak was strongly held to be more durable than French or Baltic 
(largely German) oak.”135 The muscular seaman was a national stereotype, and 
Evans needed no adaptation to fit the bill.  
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A hero within the Antarctic Five 
One wonders if Evans’ presentation goes further than not being a hero, if it 
descends into anti-hero, if he did essentially become a Judas-type-figure. 
However, Evans is not presented as wanting to cause the deaths of his comrades, 
it was not a calculated move, and as such he was more of a failed hero than an 
anti-hero. Additionally, Evans was still presented as a hero by some of the press 
reports when he was presented as part of the Antarctic five. 
 
As part of the group, Evans was frequently offered as a hero. For example, The 
Daily Mirror had a centrefold photograph and above it the headline read, “5 
heroes at the pole” 136. The Standard proclaimed, “Britain may well be proud of 
these sons of hers who are the latest to add their names to the long roll of 
heroes and the martyrs of Polar Exploration.”137 The Daily Graphic, “The strong 
man of Scott’s band of heroes”138. The Daily Telegraph, “The heroes of the South 
Pole”139, The Little Paper, “How five heroes left the world”140 Evans could be 
seen as a hero when the press wanted to present the men as one entity. 
However, as an individual Evans was rarely presented in the same light as his 
comrades. 
  
It is possible that when Evans was presented as a hero, this was a measure to 
protect the image of the strength of the nation. Evans’ presentation by Scott and 
the articles that accepted Scott’s views on Evans’ role in the disaster, 
contradicted the stereotypical image of early twentieth century Royal Navy 
sailors. These were used to show the strength of the nation, and were presented 
as “exemplars of Britishness and manliness”141. Therefore, if sailors within the 
Royal Navy were viewed as the ultimate of masculinity, by presenting Evans as 
failing, either physically, and or, mentally this was not a representation of the 
model of a sailor that had been sold to the population. This could imply that not 
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all articles were derogatory, for if sailors represented imperial power, a failing 
sailor was potentially a failing nation.  
 
Conclusion 
Evans’ legacy was vulnerable having come under attack in Scott’s ‘message’.  
The press took up Scott’s claims resulting in a portrayal that questioned Evans’ 
mental stability and physicality. The inadequacy of the press to offer Evans as a 
man of skill should not be viewed as a genuine reflection of Evans’ character and 
image. Historians should judge it as editorial bias. This resulted in Evans 
becoming, “the strongest man whom we least expected to fail.”142  
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Chapter 2 
“It was the act of a brave man and an English gentleman”143- the heroic ideal. 
 
Oates and Evans were the only two out of the five who did not die alongside 
their leader and both slowed the party down. By comparing the presentation of 
Evans’ death with that of Oates’, this chapter will build upon the theory that 
Evans’ class was not the only factor involved in his presentation. I contend that 
just as Scott had a key role in Evans’ subsequent presentation, he also had a 
critical a role in Oates’ heroic status, whilst the manner of Oates’ and Evans’ 
deaths had a major impact on the ability of the press to establish their 
reputations. Using the accounts of their fellow travellers, and the press reports I 
assert that Oates’ death was seen as the model upon which to base reports of 
other deaths. Additionally, it will be clear that the manner of Scott’s, Wilson’s, 
Bowers’ and Oates’ death all fitted within an already established heroic ideal. 
 
According to Lisa Bloom, “in the years following Scott’s death a myth of 
gentleman-hero was erected on the foundation of the letters Scott wrote to 
explain the causes of his expedition’s misfortunes.”144 This statement of Bloom’s 
is misleading as it suggests that the gentleman-hero’s foundation began with 
Scott, when in fact the gentleman hero had been presented and promoted in the 
Victorian period145.  Additionally, Bloom asserts Scott’s last letters caused him to 
be seen as a gentleman-hero. Contemporary press reports reveal however that it 
was not Scott, but Captain Oates who was presented as the gentleman-hero. He 
was an old Etonian and Cavalry officer who had earned the nickname “No 
Surrender Oates whilst fighting in the second Boer war.”146 If Scott took the 
initial plaudits when the news was widely published on 10 February 1913, Oates 
was the figure who soon overtook him. For example The Daily Chronicle 
proclaimed, ‘THE HERO OATES’147, Everybody’s Weekly proclaimed Oates as the, 
                                                 
143
 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.410 
144
 L. Bloom, Gender on Ice, p.112. 
145
 See C.I. Hamilton ‘Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’  
146
 M. Smith, I am Just Going Outside, p.62 
147
 The Daily Chronicle, 13 February, 1913 
 43 
“MOST HEROIC ENGLISHMAN EVER”148. Whilst The Daily Mail 12 February 1913, 
declared, “if there was a contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his 
comrades, Captain Scott, Dr Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers. The final honour lies 
with Captain Oates.”149 Oates was offered as the quintessential hero, not just 
the gentleman hero.  
 
As the previous chapter has shown, those accusations of Evans failing put forward 
by the press, were initiated by the damning criticism from his leader. Yet Oates 
was also criticised in Scott’s ‘message’, and slowed down the party. Therefore I 
will re-visit the same question proposed by Barczewski, “Why has Oates never 
come in for the same criticism as Evans? Why was his ‘breakdown’ not regarded 
as an indication of weakness or failure in the same way?”150 Barczewski’s 
response is, “the answer is obvious: Oates was an officer and a gentleman, a 
member of the landed gentry from Essex. Because of his class status, he was 
regarded as a hero for his silent suffering and self-sacrifice. What he did was to 
‘play up, play up and play the game’ according to the expectations of the time 
for a man of his rank.”151 
 
It is understandable why there are those who claim that class was the major 
difference in Oates’ and Evans’ projections, for there were instances when their 
socio-economic status did enter their presentation. For example, an article in 
The Pall Mall Gazette, from 11 February 1913, states, “Captain L.E.G. Oates was 
the elder son of the late Mr W.E. Oates, of Gestingthorpe Hall, Essex, Lord of the 
manor of Over Hall, and of Mrs Caroline Oates, now lady of the manor of Over 
Hall, second daughter of the late Mr Joshua Buckton of West Lea, Meanswood 
near Leeds. In addition to being heir to his mother’s estates, Captain Oates was 
joint owner with his brother, of the estate of his uncle, the late Mr C.G. Oates, 
of Meanswood, Yorkshire. He was unmarried as was Lieutenant Bowers. Petty 
Officer Evans was a married man.”152 
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Evidently being a member of the landed gentry was of more importance to The 
Pall Mall Gazette than the dependents left by the Petty Officer. There were 
though no accusations about Evans possessing ‘bad blood’, or his socio-financial 
status rendering him unfit for exploration. Also, the article cited above, was 
printed on 11 February, thus before the widespread accusations of Evans had 
begun, the emphasis of this magazine was already on Oates. However, The Pall 
Mall Gazette was aimed towards the upper classes of society, being priced at 
double the cost of The Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch. Thus the attention was 
with Oates and interest was directed towards his estate, it is also possible that 
some of the readers knew of Oates’ family and estate. 
 
However, there are problems with Barczewski’s interpretation of events. Firstly, 
I do not believe that coming from Essex had anything to do with Oates’ 
representation. Additionally as Barczewski had questioned Jones for not 
appreciating the significance of the criticism of Evans153, Barczewski herself 
could have gone further by looking beyond class which is too sweeping, and 
suggests that no other factors were involved.  The answer to the question 
Barczewski proposed concerning the difference in presentation between Oates 
and Evans is three-fold. Firstly, Scott did not perceive Oates’ as having as 
significant a role in the disaster as Evans, nor did Scott believe Evans’ rank was a 
cause of his ‘failure’. Secondly, the manner of Oates and Evans’ deaths as 
offered in Scott’s assessment, allowed their deaths to be seen as, and presented 
contrastingly by his fellow travellers and the press. And lastly, Evans’ death did 
not fit within an already established heroic framework.  
 
Scott’s ‘message’ 
Scott did not put forward Oates as having as significant a factor in their fate as 
he had done with Evans. Scott states, “we should have got through in spite of the 
weather were it not for the sickening of another companion, Captain Oates, and 
a shortage of fuel in our depots.”154There was clearly a difference in the way 
Oates and Evans were treated; Oates’ decline was not called an “astonishing 
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failure”155. In addition to Scott’s ‘message’, Lieutenant Evans had also sent to 
the press agencies Scott’s comments from the 17 March concerning Oates’ self-
sacrifice, Scott’s comments included, “it was an act of a brave man and English 
gentleman”156.  Thus from the very beginning of the presentation of their 
images, there was the impression that because of the manner of Oates’ death, 
Oates deserved greater acclaim than Evans. The leader that had damned Evans 
had helped to establish Oates’ heroic image. As with Evans’ demise, there was a 
clear enthusiasm by the press to accept and promote Scott’s view of Oates’ 
demise, with limited probing.   
 
In Scott’s ‘message’, the fact that Scott does not mention the rank of Evans, who 
is referred to as “Edgar Evans” implies that Scott did not deem Evans’ class as an 
explicit factor that contributed to his fate. Yet when the ‘message’ was printed, 
newspapers such as, The Daily Mirror, Daily Sketch and Daily Graphic, Evans’ 
rank was given, though it was incorrect; he is called “Seaman Evans”157 and not 
Petty Officer, his proper rank.158  Commander Evans could have added ‘Seaman’ 
when he cabled the message, or the Central News Agency could have added it in. 
It is generally claimed that Scott’s ‘message’ along with Scott’s account of 
Oates’ death were the only sections of Scott’s diary “quoted verbatim”159 in the 
report Edward Evans sent back to the Central News Agency, this statement is 
thus erroneous.  
 
The demise of Oates and Evans, the opinions of their fellow travellers 
It was not just the press and Scott that presented Oates’ death as more heroic 
than Evans’. Evans and Oates’ fellow travellers had the same opinion, although 
their judgements, like the newspaper articles, were based upon Scott’s account. 
One can see the effect that Scott’s words had on the individual’s perception of 
the events. Petty Officer Patrick Keohane, a member of the supporting Southern 
Party who turned back from the Pole, with Apsley Cherry-Garrard, Charles 
Wright and Edward Atkinson, declared: 
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“[Scott’s] Diary said that Evans P.O Died at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier he 
died of concussion of the brain caused by a fall on blue ice and Captain Oats 
[Oates] had hands and feet frostbitten and could not keep up he new he was 
preventing his companions from getting on so he walked out to his death in a 
blizzard about 18miles south of where we found the tent so as to give his 
companions a chance to get home it was one of the bravest deeds ever history 
has known”160. 
 
 
Figure 9 Petty Officer Patrick Keohane poses for Ponting. Keohane had previously served 
under Lieutenant Evans on HMS Talbot, along with P.O Forde, Dickason and Browning, all of 
whom went on this expedition. 
 
Similarly, Petty Officer Thomas Williamson, who had also been part of Scott’s 
first expedition, declared: 
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“Evans P.O.1. died at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier. Capt Oates 20 miles 
south of this place, this brave fellow sacrificing his life by walking out of the tent 
in a heavy blizzard so that he could no longer be a drag on the remainder of the 
party, he had become badly frost-bitten in both feet and they had been pulling 
him along on the sledge; as the party got down on the Barrier from the 
Beardmore Glacier they experienced very low temperatures…. The whole world 
will soon know, the deeds that were done were equally as great as any 
committed on Battlefields and have won the respect of honour of every true 
Britisher.”161 
 
Figure 10 Thomas Williamson sits smoking his pipe. Williamson wrote four journals of his 
daily exploits from both the Discovery and the Terra Nova Expeditions. He often ends the 
day’s comments with the words ‘alls well’, even the day when one of dogs got loose and 
killed the Boatswain’s cat. 
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The extracts show Oates’ death as a model; he is no longer a drag and commits 
an act of self-sacrifice. However Evans’ demise was not viewed or presented as 
an example of any of those traits.  The critical factor appears to be that Oates 
made a conscious decision whereas Evans did not. It was an act, a calculated 
move, versus a mental and physical breakdown.  A breakdown is not a decision, 
and in the context of early twentieth century beliefs, Evans’ death showed a lack 
of self-discipline and self-control.   
 
Max Jones, George Mosse and Elaine Showalter all declare that suffering without 
complaint was the basis for early twentieth century codes of masculinity.162  
Although masculinity is much more complex than the statement implies, it is 
apparent that other nations were aware that self-control was distinguished as a 
trait ‘Britishers’ predominantly admired. For in an article headed ‘Un 
Gentleman’ the French newspaper the Temps states, “His [Oates’] self-sacrifice 
bears the mark of that absolute self-control which an Englishman prizes above all 
else in the world. When the question is asked, what is the true gentleman? Our 
neighbours will have no need to search their history, or Shakespeare. It will 
suffice to reply that he is the man who behaves like Oates.”163 Additionally, self-
control was clearly admired throughout the social scale as Williamson and 
Keohane’s records demonstrate.   
 
Essentially the model of bodily comportment represented by Oates was deemed 
heroic. For as Valentine says, “a hegemonic masculine style of bodily 
comportment is about having the freedom to move freely in space and to 
appropriate it both through physical displays of competence and force”164. Oates’ 
movement was restricted whilst man hauling, it was when Oates walked to his 
death, free from the sledge, that he became a representation of the ‘masculine 
style of bodily comportment’, and could be presented as showing the masculine 
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and heroic ideal. The sledge holds back Oates, and yet it is also a show of 
manliness, using bodily force to conquer space.  
 
Thomas Williamson’s record has added significance, for he states that Oates had 
to be carried on the sledge. He makes no mention that Evans had to be carried 
on the sledge, which was one of the original accusations the press aimed at 
Evans. Yet none of the newspapers ever claimed that Oates had to carried, when 
one would have thought that if Williamson made that inference, others would 
have done so too. One reason that would explain why the press did not lay at 
accusation at Oates is that from 11 February the press had Scott’s presentation 
of Oates as a hero. And as presented in the first chapter, there was a willingness 
to eagerly accept Scott’s claims. For although articles do confirm Oates slowed 
down the party, his death on its own was deemed heroic enough to effectively 
dismiss the slowing down he had caused.  For example, The Daily Graphic 
declares, “Captain Scott himself says that but for the sickness of Seaman Evans 
and Captain Oates the party would have reached safety”. One would be forgiven 
for thinking that this newspaper regarded Oates and Evans in a similar light. 
However, on the front-page of the Graphic, in the same issue as the above 
quote, there was a full-page portrait of Oates under the heading “a very gallant 
gentleman”165. Oates’ slowing down the party was thus not promoted as readily 
as the fact he had behaved so gallantly.  
 
Those of officer status had similar views to those of the lower ranks. Physicist 
Charles Wright stated, “Found the Owner [Scott], Bill [Wilson] and Birdie 
[Bowers] in the tent. Evans went mentally first then physically at foot of 
Glacier… Titus got a bad frostbitten foot but struggled on till Mar 17. Knowing he 
had no hope & realizing that he was a drag on the party, he walked out into a 
blizzard… A damn fine finish.”166 Whilst Debenham, the man who had written so 
favourably of Evans, declared, “Taff Evans – already a little weak – had a bad fall 
and got concussion. He delayed the party and they were late for each depot. At 
the bottom of the glacier he failed and died before they reached the depot… 
Soldier failed next. He knew he was delaying them and in one blizzard walked 
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out and away and he was never seen again. He did it intentionally to save his 
comrades – a fitting death for a real hero.”167  
 
It is not known if Debenham’s comments were affected by the claims that Evans 
had been “rather disappointing in the winter being given to hectoring amongst 
his mates”168 and whether this had altered his previous opinion. Though it is 
plain to see that Oates’ death was presented as a deliberate act of heroic self-
sacrifice, whilst Evans represented a burden, a man who lacked the moral 
decisiveness and selflessness to save his comrades. The approval and awe shown 
for Oates by his fellow travellers can be seen at the very start of his image 
construction. The high regard bestowed on to Oates’ deed by his fellow-
travellers indicates that the press would not have to perform any adaptation on 
Oates’ image to offer him as a hero, they just had to use and promote Scott’s 
comments.  
 
Heroic models 
Scott’s comments on Oates’ death, “it was the act of a brave man and English 
gentlemen”, is effectively presenting Oates’ self-sacrifice as one moment that 
defined his entire life and future legacy, judging one deed as a representative of 
an entire existence. This has clear links to Geoffrey Cubitt’s theory that heroism 
can be constructed when, ‘the essential message to be derived from a life is 
encapsulated in a particularly dramatic moment.”169 Cubitt points to the heroics 
of Grace Darling and Brutus’ decision to order the death of his sons as primary 
examples.170 Oates’ death can be viewed in the same vein, one dramatic moment 
that defined his life and legacy though perhaps it is best seen as one dramatic 
image that will forever define the moment. 
 
Neither the press nor Scott presented Evans as having a dramatic heroic moment. 
Additionally Oates’ death fitted within the ideals of heroism being advocated at 
this time, for self-sacrifice was seen as a heroic ideal. It has been suggested by 
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MacDonald that self-sacrifice was seen purely as a gentlemanly deed171, but it is 
worth considering other texts. In Ireland in 1913, Patrick Pearse, Joseph Plunkett 
and Thomas MacDonagh were all advocating self-sacrifice. Additionally self-
sacrifice is one of the key factors in the understanding of the objectives for Irish 
uprising, the Easter Rising of 1916. The suffragettes in England too viewed self-
sacrifice as the ultimate act of heroism, for Emily Davidson threw herself in front 
of a horse in 1913. This challenges the claim that self-sacrifice was purely 
viewed as a gentlemanly action; it was a heroic model that was not dependent 
on, or could descend class or gender.  One must remember that suicide at this 
time was illegal, so there was a fine line between self-sacrifice and suicide. 
Suicide was essentially seen as the easy and prohibited way out, self-sacrifice 
was death for the benefit of the lives of others it was a calculated decision.  
 
Although Scott, Wilson and Bowers did not have a unique single dramatic 
moment at the end, their deaths were still in keeping with a heroic model. A 
year before the news of Scott’s disaster reached England the sinking of the 
Titanic was a leading story and the presentation of acts of heroism link the two 
events. J.E Geller’s research into the titanic disaster has uncovered that 54% of 
third class passenger children were lost, compared to 1% of the 1st Class 
passenger children and 0% of the 2nd class passengers.172 This is a scandalous 
statistic, but in Return to Camelot Mark Girouard assesses the public reaction 
and distortion of facts declaring, “the redeeming feature of the [titanic] disaster 
it was generally agreed, was the chivalry shown by the men, both passengers and 
crew.”173 It was promoted that, “all gentlemen knew that they must be brave, 
show no sign of panic or cowardice… be loyal to their comrades and meet death 
without flinching”174 Here Girouard writes in reference to the Titanic disaster, 
but, the same principles were praised for Oates, Scott, Wilson and Bowers. The 
fact that Evans’ death did not fit in within an already established heroic ideal, 
shows a further reason why there was resistance to promoting Evans as a heroic 
individual.  
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One wonders if ‘meeting death without flinching’, redeemed the titanic disaster 
in the eyes of the working classes. If it did not, it would suggest that the working 
classes would not have viewed the deaths of the Antarctic five as being heroic, 
particularly Oates, Scott, Bowers and Wilson. However, Barczewski’s research 
has discovered that Louis Heren, [an East ’ender] recalled his childhood opinions 
of the expedition, “I did not much like Scott and most of his brother officers and 
gentlemen after reading the socially superior explanation of Petty Officer Evans 
collapse, but ironically admired Captain Oates. He especially provided an aura of 
high endeavour, gallantry and tragedy to what was a splendid ship and 
quarters.”175 Clearly for some of the working classes they saw class as the core 
component to explain Evans’ presentation, yet still admired Oates. However, it 
is unknown if it was his act and decision, or, his social standing that was the 
cause of Oates’ admiration. Additionally, this is one man’s recollection, and thus 
may be the popular working-class consensus.     
 
The manner of Evans’ death aided the ability of the press to present his 
comrades in a heroic manner, for several articles present Scott, Wilson and 
Bowers as committing acts of self-sacrifice.  The Daily Mirror printed an 
interview with a Mr. J. Foster Stackhouse, Scott’s secretary in 1910 during 
Scott’s tour to raise funds for the expedition. Stackhouse declared, “I am sure 
that if he had not felt bound to stand by that poor fellow Evans after he became 
helpless he would be alive today.”176 Scott here is shown as sacrificing his life 
and by implication his companions’ lives for the sake of Evans. Similarly, The 
Times states, “When seaman EVANS became incapacitated the others knew full 
well that his breakdown was endangering the safety of them all. Yet stood by 
him till death released him from his sufferings.”177 Likewise, The Daily Mirror, 
“they stood by him till the last, thereby certainly imperilling their lives”178 
Evans’ un-heroic demise essentially aided the ability of the mediators to present 
Evans’ comrades as heroic individuals. Additionally projections such as these, 
with Evans effectively causing the death of his companions, limited the 
likelihood of his achieving a heroic status in the same league as his companions, 
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consequently lessening the likelihood of a “collective emotional investment”179 
towards Evans.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Captain ‘Titus’ Oates posses for Herbert Ponting. 
 
Traits of heroism 
Character traits were not integral to the creation of a heroic image, for the press 
attributed the same character traits; a ‘great raconteur’ and ‘man of few words’ 
on both Evans and Oates. One newspaper declared, “Captain Oates was one of 
the most popular men of the expedition. He was witty and a gifted raconteur.”180 
Whilst Ponting commented to the press that, “Evans is a great raconteur…I 
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venture to say he will spin many a good yarn on the long, arduous journey as he 
smokes his pipe in the tent”181. Evans was also described as a, “Man of few 
words” in The Sphere 24 May 1913182, as was Oates in The Times183. Evans was 
certainly was not a man of few words, Frank Debenhams’s diary shows he was 
constantly telling stories, and putting forward his opinions, such as why “90% of 
the men in the Navy would leave if they could”184, exploits from his school 
days185, how to propose186 and how to tie different knots187. This shows there 
were certain attributes the newspapers liked to bestow, and as the traits were 
used to describe Oates, were seen as virtuous. It also shows that those particular 
traits were not class-defined, nor did they define heroism, they were just 
admirable traits at the time.  
 
There was a precedent for promoting the last words of those deemed to be 
heroes. Captain Oates’ last words, and the last written words of Captain Scott 
were heavily publicised, as were Henry Lawrence’s last words, ‘No Surrender’, 
along with the epitaph he himself composed, “Here lies Henry Lawrence, who 
tried to do his duty”188. This leads one to believe that last words were a trope for 
the upper classes. However, as Alice Ayres, a “general assistant and 
nursemaid”189, who died having saved the lives of three of her nieces and 
nephews in a house fire, had her last words recorded, the notion of class 
distinction is debateable. Ayres’ supposed last words were reported as being, “I 
tried my best and could try no more.”190 If these were her last words it is 
understandable why these were promoted, it is fitting with the ideal that the 
upper and middling classes hoped the lower class would adhere to, self-
improvement and doing one’s best. It is not recorded what Evans’ last words 
were, and this lack of last words may have affected the ability of the press to 
                                                 
181
 The Daily Mirror, 12 February 1913,   
182
 The Sphere, 24 May 1913, MS 1453/39/2 
183
 The Times, 13 February 1913, MS 1453/39/2 
184
 F. Debenham, Diary, 10 February 1911, MS 1654; D 
185
 ibid, 31 January 1911 
186
 ibid, 14 February 1911 
187
 ibid, 20 February 1911 
188
 J. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’ p.118 
189
 J. Price, ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’: the Watts Memorial for Heroic Self Sacrifice,’ p. 265 
190
 J. Price, ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’ p.268 
 55 
construct him into a hero. However, last words could have been made-up191. 
There was a precedent for adaptation to enhance heroic reputations.  
Horace Waller, editor of Livingstone’s diaries, “carefully, selected from the 
journals and in some instances almost rewrote them”192.   
 
It should be acknowledged that the manner of death and the cause of death are 
two separate factors. Two of the men projected as heroes of imperial Britain, 
David Livingstone and Henry Havelock, had un-heroic causes of death. Sir Henry 
Havelock died from dysentery, whilst Livingstone died of dysentery and malaria. 
Yet the manners of Havelock and Livingstone’s deaths were still projected as 
heroic. Even though Mackenzie suggests that the image of Livingstone kneeling at 
prayer was also greatly inferred by Waller193, that image of Livingstone was the 
one readily accepted and promoted. Whilst Havelock was presenting as dying “at 
his most glorious moment after a relief of Lucknow.”194 This suggests that the 
cause of Evans’ death, whether brain haemorrhage, scurvy or starvation, was not 
as important as the manner of it. Similarly the press reports did not emphasise 
that Oates would have frozen to death, they reported that Oates walked out to 
his death.195 Oates’ death was not seen as heroic because of the cause of his 
demise just as Evans was not seen as un-heroic because of the cause of his 
demise. Therefore the cause of death was clearly not a cornerstone to the 
construction of a heroic status.  
  
It is possible that as Evans was Welsh, his nationality played a part in his 
presentation, that the press wanted to emphasis the role of the Englishmen. 
However, there were three different nationalities present as Bowers was from 
Scotland, and Scott, Wilson and Oates were from England. This would limit the 
likelihood of attacking Evans because of his place of birth. I have not found any 
evidence of comments surrounding his nationality causing his breakdown, unlike 
the comments about his education and physicality as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. It was also a time in history when there was no trouble with Anglo-
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Welsh relations. The domestic troubles within the UK at his time were in Ireland, 
with talk of uprising with claims that “nationhood is not achieved otherwise than 
in arms”196. 
 
It has been suggested that the Victorian and Edwardian men who were presented 
and raised as mythic heroes were displays of national strength, legitimising 
imperialism197. These men represented the greatness of the empire, men such as 
Livingstone and General Gordon. Although Jones has argued that Scott and his 
companions were not used as heroes of the empire198, the Antarctic five were 
used to present the strength of national character, which does infer they were 
representations of the strength of the nation, which has clear links to 
imperialism. The Daily Mail pronounced, “The story of Captain Scott’s last 
expedition is an epic worthy of the British race”199 The Daily Sketch published 
Douglas Freshfield’s comment, “Farewell to a band of heroes whose names will 
shine as examples of the courage and noble evidence of the qualities of 
Englishmen”200, the Daily Chronicle quoted Peary “they died as Englishmen”201. 
The Daily Graphic quoted Mr Asquith, “Their splendid example will be an 
inspiration to Englishmen throughout time”202. And the Observer stated, “They 
have proved, indeed, that “the spirit, the pluck, the power to endure have not 
gone out of the race.”203  The comments do not directly mention ‘empire’, but 
they clearly conjure up an image of the men as examples of the strength of the 
nation and race, which implies strength of the imperial power.  This has an 
effect on the construction of Evans’ image, for Oates, Wilson, Bowers and Scott 
were presented as showing the strength of the British race, and clearly Evans’ 
presentation in Scott’s ‘message’ made him unsuitable for a model of the British 
race as superior individuals.  Which could therefore question notions of cultural 
supremacy, and Social Darwinism, which played a part in legitimising 
colonialism. 
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Conclusion 
Oates’ death was the model and Evans was presented as falling short of Oates’ 
example. Evans’ un-heroic state was not a state solely caused by his class, but 
because Scott, the press and Evans’ fellow travellers did not present Evans’ 
death as a heroic demise in the same vein as Oates’. Nor did it fit within an 
already established heroic frame. Evans’ image could have been adapted. There 
was a precedent for adaptation, whereby traits and, or, experiences are added 
to help enforce the heroic status, but this opportunity was very rarely taken by 
Evans’ mediators. Though perhaps the most significant factor is that Oates’ 
death along with Wilson’s, Scott’s and Bowers’ did not need altering from how 
Scott had presented their deaths in his journal to be deemed heroic by the press 
and fellow travellers.  
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Chapter 3.  “the four men history will never forget”204 
Memorials in stone and ink 
 
This chapter will examine how Evans was presented through the decades. I will 
use memorials, scrapbooks, cigarette cards, biographies and published accounts 
about the expedition to present Evans’ marginalisation. I will argue against 
Jones’ claim that Evans “became increasingly marginalised”205, contending that 
he had always occupied a negligible place in the representation of Scott’s last 
expedition. I will analyse Evans’ commemoration in memorials, whereby 
memorials and commemoration will be viewed as a mark of heroism displayed, as 
part of a “collective emotional investment”206. It will become clear that 
memorials are not just stone blocks, but also scrapbooks and memorial editions 
of newspapers.  
 
Marginalisation 
Max Jones, writing in reference to the 1930s believes that as the years went on 
Evans was “increasingly marginalised, forgotten, or blamed”207. However, Evans 
had always been a marginalised figure, there was not a major change in the way 
Evans was presented from 11 February 1913, through till the 1930s. Evidence for 
this claim lays in the fact that some newspapers in the1930s saw Evans as a hero 
in the group, “Five of the bravest Britons ever”208, “Five Heroes”209, just as 
articles had in 1913, “Five Heroes at the Pole”. Equally, some newspapers in 
1937 omitted Evans, The Children’s Newspaper proclaimed, “the four men 
history will never forget”210 just as newspapers had done in 1913, “there was a 
contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his comrades, Captain Scott, Dr 
Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers.”211Furthermore, there were still accusations that 
Evans was the main cause of the disaster, “when Evans fell by the wayside they 
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stayed with him to the end. Had they left him to die they would have saved their 
own lives.”212 
 
Max Jones also argues, that seen in context, “the extent of the criticism of Edgar 
Evans should not, however, be exaggerated. Most commentators did not single 
out Evans as especially culpable but rather noted his collapse as one among a 
catalogue of factors which contributed to the disaster.”213 Barczewski disagrees, 
contending, that the fact that Evans was put forward as a scapegoat when the 
other four were raised to saint-like status is of more significance than the 
number of press reports.214 Although I agree with Barczewski, I would go a step 
further and proclaim that it is not quite as simple as appealing to the 
significance of the articles that presented Evans’ as a ‘failure’. One must look 
further and investigate other factors and instances, for there are indirect factors 
that show there was reluctance to portray Evans as a heroic individual.  
 
For example, consider the layout from The Daily Mirror 12 February 1913, the 
‘Memorial Edition’: 
Front Page – A full-page photograph of Captain Scott. 
Third page - two photographs of Peter Scott, and one photograph of Kathleen 
and Captain Scott. 
Fourth Page - the story of the expedition. 
Fifth Page - various articles about the expedition. 
Sixth Page - Photograph of Wilson and a photograph of Bowers.  
Thirteenth Page – A full-page portrait of Oates. 
Seventeenth Page - A full-page photograph of Evans.215 
 
Evans’ portrait was the last photograph in the newspaper, and in some of the 
editions, one assumes the early ones, the photograph of P.O Johnson was printed 
and not that of P.O Evans. Additionally, there were photographs of Kathleen and 
Peter Scott, yet there were no photographs of Evans’ widow and children. As this 
was a memorial edition, one can assume there was a belief that the readers may 
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want to keep the newspaper. It was therefore suggesting that Evans’ role in the 
perceived heroic expedition should be remembered as less significant than the 
roles of comrades’. In The Daily Mirror, 21 May 1913, when the photographs of 
the men at the Pole were first published, there were photographs of Peter Scott 
on page three, whilst photographs of Evans’ three children were on page twenty-
two. And if one wonders about the size of readership, this particular issue sold 
1,342,000 copies, the widest circulation for 1912 and 1913.216 Presenting Evans 
and his family last, was clearly not a unique representation, which essentially 
infers that images of Evans were not needed to sell stories. The images of his 
companions and Peter Scott were the key representations of Scott’s last 
expedition. Perhaps the press did not need to blame Evans once conventions had 
been established. 
 
It was not just the cheaper dailies that attempted to deem Evans’ role 
insignificant. An article in The Observer, 9 November 1913, states, “It rests with 
us, their fellow-countrymen, whether Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers have died 
in vain or no.”217 Similarly in The Daily Graphic on 13 February 1913, the front 
page is a photograph of Peter Scott and Kathleen, along with a separate photo of 
Captain Scott, whilst photographs of Evans’ children are on page 11218. However, 
the most telling exclusion is the centrefold of The Daily Mirror, 15 February 
1913. This is a photograph of ten members of the expedition, which the readers 
are informed, “should be kept in memory of these splendid men, and should be 
shown to children to illustrate the story that will never die”219. The photograph 
is very similar to one shown below in figure 12 and evidently Evans is not 
present. So in this memorial in paper form, that had been made to 
commemorate the disaster, and as such attempt to form part of societies 
memory of the expedition, one of the five men who died after reaching the Pole 
was not included. As it was a photograph people were told to keep ‘in memory’ 
of the men, it is insinuating that people should forget about Evans, that he is not 
worth remembering.  
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Figure 12 Scott can be seen in the middle of the shot, facing away from the camera. [In the 
version in The Daily Mirror, Scott is looking at the camera]. Wilson and Bowers can be seen 
sitting on the sledge, whilst Tom Crean who later accompanied Shackleton on the Endurance 
expedition is standing furthest left, with pipe in mouth. Oates is second from the right, 
wearing a bobble hat. 
 
Evans’ role in the expedition and the qualities he brought continued to be 
ignored. One article from The Times in September 1913, reports on Commander 
Evans talk at the Albert Hall the previous night.  The article ends, “but, to judge 
from Commander Evans’s language… All were devoted to CAPTAIN SCOTT: they 
loved and reverenced DR.WILSON “the peacemaker”, “the Solomon” of the 
party; they found infinite pleasure in the society of “little Bowers”, and they 
regarded CAPTAIN OATES as what indeed he was, “a magnificent man” That all 
these four died at the moment of achievement is one of the great tragedies of 
Arctic and nautical history”. Although they did not die ‘at the moment of 
achievement’, Evans was not mentioned and they did not even see fit to give him 
a numerical value, it was only ‘these four died’. Although the daily readership of 
The Times in 1913 was not close to the readership of the cheaper dailies, selling 
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“a mere 45,227”220, the article does show that there was a want to hide and, or, 
loose Evans’ role. Whatever the size of readership, one could be sure that if 
Evans was seen as a key image for the presentation of Scott’s last expedition and 
was crucial to selling the newspapers, proprietors would have ensured Evans was 
not forgotten.  
 
Although the statements do not directly attack Evans’, the mere fact that his 
name is not mentioned alongside his companions is significant. They are indirect 
digs at Evans, and a show that his contribution to the expedition was seen as 
insignificant. Or, perhaps, it was because his death was seen as having a major 
impact on the fate of the other four. It is also noteworthy that he occupied a 
similar place in ‘Memorial Editions’ that are, effectively, the commemoration of 
an event or individual. Though it debatable if Evans presentation was how the 
press wanted Evans to be remembered, or, if it was a genuine reflection of what 
the public believed, the fact remains that there was clearly the opinion that 
Evans and his dependants should occupy the space behind his comrades. 
 
Even though Evans’ role in the expedition was habitually ignored, other members 
of the five were also forgotten. For example, in an article in The Daily Mail from 
1928, Wilfred Bruce, Scott’s brother-in-law, rather intriguingly recalled, “he was 
introduced one day to a member of a shooting party who was an important man 
in the city. ‘Scott? Scott?’ Muttered an individual, obviously puzzled...’Oh yes, of 
course – explorer, wasn’t he?’ ‘Yes’ said Captain Bruce briefly. ‘North Pole 
wasn’t it?’ ‘South’ was the grim reply. ‘Of course,’ said the man. ‘By the way, 
what’s happened to Scott? We never seem to hear of him nowadays.’”221 Though 
obviously this is more forgetfulness that blatant ignoring. 
 
Memory 
Scrapbooks kept by individuals or families, must represent a form of memorial, 
for they are one person’s wanted recollection of the events. Scrapbooks have not 
been given the scholarly analysis and attention they deserve, for they are 
extremely valuable sources, scrapbook makers are active participants in the 
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construction of the culture and representation of exploration. One can see the 
effect of Scott’s ‘message’ and the press’ negative promotion of Evans creep 
into the scrapbooks. For example, one scrapbook has 2 pages dedicated to 
Wilson, Scott, Oates and Bowers and Evans. Out of a 140-page book, Scott, 
Wilson, Oates and Bowers occupy the pages 19 to 26, whilst Evans occupies the 
last 2 pages, 139 and 140222. The scrapbook maker kept several articles and 
photographs about each one of the five; Evans’ articles were the shortest, and 
he was the subject of the least number of photographs kept. See figure 13 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows a table of the number of individual articles and photographs dedicated to 
the five in one scrapbook. 
 
However, Apsley Cherry-Garrard had compiled this scrapbook, which would 
explain the bias for Bowers and Wilson. Cherry-Garrard had accompanied Bowers 
and Wilson on the Journey to collect Emperor penguin eggs from Cape Crozier in 
Antarctic Winter 1911. Thus Cherry-Garrard had a particular bond with Wilson 
and Bowers, and as such one could expect more attention to be paid to those 
two. I have not uncovered any evidence that suggests Cherry-Garrard housed any 
feelings of contempt towards Evans. So it is possible that the scrapbook is a 
genuine reflection of the press’ presentation of Evans. However, Cherry-Garrard 
must have made a decision where to place Evans in the scrapbook, and the gap 
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in between Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers and that of Evans is over a hundred 
pages, so that will remain unaccountable. This is the only scrapbook that has 
individual pages dedicated to each of the Antarctic five, the other scrapbooks 
are mainly a hundred pages long, containing scores of press clippings, so the 
same criteria cannot be investigated.   
 
However, other criteria can be investigated. In another scrapbook, where 
predominantly portraits had been cut out of the newspapers to commemorate 
the disaster, Evans had the fewest individual photographs.223 See figure 14 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14, a table to show the number of portraits kept by the scrapbook maker.  
 
It is possible that the results are a reflection of the press’s limited use of Evans’ 
portrait, rather than the scrapbook maker having a limited interest in Evans.  
 
The vast majority of scrapbooks viewed, that contained articles from 1913, held 
at least one of the articles that accused Evans of failing physically and mentally, 
and, or, reports that left out Evans. Therefore, it was clearly not one scrapbook 
or one scrapbook maker; there were a number of individuals who either wanted 
reports of Evans failing to form part of their individual memory of the 
representation of the expedition. Or, wanted to keep a genuine reflection of the 
press’ presentation of Scott’s last expedition, and any future references to it.  
Whatever the individuals’ reasons were for including those specific articles, it is 
a clear reflection of Evans’ marginalised status in print culture.  
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Figure 15 J.C Dollman’s painting, ‘A very Gallant Gentleman’ shows Oates leaving the tent 
into the blizzard.  
 
Figure 13, Dollman’s painting is not simply an image showing Oates’ moment of 
self-sacrifice, for it represents Oates’ apotheosis. It looks as though Oates is 
averting his eyes, cowering from the strength of light shining from above that is 
hitting his back. The painting is a representation of the moment Oates dies, one 
knows that is to come, linking it to paintings of the sublime, “where the disaster 
is safely distanced”224. It could be argued that the image of Oates forms a 
triangle, from the top of his back to the ground and from his head to his hand to 
the ground, this is significant for triangles in art have long been associated with 
Christ-like images, ever since El Greco’s Pietà. Triangles were also used to show 
the apotheosis of General Wolfe and Horatio Nelson in Benjamin West’s The 
Death of General Wolfe, and Death of Nelson. Dollman’s painting must therefore 
have played a part in enhancing of Oates’ heroic status. 
 
Portraits of Scott’s demise were also produced, The Sphere Memorial Number, 
included a full-page image of an Angel receiving the ‘message to the public’ 
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from a dying Scott.225 And in Punch, or the London Charivari, there is a full-page 
illustration by Bernard Partridge of an angel looking down upon the names of the 
Antarctic five. Even though Punch was a satirical magazine, the image was not in 
jest, it was entitled, “In Honour of Brave Dead Men.”226 As no painting or image 
was produced of Evans, this implies that the manner of his death was not 
deemed heroic enough, people had no wish to commission or view a painting 
showing Evans’ decline as they did with his comrades. Thus resulting in a 
reduced iconography of Evans, indicating a lack of perceived heroic status, for 
iconography is key in establishing and confirming a reputation, as shown by 
MacKenzie’s analysis of the paintings of Livingstone.227 
 
The cigarette company, John Players & Sons devoted a series of cards to polar 
exploration. The cards included portraits of, Scott, Oates, Wilson, Bowers, 
Edward Evans, Dimitri (the dog-driver) and Commander Evans’ flag. Yet “not one 
of the twenty-five cards issued mentioned Petty Officer Edgar Evans”.228  See 
figure 16 below. As the cards were printed in 1915-16, it reinforces my 
contestation that Evans had continuously occupied a ‘marginalised’ status. This 
is bolstered by the notion that individuals often kept cigarette cards, thus the 
cards have the potential to become a memory of the representation of the 
expedition, without Evans. John Players & Sons obviously made a decision not to 
include Evans, again implying that Evans was not deemed a necessity in the 
representation of the expedition. The cards also illustrate the deficiency in 
iconography of Evans in comparison to his comrades. 
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Figure 16 shows the 25 cigarette cards issued by John Player in 1915-16 on the topic of Polar 
Exploration. Children often collected and kept cigarette cards, and as such this was 
effectively installing in a generation the notion Evans should be forgotten. (Image taken from 
Antarcticcircle.org) 
 
In Antarctica one of the two Cairns erected by the search party was dedicated 
with the words: 
“This cross and cairn erected over the remains of: 
Captain R. F. Scott  
Dr. E. A. Wilson,  
Lieutenant H. R. Bowers  
As a slight token to perpetuate their gallant and successful attempt to reach the 
goal…Also to commemorate their two gallant comrades, Captain L.E. G. Oates, 
of the Inniskilling Dragoons, who walked to his death in a blizzard willingly, 
 68 
about twenty miles south of this place, to try and save his comrades beset by 
hardship; also of Petty- Officer Edgar Evans, who died at the foot of Beardmore 
Glacier.” 
 
Near this cairn the second cairn was erected with the record: 
“Hereabouts died a very Gallant Gentleman.”229 
 
No such cairn was dedicated solely to Evans. Additionally, when Evans was 
mentioned in the first dedication, his death was not viewed or presented by his 
comrades in the same heroic style as Oates’ demise was offered. Evans’ death 
appears as almost an anti-climax after the tale of Oates’ death. One can again 
see the stress on Oates committing a deliberate act, his ‘willingness’ to offer his 
life. The dedication over the Cairns should be viewed as setting the standard for 
Evans’ future commemoration.  
 
 
Figure 17, a close up of the wooden cross that was erected over the grave of Scott, Wilson 
and Bowers. Neither Oates’ nor Evans’ body was ever found.   
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As the decades passed, Evans remained marginalised. There were many 
memorials to honour the heroic dead, often publicised by the press. Yet, Evans’ 
wife Lois died in 1952 and “during her lifetime… the only initiative to honour her 
husband was taken by herself.230 Additionally Evans had the least number of 
memorials solely commemorating him, and if memorials are society’s memory231, 
this suggests that there was a lack of popular interest in Evans. Society was not 
keen to commemorate Evans as an individual.  And the only individual who 
actively sought to commemorate Evans, had an already established, “emotional 
investment”232.  This leads on to the question posed in Contested Sites, “whose 
memory is it?”233 This question infers that it was one locality, one class or, one 
institution responsible for the commemoration. Evidently for Evans, only his 
family saw Evans as someone who should occupy a place in societies memory.  
 
Although there was a precedent for not commemorating the lower ranks of the 
Royal Navy as individuals, it seems unlikely that solely his social standing was the 
cause of Evans’ lack of memorialisation. Seymour and Calvocoressi state, 
“despite their inclusion in the Naval Thanksgiving procession of 1797, there were 
no monuments to ordinary sailors in St Paul’s”234. Similarly, in Nelson’s Seat, [a 
memorial to Nelson] “ordinary sailors are listed as numbers working in each 
ship’s crew… They are not identified or commemorated as individuals as are the 
ships captains.”235. And although it could be argued that Evans’ commemoration 
was based around his numerical value as one of the five, for there were far more 
memorials dedicated to the group (17) than Evans as an individual (2)236. That 
though was also the case with the rest of the five, suggesting that Evans’ lack of 
memorialisation cannot be deemed as being solely caused by his naval rank and 
naval tradition of commemoration. 
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However, Nicholas Penny’s research has shown that during the nineteenth 
century there were a number of memorials that contained an image of Jack 
Tar.237 He declares, the memorials were not commemorating the individual 
sailor’s life or deeds; the image of Jack Tar was used to show that their leader 
had devoted followers. Furthermore, Penny argues the images of sailors were 
used to represent an example, “to reinforce the hope that such people would 
behave piously, loyally, and soberly as the representations of them in bronze and 
marble”238. This suggests that the authorities were concerned about the 
behaviour of some of the lower classes. If the same feelings and insecurities 
about the lower orders were present in the 1910s, this represents another reason 
why Evans was not massively commemorated. For Evans was rarely presented as 
displaying the perfect example. This is significant for examples were seen as a 
critical method of influence, for as Victorian reformer Samuel Smiles’ claims, 
“example is one of the most potent instructors, though it teachers without 
tongue.”239 As previously shown Evans had been presented as having a mental 
and physical breakdown, and had been called a ‘failure’ by his leader, this was 
clearly not a representation of an example that society wished to promote 
additionally some memorials in paper form had already implied that Evans’ role 
was one to forget.  
 
By the late nineteenth century there were memorials to commemorate the deeds 
of members of the working classes, and the memorials were not just used to 
highlight the heroic image of a leader. As John Price’s research has shown, Alice 
Ayres, a “general assistant and nursemaid”240 was presented as a heroine with a 
place on Watt’s Self-Sacrifice Memorial along with sixty other people, who lost 
their lives while attempting to save others.241 This does suggest that there was a 
precedent, even if it was somewhat minor for commemorating and praising 
‘heroes’ regardless of their socio-economic situation. Particularly if viewed in 
conjunction with the memorials to advocates of social improvement, as Pickering 
and Tyrrell state in reference to the Reformers’ Memorial, “Middle and working-
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class reformers predominate, but all classes are included.”242 Therefore, it 
appears that there were a number of factors that explain Evans’ limited 
memorialisation. His class was a factor, for he was not linked to any notable 
institutions like Oates, who had been schooled at Eton, and Wilson who had 
attended Gonville and Cauis College, thus restricting the scope for 
commemoration. Additionally, because of his social circumstances it is likely his 
friends and family were not figures who had positions of significant authority to 
influence public perception. Secondly, there was also a precedent for ignoring 
Evans as shown by the articles in the press and lack of iconography. And finally, 
the presented manner of his death lessened the likelihood of a mass public 
appeal for a memorial of Evans. 
 
Evans in literature 
Most scholars agree that the number of biographies is often a show of iconic and 
generally heroic status.  MacKenzie declares that over an 80-year period there 
were at least 100 biographies of David Livingstone and 70 for General Gordon.243 
Additionally C.I. Hamilton’s research has shown that, “in the catalogue of the 
National Maritime museum there are listed some 135 biographies of British naval 
men – sailors and officers – plus 28 of Nelson, published in Britain between 1830 
and 1914.”244 There was clearly an interest in those in the naval profession, for 
otherwise publishers would not have been interested in printing a book which 
would not make a profit. This interest in the maritime life was perhaps one 
reason why there was so much public interest in the expedition and aftermath. 
However, within this time of naval fascination, no biography of Evans was 
produced. In fact he has only one biography to his name, G.C. Gregor’s 
Swansea’s Antarctic Explorer, it is less than 100 pages long and was only 
published in 1995. 66 years after the first biography of Scott, 62 years after 
Wilson’s, 62 years after Oates’ and 57 years after the first biography of Bowers.  
As biographies are one of the indicators that must be present to generate a 
heroic reputation and status245, Evans again falls short. 
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Texts about the events of the expedition have been in print since 1914. And it is 
in one of the accounts that Evans comes in for some of the harshest comments 
ever published about his rank and role in the disaster. Max Jones and Stephanie 
Barczewski both make reference to Evans’ presentation in the small booklet, 
Like English Gentlemen, (1915), by J.E Hodder Williams, with Jones believing the 
“scrapegoating of Evans reached in apogee”246 within the text. Hodder Williams 
proclaims: 
 
“If Evans could not walk alone, he must be helped, dragged, carried along 
somehow...It was their lifeblood the heroes gave for this simple seaman… 
If they had left him he would die just a few hours sooner and they would be safe. 
But they were English gentlemen these four, the hero, and Dr Wilson and Captain 
Oates and Lieutenant Bowers…Poor Evans! If he had not fallen. If his strength 
had not failed. If only they could have left him where he fell. Poor heroes! But 
they were four English gentlemen.”247 
 
What seems very explicit is the fact that Scott, Wilson, Oates and Bowers were 
the ‘heroes’, whereas Evans was just a ‘simple seaman’.  There is a definite 
barrier. Here it appears that the manner of his death and his class were 
prominent in this interpretation. However, it should not be viewed as the 
popular consensus for the pamphlet was produced for Peter Scott, as stated in 
the acknowledgements, “to Peter Scott From the author of ‘Where’s Master?”248 
It was in essence a show to Peter Scott what a brave gentleman his father, 
Captain Scott had been. It did though put another nail in the coffin of Evans’ 
reputation, in an effort to enhance that of Scott’s. This was by no means a 
unique occurrence for Evans’ image was later adapted to suit the purpose of an 
individual’s objective.  
 
George Seaver’s, Scott of the Antarctic (1948) promotes Evans as, “a man of 
giant physique, of intelligence, resources and inventiveness, calmness and 
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presence of mind, in everyway a man of his hands, and a tower of strength.”249 
One would be forgiven for thinking the book represented a new representation 
that would henceforth become the common consensus. However, Roland 
Huntford adapted Evans’ image back, in order to support suit his own individual 
philosophy. 
 
Roland Huntford declares, “Over the years, P.O Evans, a Welshman from 
Glamorgan, had turned into a beery womanizer, exposed to the risk of venereal 
disease, and running a bit to fat.”250  This is a very incriminating statement, but 
Huntford provides no evidence for this claim, (though it is popular consensus that 
Evans would often get drunk whilst on shore leave.251) Evans has been used as a 
pawn to present a view that Scott was a poor leader, just like fifty years 
previously when he was used to present the notion that strong, uneducated men 
were a liability on expeditions. Although one could assert that Huntford is merely 
presenting the stereotypical image of Jack Tar, Mary Conley’s recent study, From 
Jack Tar to Union Jack (2009) has shown that by the late Victorian period, 
“newer images emerged that valorised the modern bluejacket, who was cast as a 
manly ideal, virtuous both afloat and ashore.”252 Conley’s research infers that 
Huntford’s accusation does not even reflect contemporary reflections of Jack 
Tar.  
 
In the first chapter it was revealed that Edgar Evans and Frank Debenham had a 
great rapport. However, in the published version of Debenham’s dairy, The Quiet 
Land, (1992), the vast majority of the comments about how well Evans and 
Debenham got on have been taken out. The removed comments include; “Evans 
and I have started a feud…Ripping chap!”253 
“Evans and I whirled away the time singing and generally acting the giddy ox. 
Amongst other things he proposed to me.”254 
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Additionally, in his published diary Debenham states, “the nails have come out of 
my boots and the crampons have raised me a blister on the heel so I did not wear 
them yesterday. The consequence was that on the lakes and rivers of ice I 
slipped & skidded in all directions with many falls, much to the amusement of 
others,255 [This is where this date’s entry stops in The Quiet Land, however, his 
original diary continues,] specially Evans. Whenever Evans got mean he would 
give me a shove + we were sparring across the traces half the day.”256 It seems 
somewhat unjust that these comments were cut and I have been unable to find a 
conclusive reason, the introduction to the ‘Autumn journeys 1911’ section simply 
states, “Here follows an account of out autumn sledging trip in the Western Mts, 
being almost a copy of the pencil diary I kept while on the trip, but with 
occasional additions and explanations.”257 There have been deletions and few 
additions. 
 
Perhaps as Debenham’s opinion of Evans changed, this affected how he wanted 
his relationship with Evans on that journey to be seen. As he states later in The 
Quiet Land, “Taff Evans… was simply splendid on that trip and we were very 
chummy. He was rather disappointing in the winter being given to hectoring 
amongst his mates, but he’s the most useful man down here and a treasure to 
Capt. Scott.”258 It is possible that these later events may have affected how he 
wanted to remember Evans. Though one should remember that Evans was a Petty 
Officer and according to Christopher McKee’s research on the lives and views of 
sailors from 1900-45, “the word most frequently used in describing petty officers 
was bastard.”259 So perhaps Debenham was judging Evans on his occupational 
role as a naval rating. Debenham’s daughter was the editor of The Quiet Land, 
and it is possible that quotes concerning Evans were deemed of no significance, 
with the belief that the focus should solely be on Frank Debenham. However, 
having contacted Debenham’s family, there appears to have been no specific 
reason for the omission, besides a lack of space. Had the comments about Evans 
been left in it would have shown the crossing of social boundaries a man of 
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science and a sailor. There is also the chance that there is a skeleton in Evans’ 
closet that Debenham later discovered and this altered his opinions, a skeleton 
which is still waiting to be discovered by historians.  
 
Conclusion 
Evans held a state of marginalised heroism throughout the twentieth century. 
There was a lack of interest in his story, with fewer biographies, memorials and 
images in scrapbooks than his companions. Similarly the illustrators and painters 
had no wish to portray the moment before Evans’ death as they had done with 
Evans’ companions, resulting in a reduced iconography. There was clearly a lack 
of ‘collective emotional investment’ towards Evans, and the actions of an 
individual, Lois Evans, was not enough to elevate Evans into a popular heroic 
individual. 
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Conclusion 
As the decades passed, the story of the Antarctic five moved into projection by 
feature film. Ponting had some footage of the Antarctic five in his film, 90 
South, and this was widely viewed throughout the nation, though there was 
actually no footage of the Southern Journey itself. In 1948 the feature film Scott 
of the Antarctic was released, a film had been proposed in the 1930s though 
Kathleen Scott had announced, “NOT WHILE I’M ALIVE.”260 Scott of the Antarctic 
starred John Mills as Captain Scott and James Robertson Justice portrayed a 
rather large and jolly Edgar Evans. There was no real blame attached to any of 
the men and there was no animosity shown towards Evans. Although, Oates’ 
death, like Scott’s, Wilson’s and Bowers’ comes across as more heroic due to the 
nature and manner of their deaths. In the descent into television drama Evans 
was once again used as a means to convey popular beliefs. In the drama, Last 
Place on Earth, which was based upon Huntford’s Scott and Amundsen, it was 
important to make Evans out to be an irresponsible drunk as it was one of ways 
used to present Scott as a completely incompetent leader. One must though bear 
in mind that Trevor Griffiths, the author of the script, has strong left wing 
sentiments, and thus harboured feelings of resentment towards imperialistic 
ventures. Evans was a pawn of an image to be manipulated to support specific 
philosophies at any given time, whilst his comrades’ depiction of him before his 
demise was frequently ignored.    
 
Wide samples of press clippings have been analysed from The Globe to The 
Sheffield Telegraph to John Bull to the Birmingham Gazette whilst the entire 
newspapers examined include; The Daily Mirror, Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Graphic 
and The Daily Sketch. However, to take this investigation further, larger samples 
of newspapers could be viewed, such as a bigger range of regional newspapers 
and newspapers and magazines aimed towards women and children, thereby 
investigating if Evans’ presentation altered between region, class, gender and 
age.  
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Evans’ presentation was affected by the contemporary thoughts and beliefs at 
the time, for as MacDonald states, a hero is a product of society’s virtues261, and 
if one turns this on its head, Evans was sometimes representative of the 
weaknesses society feared, such as degeneration, effeminacy and insanity. 
The accounts written by his fellows’ show Evans was a skilled craftsman, thus 
fitting the masculine ideal of self-control and, the masculine ideal of the 
mariner, assuming the latter was based around maritime skill. However, Scott’s 
‘message’ essentially set the standard for criticising Evans, with the claim of an 
“astonishing failure”262, Scott’s accusation was fuel for the press. Evans’ family 
attempted to keep Evans in the public memory, however, the many articles and 
the lack of iconography show that some of the population wanted to forget his 
role in the expedition. Thus Evans’ fellow travellers, his family, the press, (who 
worked within contemporary beliefs concerning masculinity), constructed Evans’ 
image.  
 
The sailors sculpted in nineteenth century memorials had a function; they were 
there to present the perfect example, what men should strive to be. Similarly 
Oates’ death was the model, and Evans’ was frequently presented as falling 
short of Oates’ example. This allowed the Antarctic five to become, “the four 
men history will never forget”263. 
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Appendix 
Message to the public 
 
“The causes of the disaster are not due to faulty organisation, but to misfortune 
in all risks which had to be undertaken. 
1. The loss of the pony transport in March 1911 obliged me to start later than 
I had intended, and obliged the limits of stuff transported to be narrowed. 
2. The weather throughout the outward journey, and especially the long gale 
in 83° S., stopped us. 
3. The soft snow in lower reaches of glacier again reduced pace. We fought 
these untoward events with a will and conquered, but it cut into our 
provision reserve. 
Every detail of our food supplies, clothing and depôts made on the interior ice-
sheet and over that long stretch of 700 miles to the Pole and back, worked out to 
perfection. The advance party would have returned to the glacier in fine form 
and wish surplus food were it not for the astonishing failure of the man whom we 
had least expected to fail. Edgar Evans was thought the strongest man of the 
party.  
 The Beardmore Glacier is difficult in fine weather, but on our return we 
did not get a single completely fine day; this with a sick companion enormously 
increased our anxieties. 
 As I have said elsewhere we got into frightfully rough ice and Edgar Evans 
received a concussion of the brain we think – he died a natural death, but left us 
a shaken party with the season duly advanced. 
 But all the facts above enumerated were as nothing to the surprise that 
awaited us on the Barrier. I maintain that our arrangements for returning were 
quite adequate, and that no one in the world would have expected the 
temperatures and surfaces which we encountered at this time of year. On the 
summit in lat. 85° 86° we had -20°, -30°. On the Barrier lat. 82°, 10,000 feet 
lower, we had -30° in the day, -47° at night pretty regularly, with continuous 
head wind during our day marches. It is clear that these circumstances come on 
very suddenly, and our wreck is certainly due to this sudden advent of severe 
weather, which does not seem to have any satisfactory cause. I do not think 
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human beings ever came though such a month as we have come through, and we 
should have got through in spite of the weather had it not been for the sickening 
of a second companion, Captain Oates, and a shortage of fuel in our depôts for 
which I cannot account, and finally, but for the storm which has fallen on us 
within 11 miles of the depot at which we hoped to secure our final supplies. 
Surely misfortune could scarcely have exceeded this last blow. We arrived within 
11 miles of our old One Ton Camp with fuel for one last meal and food for two 
days. For four days we have been unable to leave the tent – the gale howling 
about us. We are weak, writing is difficult, but for my own sake I do not regret 
this journey, which has shown that Englishmen can endure hardships, help one 
another, and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past. We took 
risks, we know we took them; things have come out against us, and therefore we 
have no cause for complaint, but bow to the will of Providence, determined still 
to do our best to the last. But if willing to give our lives to this enterprise, which 
is the honour of the country, I appeal to our countrymen to see that those who 
depend upon us are properly cared for. 
 Had we lived I would have a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance, and 
courage of my companions which would have stirred the heart of every 
Englishman. These rough notes and our dead bodied must tell the tale, but 
surely, surely, a great rich country like ours will see that those who are 
dependent on us are properly provided for.264 
      
                                                 
264
 R.F. Scott, Journals, pp.421-422 
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Figure 18 this is the entire photograph that I cropped and enlarged for of figure 5. From right 
to left Petty Officer Forde and Crean can be seen working on the rear of the sledge. 
 
 
Figure 19 this is the entire photograph that I cropped and enlarged for figure 8.  
 
 1 
 
“There was a contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his comrades, 
Captain Scott, Dr Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers.”1 
 
An analysis of the presentation and portrayal of Petty Officer Edgar Evans, 
the first man to perish in Captain Scott’s pole party of 1912. 
 
Introduction 
 
Between the 17 February and 31 March 19122, the five British explorers who 
reached the South Pole on 17 January 1912, perished on the return journey. The 
news did not reach Britain, or even the closest inhabited land, New Zealand, 
until the following February. When the news came through, as a group of five 
they were raised as heroes, with particular attention played to Captain Oates 
and Captain Scott. The Antarctic five consisted of, Captain Robert Falcon Scott, 
the leader of the expedition, Dr. Edward Wilson, chief of scientific staff, 
Lieutenant Henry Bowers, Captain Lawrence ‘Titus’ Oates3 and Petty Officer 
Edgar Evans. P.O Evans held unique status, he was the first man to die, the only 
member of the Antarctic five not of officer status and the only one several 
contemporary press and publishers put forward as a scapegoat. 
 
This dissertation is based upon the results of my research undertaken over a 
period of three months. I have examined the published diaries and memoirs of 
Edgar Evans’ fellow travellers, including, Scott’s Journals, Thomas Griffith 
Taylor’s With Scott – the Silver Lining, and Frank Debenham’s The Quiet Land. 
Along with unpublished and thus un-adapted journals and letters, from both the 
lower ranks of the expedition and those of officer status, including the journals 
of P.O Keohane, P.O Williamson and Frank Debenham. I have also examined 
newspaper articles dated from 1901 to 1938. These articles are from various 
newspapers aimed towards the lower classes, such as The Daily Mirror and Daily 
Mail, and newspapers aimed towards the upper classes, such as The Pall Mall 
Gazette and The Times. Around 60% of the articles examined are from 
scrapbooks of the Terra Nova Expedition (1910-13), and scrapbooks of the 
                                                 
1 The Daily Mail, 12 February, 1913 
2 The exact date of Scott’s death is unknown, though the last entry in Scott’s diary was dated 29 March 1912.  
3 Oates was a Captain in the Inniskilling Dragoons Cavalry Regiment, but signed on the expedition as a 
‘Midshipman’ as the expedition was short of funds and could not afford to pay him a higher wage.  
 2 
Discovery (1901-04) expedition, held at the archives of the Scott Polar Research 
Institute.4 There are problems with analysing newspaper reports, for there is the 
age-old dilemma, “whether the press simply reported what of interest to the 
public or whether it created that interest.”5. This query has a further effect on 
scrapbooks, for is the scrapbook a typical representation of the coverage? Or, 
were only specific articles cut out and kept as a memory of the presentation of 
exploration?  
 
However, although the sources are not problem-free, an analysis of the press’ 
perception of Edgar Evans is the most effective way to examine how he was 
popularly presented, as halfpenny dailies regularly reached audience figures of 
1,000,000.6 Additionally, the use of scrapbooks in an analysis of Evans’ 
presentation is not as problematic as using scrapbooks as a basis for a study on 
the presentation of exploration in general. For the cut-out-articles would not 
perhaps be a genuine reflection of exploration’s entire representation. However, 
I am analysing the presentation of an individual within a group, so articles in 
scrapbooks will not only show how specific newspapers perceived Evans, but 
also, how one person wishes to remember Evans. Furthermore, the majority of 
scrapbooks viewed contain at least 100 articles from a dozen different 
newspapers and magazines, thus the research has not been restricted to Evans’ 
presentation in two or three newspapers of similar audiences and political bias’. 
 
These particular documents and texts have been examined as they show the 
construction of individuals’ images. For as Cubitt declares, “formal rituals and 
official procedures constitute…only the most explicit part of a society’s hero-
worshipping and hero-producing activity. Equally important are the ways in 
which heroic reputations are developed through the generally less formal 
practices of social, cultural and economic life – through story-telling and 
entertainment through gossip and news reporting, and through the circulation of 
                                                 
4 Scrapbooks have been analysed rather than going to Colindale to examine whole newspapers, for 
scrapbooks also enable one to assess collecting practices and an individual’s wanted recollection of an event. 
5 B. Riffenburgh, The Myth of the Explorer, p.1 
6 ibid, p.152 
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literature.”7 This dissertation will examine Edgar Evans’ image construction via 
those less formal practices.    
 
Scholarly work on Victorian and Edwardian heroism particularly the ‘imperial 
heroes’ has changed direction over the last twenty years. As Max Jones states, 
“The historian’s role is no longer to act as judge, asking ‘How great was this 
individual?’ Instead scholars should ask ‘Why did a past society raise this 
individual as a hero.’”8 To take Jones’ question a step further, why was this man 
not raised as a hero, in the same way as his comrades? I will therefore be using a 
methodological symmetry, much like the ‘strong programme’ whereby failure is 
looked upon through the same lens as success, with the notion that similar social 
factors contribute to both successful and unsuccessful theories. Evans’ presented 
“failure”9 must be viewed in the same context as the presented heroism of 
Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers.  
 
Figure 1 The Antarctic Five at the Pole on 17 January 1912. Dr Wilson took the photograph 
for the string attached to the camera can be seen in his right hand. 
                                                 
7 G. Cubitt, ‘Introduction’ Heroic Reputations, p.4 
8 M. Jones, ‘What Should Historians Do With Heroes’, History Compass, p.441 
9 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
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Due to the fact that Evans was a Petty Officer, and therefore the only one not of 
commissioned officer status, there will obviously be class issues presented and 
examined, such as the differing perceptions of manliness, and accusations that 
his lack of education rendered him un-fit for exploration. However, as this paper 
will make clear, it is not sufficient to say that Evans’ presentation was purely 
and simply caused by his class, there is more to understanding the construction 
of Evans’ image, than class, for it is too sweeping.  
 
The consensus is that the ‘hero’ is such because he is presenting an ideal image. 
As Orrin. E Klapp states, “the hero in social life is… more than a person; he is an 
ideal image, a legend, a symbol.”10 This has been echoed by Max Jones, “the 
hero is the ideal man or woman”11. It is this that frames the understanding of 
the presentation of Petty Officer Edgar Evans.  
 
As the hero is representative of the ideal, it can also be assumed that he was 
representative of the masculine ideal. It is the general consensus, that one of 
the principal components of the masculine ideal, during the early twentieth 
century, was self-control.12 However, there are obvious problems with examining 
concepts of masculinity and manliness, for there has only been a limited amount 
of analysis on working-class masculinity. Recent leading lights in the field such as 
John Tosh have tended to concentrate on middle and upper class masculinity.13 
Additionally, Stephen Heathron believes that the little that is known about 
working-class gender suggests, “masculinity was tied to respectable employment 
and physical labour”14. Thus it is likely that Evans’ masculinity was defined not 
only by his class, but also by his occupation. However, if scholarly research on 
working-class masculinity is lacking, there has been even less analysis on the 
masculinity of mariners. The main contributors to this field include, Mary 
Conley’s, From Jack Tar to Union Jack and J.D Glasco’s ‘The Seaman Feels Him-
self a Man’. Conley argues that Edwardian sailors were respected for their 
                                                 
10 O.E. Klapp, ‘The Creation of Popular Heroes’ p.135 
11 M. Jones, ‘What Should Historians Do With Heroes’ p.440 
12 J. Tosh, ‘What Should Historians Do With Masculinity’ p.183, G.L. Mosse, ‘Shell-shock as a Social 
Disease’ p.101, M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.245. 
13 For example, J. Tosh, A Man's Place: Masculinity and the Middle-Class Home in Victorian England  
14 Heathorn, ‘How stiff were Victorian Upper Lips’, History Compass, p.2 
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domesticity15, and Glasco contends that during the eighteenth century, a sailor’s 
masculinity was complex but often linked to their level of maritime skill.16 These 
two ideas will be further examined in this paper.  
  
Michael Lieven, in his examination of hero making during the Zulu War proclaims, 
“the roots of the hero are in dramatic narrative”17. This has clear links to the 
heroism of the Antarctic Five whose story was told by ‘mediators’, a term firstly 
used by John M. MacKenzie. Mackenzie has contributed greatly to the field of 
imperial heroism. He put forward in ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, the widely 
accepted theory that it is not so much the exploits of the individual that count, 
for it is the ‘mediators’, those who work to keep the hero in the minds of the 
public that create a hero.18  Since mediators are necessary for the establishment 
of a heroic reputation, they must also play a role in the creation of an un-heroic 
reputation. However, in the case of the Antarctic five, the ‘mediators’ are not 
individual people, they are texts, Scott’s ‘message to the public’ and press 
reports. Both played a significant role in the creation of Evans’ image and 
reputation.  
 
Scholars analysing Victorian and Edwardian heroes have tended to concentrate 
on military figures, such as, the Havelock heroes19and General Gordon20. Whilst 
the original focus of naval heroism began with the apotheosis of Captain Cook, 
scholars analysing Victorian naval heroes, have focused on Nelson and Franklin.21 
MacKenzie, C.I Hamilton and Robert MacDonald have all shown that there was a 
definite link between Christianity and military heroism.22 However, Christianity 
was also a key component in the construction of a non-military hero, David 
Livingstone. MacKenzie and Jones contend that Livingstone became to be 
                                                 
15 M. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack, specifically chapter 4, ‘Strong men for a strong navy’ 
16 J.D Glasco, ‘The Seaman Feels Him-self a Man’pp40-52 
17 M. Lieven. ‘Heroism, Heroics and the Making of Heroes: The Anglo-Zulu War of 1879’ p.419 
18 J. M McKenzie, ‘Heroic myths of Empire,’ p.114 
19 R. Mackenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, M. Jones, ‘What should historians 
so with heroes’  
20 R. MacKenzie, Heroic Myths of Empire’, G. Dawson, Soldier Heroes, M. Jones, ‘What should historians 
so with heroes’, R. MacDonald, The Language of Empire  
21 C.I. Hamilton, Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’, H. Lewis-Jones, ‘Heroism displayed’: 
revisiting the Franklin Gallery at the Royal Naval Exhibition, 1891’,  
22 C.I. Hamilton, Naval Hagiography and the Victorian Hero’, J. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’, R. 
MacDonald, ‘Deeds of Glory’ in The Language of Empire 
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regarded as a hero because he could be used to present differing ideals, such as 
the lower class man who educated himself, thus an advocate of self-
improvement, the Christian missionary and symbol of empire.23 MacKenzie’s 
research has also shown that being able to present several ideals turned the 
individual, with the help of mediators into “mythic status”24. The same principal 
can be applied to the Antarctic five, for as a group they were a symbol of the 
strength of British character, they were also promoted as having sacrificed their 
lives for the cause of science, advocating a quest for knowledge. Additionally as 
individuals, Wilson, Bowers, Scott and Oates became proponents of how to 
behave, and perhaps most importantly, how to die in a perceived heroic manner. 
 
There has been little scholarly analysis of Edgar Evans’ image construction. The 
only article analysing Evans is from the medical field, and concerned with the 
cause of his death.25 Whilst the majority of publications about the British 
Antarctic Expedition, (1910-13), have not been analytical studies, but 
biographical in approach, either of the expedition member, or, of the expedition 
itself. With as R. Fiennes’ Captain Scott, (2003), Michael Smith’s I’m Just Going 
Outside (2000), C.H. Lagerbom’s The Fifth Man (1999) and G. Seaver’s Edward 
Wilson of the Antarctic (1933), as just a handful of examples. However, in the 
last five years, Max Jones’ The Last Great Quest (2004) and Stephanie 
Barczewski’s Antarctic Destinies (2007) have analysed the presentation and the 
aftermath of Scott’s final expedition. Both have put forward their views on early 
twentieth century heroism. Jones’ work should be seen as groundbreaking for no 
scholar before had analysed the reaction to the expedition by the press26, when 
in fact the newspapers’ had such a critical role in the transfer of knowledge in 
early twentieth century society, newspaper reports are the key component of 
the popular presentation of exploration.  
 
However, despite the valuable analysis, there are limitations to the texts. In 
Antarctic Destinies, a 300-page book, Evans gets four pages concerning the press 
                                                 
23 J.M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths’, p.125, M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.24 
24 J.M. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’ p.l22 
25 Rogers, ‘The death of Chief Petty Officer Evans’ The Practitioner, 1974 
26 Riffenburgh’s investigation of the British and American press’ presentation of exploration in The Myth of 
the Explorer stopped in 1910, thus leaving the presentation of Scott’s last expedition un-examined. 
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attacks upon him and a similar amount in The Last Great Quest. Therefore, the 
gap between the image of Scott, Wilson, Bowers and Oates and that of Evans is 
only briefly dealt with. Furthermore, Jones declares that Evans was not attacked 
on a wide-scale and thus accusations towards Evans should not be exaggerated,27 
a point I will oppose in Chapter 3. Barczewski asserts that class caused the 
difference in Evans ‘and Oates’ presentation,28 whereas I will contend that there 
was more to understanding Evans’ presentation than his socio-economic status. 
Additionally, neither Jones nor Barczewski examine how Evans was portrayed in 
the diaries of his fellow travellers. In consequence, the derogatory comments by 
the press aimed at Edgar Evans are not analysed in the wider context of Evans’ 
image construction.  
 
Lisa Bloom’s (1995), Gender on Ice attempts to analyse heroism and Scott’s last 
expedition. However, much of her secondary reading is taken from Roland 
Huntford, thus limiting the ability to form a rounded argument. This is because 
Huntford’s book, Scott and Amundsen, is a greatly inferred text, wherein Scott is 
essentially presented as villainous, whilst Amundsen is presented as an almost 
saint-like being. Therefore, anyone who solely quotes Huntford and looks to no 
other evidence or scholarly work limits the plausibility of his or her own 
argument.  Moreover, Bloom does not look into the presentation of exploration 
by the British press when the news of the Antarctic five’s death came through, if 
one does not know what traits and exploits were presented as heroic, how can 
one comment on what was considered heroic at the time.  
 
Although there has been no scholarly analysis of scrapbooks there have been 
studies on memorialisation. The majority of work on memorials has focused on 
military memorials29. Susan Seymour and Rupert Calvolcoressi’s examination of 
naval memorials in ‘Landscape Parks and the Memorialisation of Empire’, 
demonstrates that the lower ranks were commemorated, though it was still in 
fitting within an aristocratic framework.30 Similarly, Nicholas Penny’s ‘Amor 
                                                 
27M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.112 
28 S. Barczewski, Antarctic Destinies, p.177 
29 Such as Cooke’s ‘Hyde Park Holocaust Memorial’, Craske’s ‘naval and military heroes’, and Jordan and 
Rogers ‘Admirals as Heroes’ 
30 S. Seymour and R. Calvocoressi, ‘Landscape Parks and the Memorialisation of Empire’, p.113 
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Publicus Posuit’ shows that the image of Jack Tar was used in memorials but only 
to show devotion to a fallen commander, they were examples.31 This can be 
linked to John Price’s research into non-military heroism. Price investigated the 
Watt’s Memorial for Self-Sacrifice in ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’, and has shown 
that the working classes, who were commemorated for their heroism, had their 
image adapted by the press to promote specific ideals32. Evans had few 
individual memorials, very rarely had his image adapted to be promoted as a 
heroic individual, and was seldom presented as an example for those to follow.  
 
In ‘What Should Historians do with Heroes’, Max Jones proclaims that based upon 
one of Cubitt’s theories on heroism, that a hero is someone who is an object of 
emotional investment33. Believing that there is a range of indictors to gauge the 
level of heroism, Jones points to, biographies, media representations, and 
references in personal testimonies, commercial exploitation, memorial services, 
memorial funds and public monuments as the determinant factors34.  I shall 
investigate four of these indicators; personal testimonies, media 
representations, public monuments and biographies, whilst also analysing what 
factors affected Evans’ presentation. This dissertation will show the chronology 
of Evans’ image, presenting his fellow travellers opinions of him before his 
death, the role of Scott’s ‘message’ and the press reports, his companions’ 
opinions of Evans’ death and Evans’ commemoration in memorial form in both 
stone and ink. Showing that just as heroism is a constructed state, an un-heroic 
image is also a constructed state. There are four main factors that affected and 
defined Evans’ image, firstly the circulation of knowledge, secondly inscriptions, 
artefacts and diaries, thirdly print culture including the use of images and lastly, 
the negotiation of masculinity.   
 
In chapter 1 I shall analyse the image of Evans, as presented by his fellow 
travellers before he died. I will then give a brief chronology of the press’ 
presentation of Evans, and answer several questions, including, why was Evans 
open to attack? I will then analyse the reports that promoted Evans as a hero 
                                                 
31 N. Penny, ‘Amor Publicus Posuit’; Monuments for the People and of the People’, pp797-800 
32 J. Price, ‘Watts Memorial’, pp.268-269  
33 G.Cubitt, Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, p.3 
34 M. Jones, What Should Historians Do With Heroes’ p.441 
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within the group, articles that accused Evans of going insane, failing because of a 
lack of education and failing because of his physicality. Whilst also assessing how 
the portrayal of Evans reflected contemporary views on masculinity.  
 
The second chapter will be a comparison between the presentation of Captain 
Oates, the proclaimed, ‘gentleman hero’, and Edgar Evans. Ideals of masculinity 
will also be assessed and I will question Barczewski’s claim that the reason the 
two were presented differently was purely an issue of class; it will become clear 
that the manner of Evans’ death was a key factor in his subsequent projection. 
Geoffrey Cubitt has argued that heroism can occur when “a life is encapsulated 
in a particularly dramatic moment”35. It is through this one moment that the 
presentation of the heroism of Captain Oates can be assessed in comparison with 
Edgar Evans.  
 
The third chapter will focus on how Evans’ presentation developed throughout 
the century, I will investigate two of Jones’ indicators of heroism, memorials and 
biographies and adding another factor, scrapbooks, to see how society and 
individuals wished to remember and present Evans. Additionally, if memorials 
are “memory in the guise of representation”36, what does this show about how 
people wanted to commemorate Evans? I will also build upon Barczewski’s 
suggestion that the fact Evans was attacked is more significant than the number 
of accusations, and I will contend that there are other, less direct ways that 
show the contemporary perception of Evans’ un-heroic status.  
 
                                                 
35 G. Cubitt, (ed) Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, p.13 
36 C. W. J. Withers ‘Memory and the history of geographical knowledge: the commemoration of Mungo 
Park’ p.3, taken from Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, p.161 
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Figure 2 Evans poses for Herbert Ponting, the self-proclaimed ‘camera artist’. Evans made all 
of the sledges with fellow Petty Officers Crean and Keohane, and so it is very likely that the 
sledge behind Evans is a result of his handiwork. 
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Edgar Evans 
Edgar Evans (1876-1912) was born in Rhossili, Wales. When he was 15 he joined 
the Royal Navy. He advanced from seaman on HMS Trafalgar to physical 
education instructor on HMS Excellent, to able seaman on HMS Vernon, and to 
leading seaman on HMS Pembroke. In 1899 he joined Lieutenant Scott on HMS 
Majestic37. At the age of twenty-five, he applied to, and was accepted on to, 
Scott’s first Antarctic expedition, The National Antarctic Expedition, (1901-04), 
as a Petty Officer. After returning to Wales he married his cousin, Lois Beynon. 
He then worked as a gunnery instructor and won the Torpedo Cup several 
times38, before re-joining Captain Scott for the British Antarctic Expedition 
(1910-13). Evans was one of four men chosen by Scott to march to the South 
Pole. All five perished on the return journey, Evans left a widow and three young 
children.   
 
Out of the five Evans was the first to die, collapsing on 17 February 1912. Evans’ 
death is still a matter of mystery. Scott believed Evans had a fall, which later 
caused a brain haemorrhage. Whilst some have suggested scurvy, which weaken 
his blood vessels, thus when Evans fell and hit his head, this caused a brain 
haemorrhage39. Though Susan Solomon believes he suffered high altitude 
cerebral oedema40. A month after Evans’ demise, Captain Oates walked out of 
the tent to his death, with the immortal words, “I am just going outside I maybe 
some time.”41 Scott, Wilson and Bowers died in their tent at the end of March 
1912.  
 
When the news reached England in February 1913, following the publishing of 
Scott’s ‘message to the public’, which proclaimed Evans’ role in the disaster as 
the “astonishing failure… of the strongest man”42. Henceforth Evans became 
known as ‘the strong man’. However, Evans was not just a one-dimensional 
figure as the name ‘strong man’ implies.  
                                                 
37 G.C. Gregor, Swansea’s Antarctic Explorer, p.77 
38 According to Frank Debenham’s journal Evans stated he had won the cup 5 times, though Evans’ 
biographer G.C. Gregor has stated Evans won it twice. 
39 A.F. Rogers, ‘The Death of Petty Officer Evans’ The Practitioner, April 1974, and R. Huntford, Scott and 
Amundsen, p.505 
40 S. Solomon, The Coldest March, pp.228-231. 
41 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.410 
42 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
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Chapter 1 
“In a show like this we have no scared namby pamby’s”43.  
 
In order to analyse the construction and establishment of Evans’ image, it is first 
necessary to examine how Evans’ fellow travellers viewed him prior to his death. 
Thus, before Scott’s opinions of his ‘failure’ were published and before the 
accusations by the press. The remainder of the first chapter will deal with Evans’ 
representation by the press in 1913. A brief chronology is given to show how 
Evans’ image developed. This chapter then focuses on the newspaper reports 
that suggest Evans failed mentally, along with the reports that suggest Evans’ 
failure was caused by his physicality. I contend that newspaper reports and 
Scott’s ‘message’ were the key mediators in Evans’ subsequent projection and 
status, questioning his manliness and creating a vulnerable legacy.  
 
The opinions of Evans’ fellow travellers  
In January 1911 Evans was told by Scott to accompany three scientists on the 
Western Sledge Journey. 44 The scientists, Thomas Griffith-Taylor, Frank 
Debenham and Charles Wright had never been to Antarctica before, and so 
Evans’ job was essentially to show the men how to sledge and camp. Evans 
demonstrated how to put up and pull down the tent, how to cook for four men, 
how to fix boots, and he kept their spirits up with a stream of anecdotes, 
chocolate and card games. In Griffith-Taylor’s journal he promotes Evans as, “an 
ideal sledge-mate”45, an “expert steersman”46, who kept them in good humour; 
“Evans as usual enlivened us with Navy yarns”47. These comments show Evans as 
a man of skill, whilst being fully aware of his responsibilities by ensuring the 
morale of the group remained high. Similarly Captain Scott promoted Evans as, 
“the most invaluable asset to our party”48, hailing his craftsman-like skill; “a 
new pair of sealskin overshoes for ski made by Evans have been a complete 
                                                 
43 Henry. R. Bowers letter to Emily Webb Bowers, 22 June 1910, MS 1505/1/1/3/89 
44 T. Griffith-Taylor was the official leader, but as Evans was there to teach Debenham, Wright and Griffith-
Taylor how to survive tent-life, Evans became the unofficial leader. 
45 Griffith-Taylor collection, (ed) W. Hanley, p.87 
46 ibid, p.100 
47 ibid, p.97 
48 R. F. Scott, Journals, p.363 
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success”49, “Evans has made a lining for one of the tents; it is secured on the 
inner side of the poles and provides an air space inside the tent”50. There was far 
more to Evans than simple seaman who was there for his strength alone. 
Particularly as Evans was presented as a craftsman, that is in essence a show of 
self-discipline and control, two traits advocated by Victorian freethinkers Carlyle 
and Kinsley51.  Although self-control may only have been a key component of the 
masculine ideal for the middle-upper classes, the men praising Evans’ skill were 
from that social standing, thus it is highly probable that to Scott and Griffith-
Taylor, Evans represented a display of supreme masculinity. It could be argued 
that Evans was a favourite of Scott, and as such Scott’s comments would be 
positive. However, Scott was heavily responsible for Evans’ subsequent un-heroic 
representation and so Evans was not so favourable that he was beyond criticism.  
 
In Frank Debenham’s unpublished diary there were frequent comments about 
him and Evans larking about. Debenham regularly made a note of Evans’ sayings. 
For example, when dealing cards Debenham gave Evans a bad hand to which 
Evans replied, “Right o my old blossom, wait till I’m cook again I’ll pizen you”52. 
This was not simply a patronising note of look at how the lower ranks talk, for he 
expresses how well they get on, immediately after the incident Debenham 
recorded, “we really are a very jolly sledging party and it is practically all due to 
Evans”53. It seems from Debenham’s original diary that he looked up to Evans. 
This statement is inferred because Debenham makes no references to the 
comments used by Griffith Taylor or Charles Wright, as he does with Evans, 
whom he mentions every day, writing down Evans’ opinions and popular sayings. 
Debenham states, “Evans has the most frequent falls and after one he peers out 
of his hole at me to see if I’m laughing and that always breaks me up.”54 
 
“Evans and I have started a feud…Ripping chap!”55 “Evans and I whirled away the 
time singing and generally acting the giddy ox. Amongst other things he proposed 
                                                 
49 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.245 
50 R.F. Scott, Journals p.229 
51 C. Oldstone-Moore ‘The Beard Movement in Victorian Britain’, p.14 
52 F. Debenham, Diary, 15 February 1911, MS 1654;D 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid, 20 February, 1911  
55 Ibid, 18 February 1911 
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to me.”56 Evans was essentially breaking down the class barriers that have often 
been associated with the regime of Scott’s expeditions. The quotes also show 
that Evans possessed qualities that the educated men admired.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 [Left to right: Evans, Griffith-Taylor and Debenham in early 1911.] Debenham stated 
in his journal that Evans would make him laugh just as the photograph was taken, resulting in 
the two of them “grinning like apes” 57, though here is looks like they have managed to keep 
a straight face. 
 
Unfortunately, there is little evidence to illustrate how the Seamen and Petty 
Officers viewed Evans. This is because, only a minority kept journals, and those 
                                                 
56 Ibid, 26 February 1911 
57ibid, 21 February 1911 
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who did often wrote rather short entries58, and generally made no mention of 
their thoughts and feelings about their fellows. Often just stating the time, 
weather, food consumed and where they camped, whilst any extraordinary 
events were also noted. For as Evans proclaimed having seen a whale, “Hoorey, 
got something to put in the diary.”59 Additionally, one should acknowledge that 
journals could have been lost or destroyed, or they may have remained in family 
possession. 
 
It should though be clear that from the evidence available, Evans was seen as an 
asset to the expedition and to his fellow travellers. He was a leader, not only 
shown by the fact that he became the unofficial leader of the western sledge 
journey, but as a gunnery instructor his team won the Torpedo cup several 
times. He was a skilled craftsman, making successful sledges, crampons, sleeping 
bags, and tent linings, he was devoted to his leader and broke down social 
boundaries. Yet these virtues stated by his fellow explorers have, by and large, 
been lost, hidden or misrepresented by the mediators. 
 
A chronology of the press’ presentation of Evans 
To aid the readers understanding of the construction of Evans’ image, I have 
written 4 key dates to show a brief chronology of Evans’ presentation by the 
British press. 
 
On 10 February 1913, the news of the fate of the Antarctic five was first 
published. There were no accusations being put forward on this date for 
knowledge of the disaster is minimal.60  
 
From 11 February 1913 Captain Scott’s ‘message to the public’61 was printed62. 
In the ‘message’, Scott calls Evans’ breakdown an “astonishing failure of…the 
                                                 
58 With the exception of Petty Officer Thomas Williamson 
59 F. Debenham, diary, 13 February 1911. Rather ironically this was noted by Debenham in his diary and not 
recorded by Evans. 
60 Westminster Gazette, 10 February 1913, Extra late Pall Mall Gazette, 10 February 1913, MS 1453/40 
61 See Appendix for the entire ‘Message to the public’ 
62 Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Mail, Westminster Gazette - 11 February, Daily Mirror, Daily Graphic, Daily 
Sketch, Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Morning Post- 12 February 12, The Times Weekly – 14 February 
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strongest man”63. From this date on Evans was known as the ‘strong man’, and 
theories were put forward by the press concerning Evans’ role in the disaster, 
such as, “did he fail physically or mentally?”64 From 11 February for several days 
there were also articles about Evans with a sympathetic tone, for Evans’ wife 
Lois was quoted.65  
 
From 15 February 1913, Commander Edward Evans’66 interview, whereby he 
stated that the accusations that Edgar Evans went insane were untrue, was 
extensively reported67. However, some newspapers as late as 21 February were 
stilling projecting the view that “Evans [had] lost his reason”68. There were two 
images of Evans being offered, “the strong man of Captain Scott’s Southern Party 
whose accident was the beginning of the disaster”69, in conjunction with, “the 
strong man of Scott’s band of heroes”70.  
 
Throughout the remainder of 1913, Evans was still offered as a hero within the 
group, but his un-heroic reception as an individual continued. The Daily Mirror 
presented the publication of Scott’s Journals as a means to “clear up the 
mystery of Evans’ death”, the article concurs,“there is no mystery at all Evans 
died a natural death following great exhaustion.” However, Evans’ image is not 
re-constructed as heroic, for the article continues, “the following extracts show 
how the various stages of the sturdy seaman’s fate dogged them”71. Evidently 
Evans was still a controversial figure.   
 
 
 
                                                 
63 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.420 
64 The Daily Express,  
65 Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Graphic, 12 February, The Times Weekly, 14 February, The Globe 13 February.  
66 Commander Edward Evans began the expedition as a Lieutenant, but after Scott’s death, he was promoted 
to Commander. He is no relation to Edgar Evans. 
67 The Observer, Sunday 16 February 1913, The Daily Mail 15th February, The Times Weekly Edition, 
February 21st, The Times 17 February 1913 
68 The Times Weekly Edition, 21 February 1913  
69 Illustrated London News, 15 February 1913, MS 1453/40 
70 The Daily Graphic, 15 February 1913, MS 1958/1 
71 The Daily Mirror, 6 November 1913  
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Figure 4 [Left to right] Bowers, Oates, Evans, Scott and Wilson at the South Pole, 17 January 
1912 
 
Scott’s ‘message to the public’ 
Why did the press attack Evans? 
 
From the chronology it is clear that the primary reason Evans was open to attack 
stems from the fact that the first, and most influential mediator, Captain Scott, 
had lambasted Evans in the ‘message to the public’. From that point on Evans’ 
legacy became vulnerable.  
 
The ‘message’ was a note written by Scott as he, Bowers and Wilson awaited 
death in their tent; it was an attempt to explain the reasons for the disaster. 
Scott blamed the loss of pony transport, the weather, the soft snow and he then 
claims that they would have made it home “in fine form and with surplus food, 
but for the astonishing failure of the man whom we least expected to fail. Edgar 
Evans was thought the strongest man of the party.”72 However, Scott went on to 
state that the journey had shown, “that Englishmen can endure hardships, help 
                                                 
72 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421  
 18 
one another and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past…had we 
lived I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance and courage of 
my companions which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman.”73   
 
Scott’s ‘message’ was not just a note; it was an unofficial document that 
became the basis for Evans’ un-heroic reputation and the others heroic 
depiction. Notes are essentially filling in for official documentation, therefore it 
was not an official statement produced by Scott; it was his own private thoughts 
and opinions.74  
 
To be declared a ‘failure’ by his leader twice is indisputably not a representation 
of a state of heroism. However, ‘failure’ is not the only significant word in 
Scott’s pronouncement of Evans’ role in the disaster. Qualifying the ‘failure’ 
with the word ‘astonishing’, presents the notion that Evans’ ‘failure’ was 
unpredicted, Evans should not have failed, and he was therefore unreliable. This 
is a key statement, for self-control and self-discipline were often viewed as the 
epitome of masculinity, particularly for the middle to higher classes. Thus 
unreliability was not a virtue it was an indictment. As Showalter states, in 
reference to the First World War, “chief among the values promoted within the 
male community of the war was the ability to tolerate the appalling filth and the 
stink of the trenches, the relentless noise, and the constant threat of death, 
with stoic good humour, and to allude to it in phlegmatic understatement. 
Indeed, emotional repression was an essential aspect of the British masculine 
ideal.”75 Evans was presented as having an unpredictable failure; this was clearly 
not a representation of a masculine ideal, let alone a heroic ideal. 
 
Scott’s ‘message’ along with Oates’ self-sacrificing moment, “I’m just going 
outside I may be sometime”76 were, as Jones’ research has found, the only two 
extracts directly quoted from Scott’s Journals that were telegraphed back to the 
                                                 
73 R. F. Scott, Journals, p.422 
74 Though it is debatable if Scott knew this personal note would be made public, it would be reasonable to 
assume that it was his intention, as it was entitled ‘message to the public’. 
75 E. Showalter, The Female Malady, p.169 
76 R.F. Scott, Journals, p. 410 
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press in England.77 Those two extracts from Scott’s Journal’s provided the basis 
for the story told to one and a half million children in elementary schools on 15 
February 191378.  The message was also printed in a small 7 page booklet 
entitled ‘The People’s Tribute to the Heroes of the Antarctic’, which was a 
“penny contribution…enabling the humblest of us to participate”79 in the fund-
raising. The ‘message’ was evidently publicised throughout the social hierarchy. 
The public would not see Scott’s comments praising Evans until the end of the 
year, when Scott’s Journals were published on 6 November 1913. Therefore, the 
image of Evans that was offered in newspapers throughout Britain in February 
1913, stemmed from the image presented by Scott; a strong man, dying first and 
contributing to the fate of the other four.  
 
Evans’ state of mind 
Many newspapers ran stories that questioned Evans’ state of mind, From15 
February 1913, The Observer, Western Mail, South Wales Echo, Daily Graphic 
and The Times Weekly Edition all ran a very similar story expressing concerns 
about Evans’ mental state. “It would seem from what has escaped some of the 
survivors that Evans lost his reason for the time being under the great stress of 
fatigue and privation and was incapable of obeying orders, or assisting his hard-
pushed companions in the weary work of pulling the sledge. Indeed it became 
necessary in the end to lay him on it.”80  This article declares that the evidence 
for Evans’ mental breakdown stems from his comrades, though there were also 
reports that the men did not talk to the press. For example, in another interview 
Commander Evans had stated, “members of the expedition were not anxious to 
be interviewed.”81 So although possible, it is unlikely that one of his companions 
would have made such an accusation, for claiming that Evans had ‘lost his 
reason’, was a term used to insinuate insanity. The press were making a serious 
indictment since the attribution of mental health issues would have been seen as 
a major social stigma, and consequently a long way from a heroic image.  
 
                                                 
77 M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, pp.99-100  
78 M. Jones, ‘The King Upon His Knees’ p.110 in G. Cubitt and A. Warren (ed) Heroic Reputations and 
Exemplary Lives 
79Ephemera Collection 1910-13 
80The Times Weekly 21 February 1913,  
81 The Birmingham Gazette, 14 April 1913, MS 1957/7   
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The image presented by those newspapers of Evans being carried on the sledge 
itself a tool of labour, shows a lack of ability to operate on space, his demise 
represented a failed, ‘bodily force’. For as Valentine states, “Connell…argues 
[men] are expected to be able to exhibit bodily skill in terms of their 
competence to operate on space, or the objects in it, and to be a bodily force in 
terms of their ability to occupy space”82.  In the reports of his failing mentality 
and physically Evans was clearly presented as showing an inability to operate not 
only the technology of the object (the sledge), but also an inability to orientate 
within the Antarctic space. However, in the accounts of his fellows before he 
reached the Pole, Evans was the embodiment of bodily force and by crafting 
objects, leading and teaching men, he had clearly occupied space with 
authority.  
 
Mark Jackson believes, that Edwardian perceptions of feeble-minds “were closely 
framed by broader social and cultural concerns, particularly about race, class 
and gender.“83 Evans’ presented mental instability was also framed by those 
cultural concerns. For the early twentieth century was a time when the theory of 
‘separate spheres’ for men and women was a still a popular belief. It would 
therefore be reasonable to assume that there were views of separate spheres too 
for male and female mentality, since hysteria and nervous dispositions were not 
seen masculine traits, they were characterized as effeminate. And the 
appearance of effeminate traits was seen as danger to the manliness of the race, 
for example, hunting was encouraged at public schools for it was seen as an 
“antidote to effeminacy”84. To give another contemporary example, the 
following letter, written by an ex-military man was printed in The Daily Sketch: 
 
“MORAL GERMICIDE – Returned Exile Shocked at London’s Effeminate Men” 
 “After eighteen years in India I return to England and what do I find? An 
improvement in her modes of locomotion? Perhaps. But where are her sons? 
 …There is a brigade of microbes (I cannot think of any other term) with 
painted faces, high-heeled boots and bangles infesting London. 
                                                 
82 G. Valentine, ‘What it means to be a man, the body, masculinity, disability’ p.165 from R. Butler + H. Parr 
(ed), Mind and Body and Spaces 
83 M. Jackson, The Borderline of Imbecility, p.129 
84 J. M. MacKenzie, The Empire of Nature, pp.45-46 from P.A Dunae, British Juvenile Literature, p.475  
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 I went into a hairdresser’s in Piccadilly for a shave and to my 
astonishment and disgust was asked if I would have my face massaged! With a 
reply more forcible than polite I seized my overcoat and a hat (unfortunately not 
my own) and hurried along the streets thinking: What has England come to? 
 In the boy scouts we certainly have the making of men – not that these 
men will remain in Britain unless something is done to improve the masculine 
standard. They will away to the colonies and live with men. 
 KADER – Birmingham85 
 
The letter clearly shows that displays of femininity were seen as unmanly, and so 
the Antarctic five may have been viewed as antidotes to the accusations of the 
declining manliness of the nation. The letter does though have a satirical tone, 
for it seems people were well aware that the testing ground for the manliness of 
British subjects was in the colonies, away from Britain. Although it cannot be 
assumed this voice was the voice of many, for it could be the voice of one 
region, occupation, or age. It should be acknowledged that during the Victorian 
and Edwardian period there was an emphasis on creating brave boys to defend 
the empire. This accounts for the prominence of frontier and military stories in 
boys’ literature, wherein; “the imperatives of empire elaborated a militaristic 
and robust hypermasculinity which found its apotheosis in…the boys’ adventure 
story.”86 This implies the shocked opinion put forward in the letter was not an 
individual perception, there was a popular desire to enhance the manliness of 
the male British nation, and Evans’ presented mental instability reflected the 
fears of un-manliness. 
 
It is the general consensus that the First World War acted as a catalyst for 
advancing the understanding of mental health and developing psychological 
therapy, whilst also calling into question popular beliefs on degeneration.87 
However, medics first had to recognise that shellshock was not a sign of 
weakness and degeneration, and it appears from Elaine Showalter’s investigation 
into male hysteria in The Female Malady (1985), that a class distinction was 
                                                 
85 Daily Sketch, 11 February 1913  
86 M. Francis, ‘The Domestication of the Male’, Historical Journal, p.640 
87 P. Howorth, ‘The treatment of shell-shock’, p.225 
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introduced.  “Doctors noticed that war neurosis took different forms in officers 
and regular soldiers... [There was a] tidy distribution of symptoms and diagnosis 
is consistent with late Victorian moralistic and class orientated attitudes to 
hysteria and neurasthenia in women.”88 Showalter continues, “the hysterical 
soldier was seen as a simple, emotional, unthinking, passive, suggestible, 
dependant and weak – very much the same constellation of traits associated with 
the hysterical woman – while the complex and overworked neurasthenic officer 
was much closer to an acceptable, even heroic male ideal.”89 
 
Evidently Showalter’s research shows that the lower ranks were fitted to a 
feminine model, leaving the privations of the higher ranks to be viewed within a 
heroic ideal.  The fact that a distinction was sought out shows there was a 
concern that a state, which had traditionally been seen as a feminine trait and 
defect, could be pinned to men of officer status. This implies that in the pre-war 
and thus pre-distinction phase, Evans’ class was not the cause of accusations 
about his presented mental instability, for the class distinctions were yet to be 
introduced.  Therefore, Evans’ breakdown was seen as a demonstration of a lack 
of will power, an accusation of femininity, not one solely tied to social status. 
The accusations questioned his masculinity, which would have affected the 
likelihood of Evans being promoted as a heroic individual.  
 
It seems fitting to have compared the diagnosis of shellshock, a military 
syndrome, with the supposed mental breakdown of Edgar Evans. This is because, 
as George Mosse claims, “war is a test of manliness, those who had shell-sock 
failed the test”90. In pre-war Britain, Antarctic exploration was the supreme test 
of manliness, those who were projected as slowing down their comrades, losing 
their mind and having to be carried on a sledge, failed the test.  
 
However, although hysteria and mental breakdown were seen as essentially 
feminine, there has traditionally been a connection between sailors and 
femininity. Quintin Colville states, “ratings were associated with feminised 
                                                 
88 E. Showalter, The Female Malady, p.174 
89 ibid, p.175 
90 George. L. Mosse, ‘Shell-Shock as a Social Disease’, Journal of Contemporary History, p.104 
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qualities such as the love of domesticity, sentimentality, emotional spontaneity 
and immaturity; connotations further borne out by the requirement of ratings to 
wash and repair their own clothes.”91 So there was a link already, inferring that 
sailors had a masculinity of their own, and thus is not comparable to other 
occupations, or those within the same class. Additionally, Conley has proclaimed 
that there was a genuine respect for the domesticated sailor, for cleaning 
products were often advertised by images of sailors.92 However, whereas 
feminine qualities such as domesticity can be praised within or outside the 
seaman’s world, a mental breakdown was not a praise-worthy state in a 
seaman’s world of masculinity or any other.   
 
 
Figure 5 Edgar Evans at the sewing machine, like all Petty Officers would have been a skilled 
sewer, for a Royal Naval mariner sewing was a necessity as they needed to mend their own 
clothes. 
 
Reports questioning Evans’ mental state continued to be printed.  The Daily 
Express ran an article entitled, “The problem of Seaman Evans – why he “failed” 
the expedition – was he handicapped by his strength? – Did Seaman Edgar Evans- 
                                                 
91 Q. Colville, ‘Jack Tar and the Gentleman Officer. The Role of Uniform in Shaping in the Class – and 
Gender-Related Identities of British Naval Personnel, 1930-39’ p.127 
92 M. Conley, From Jack Tar To Union Jack, p.145 
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the cheery giant of the party fail physically or mentally?” The article quoted an 
‘eminent mental specialist’, who asserted, “it is the uneducated man he said 
who would feel most acutely the mental strain and dreary, monotonous life amid 
eternal snows...To an educated man this strain would be bad enough, but he 
would be able to stimulate his brain from his store of learning. Contrary to 
popular belief, educated men endure long terms of imprisonment – most of the 
rigours of which would be reproduced and intensified among the hardships of the 
Antarctic – better than the uneducated man. The absence of stimulus in an 
uneducated man, such as presumably Seaman Evans would have been – might 
have been succeeded by a kind of self-mannerism, followed by mania and 
delusion that he was being kept from food and home, both close at hand. Such a 
breakdown may have been the ‘failure’ of which Captain Scott speaks. Or it may 
have been physical failure. It is not always the biggest and most athletic man 
who endures privation best.”93 
 
The fact that the press sought out a ‘specialist’ to offer his opinions shows that 
the press were accepting Scott’s initial criticism of Evans, and were not looking 
to provide evidence that proved otherwise. The newspaper had sought an 
educated man, a voice of medical authority, who was effectively verifying 
Scott’s statement, and thus attempting to turn it from interpretation to factual 
analysis. Evans was therefore officially labelled unsuitable for exploration. The 
Express’ ‘specialist’ was evidently questioning Evans’ mental capability, 
asserting that Evans had a lack of education, essentially implying that Evans’ 
financial and social circumstances rendered him unfit for exploration. However, 
when Evans had returned from Scott’s first Antarctic expedition the Discovery 
(1901-04), the press declared, “the crew is composed entirely of absolutely 
picked men, each one of them noted for a high standard of intelligence.94 Whilst 
another claimed, “they have been specially selected for their physique, 
constitution, seamanship, and for their capacity in entertaining their fellows.”95 
Additionally, Evans’ mental state was not an issue before January 1912, as 
Bowers stated in a letter to his sister, “in a show like this we have no scared 
                                                 
93 The Daily Express, 12 February 1913, MS 1453/2 
94 Unknown Paper, date is most likely 1903, MS 735/1  
95 Daily Mail, 8 July 1901, MS 1464/31 
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namby pambys – Thank goodness”96. Whilst Scott claimed in his Journals Evans 
had a “really remarkable headpiece”97 and Ponting recalled, “Evans, always 
quick-witted”98. Evidently these were a long a way from the reports that Evans’ 
lack of education made him a liability on the expedition.   
 
The day before Evans died, Scott had stated, “Evans has nearly broken down in 
the Brain we think.”99 Which could account for the press accusations, yet these 
comments were not published until November 1913, some nine months later. 
Additionally on the day Evans died, Evans had announced, “As he always did, 
that he was quite well”100 and he started the day pulling the sledge in his 
harness. He was clearly not a perpetual delirious mess as some of the press 
reports implied.  
 
                                                 
96 H. R. Bowers, letter to Emily Webb Bowers, 22 June 1910. 1501/1/1/3/89 
97 R. F. Scott, Journals, p.369 
98 H. Ponting, The Great White South, p.27 
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Figure 6 this photograph is a section from a larger image showing Evans building a sledge101. 
Frank Debenham, the co-founder and first director of the Scott Polar Research Institute, was 
a member of Scott’s last expedition and claimed Evans was, “the most useful man down 
here.”102 
 
It was when Evans was blamed that the press became selective and ignored 
evidence that proved Evans could be self-disciplined. Figure 6, above, is of major 
significance for it shows Evans’ skill. Evans was not a trained carpenter, yet 
along with his fellow Petty Officers he made all of the sledges, showing his 
capacity for learning and engineering. This has implications for a man of skill and 
master of a craft shows a presence of self-discipline, control of mind and body. 
Yet this photo was not chosen by the press to represent Evans. Perhaps a display 
of a hard working, adaptable and skilled mariner was not the image the press 
                                                 
101 The full photograph can be viewed in the appendix, p.85 
102 F. Debenham, The Quiet Land, p.127 
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wanted to project once conventions had been established. On the other hand, it 
may simply be that this image was not available to the press. That though is 
extremely unlikely as, from 21 May 1913 the photographs taken by the five at the 
South Pole were available, with The Daily Mirror having exclusive rights to show 
the photographs first. If the last photographs of the Pole Party were accessible 
from that date it can be assumed that from 21 May at the very latest, all the 
photographs of Evans taken prior to the Pole would have also been available to 
the press. In fact the image chosen to represent Evans in that particular issue 
was an image that highlighted his strength, not his self-discipline. The 
photograph used can be seen in figure 7 below.  
 
Figure 7 Edgar Evans poses with a pickaxe slung over his shoulder. Underneath the portrait 
the captain in the Daily Mirror read, “Petty Officer Evans, ‘the strong man of the party,’ who 
was the first to die. ‘He died a natural death, but left us a shaken party with the season duly 
advanced’ wrote Captain Scott.”103 
 
                                                 
103 The Daily Mirror, 21 May, 1913 
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Interestingly The Daily Chronicle on 13 February 1913, printed an article 
claiming, “Evans accompanied Captain Scott on his first attempt to reach the 
Pole ten years ago, and the leader then praised him highly. There is no word of 
commendation for him on this occasion.”104 One cannot help but wonder if the 
press did actually probe, or, just accepted the evidence at face value. The only 
official account they were given was through Commander Evans and this included 
Scott’s ‘message’ and a report of the disaster, Commander Evans was 
interviewed in April 1913, but during this interview declared that Evans had 
behaved, “magnificently throughout the expedition”105. However, during this 
interview Commander Evans also cast judgement over Evans. The Birmingham 
Gazette explains, Commander Edward Evans was “told of some of the rumours 
which were circulated regarding the fate of Seaman Evans… Poor Evans behaved 
magnificently throughout the expedition he said and his astonishing failure, as 
Captain Scott described it, was due to the continuous hardships encountered. 
Evans was possessed of tremendous strength, but it would seem that his staying 
power was not equal to that of his tent-mates.”106  
 
The comment from Lieutenant Evans, accusing Evans as lacking ‘staying power’ is 
not a technical or medical explanation for Evans ‘failure’. It is an accusation 
based upon contemporary popular language that infers and implies rather than 
offering a definite and constructive explanation. Paul Fussell’s, The Great War 
and Modern Memory, (2000) investigates the adaptation of words to hide a 
greater meaning.  “Not to complain is to be - manly” “actions are – deeds” “to 
be cheerfully brave is to be – plucky” “to be earnestly brave is to be – 
gallant”107. The language used in Great War was, “the language is that which 
two generations of readers had been accustomed to associate with the quiet 
action of personal control and Christian self-abnegation (‘sacrifice’), as well as 
with more violent actions of aggression and defence.”108 The language used 
defined and identified several generations, and it was this language that was 
prominent in the projections of the exploits of the expedition. By questioning 
                                                 
104 The Daily Chronicle, 13 February 1913, 
105 The Birmingham Gazette, MS 1957/7, The Times, 17 February 1913 
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107 P. Fussell, The Great War and Modern Memory, p.22 
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Evans’ ‘staying power’, it implies Evans had a lack of mental strength and thus a 
lack of self-control. Additionally Commander Evans’ comments show that even 
Edgar Evans’ fellow travellers viewed him in a differing light to the rest of the 
Antarctic five, a point I will further examine in chapter 2.  
 
Major Raymond. E. Priestley, who was part of Scott’s 1910-13 expedition, 
declared in his paper ‘The Psychology of exploration’ in the section ‘polar 
madness’ that “one factor worth mentioning is that it appears to be the most 
unelastic temperaments and minds that succumb. The higher strung and more 
sensitive the organisation the better it will withstand extraordinary strain.”109 
However, Debenham, who often quoted Evans in his diary, states that Evans had 
said “a man who takes things as they come and doesn’t worry can enjoy the Navy 
as he does.”110 He clearly did not posses an ‘unelastic temperament’. 
Additionally, although Priestley’s statement is based upon his opinions and 
observations in the Antarctic, Priestley would not have spent very much time at 
all with Evans. Priestley was not part of any of the geological party’s that were 
accompanied by Evans, and Priestley spent nine months with the Northern Party, 
whilst Evans was on the Southern Journey. It was reported by the press that P.O 
George Abbott, a member of the Northern Party suffered a mental breakdown111, 
so it is likely Priestley’s comments were written in reference to Abbott and not 
Evans.  
 
Evans’ physicality and popular opinion 
The ‘message to the public’ had essentially set the standard for criticising Evans, 
it also had a major contribution in the construction of Evans’ image for it put 
forward the notion that Evans’ strength was his key, and defining trait. In 
consequence, the vast majority of press reports from 11 February 1913 refer to 
Evans as ‘the strong man of the party’. For example, The Illustrated London 
News declares Evans as, ‘the strong man of Captain Scott‘s Southern party whose 
accident was the beginning of the disaster.”112 The Daily Sketch calls Evans, “the 
                                                 
109 Major. R.E. Priestley, ‘The Psychology of exploration’ p.76, SPRI- MS 1097/16/1 
110 F. Debenham, Diary,  MS 1654 
111 Unknown paper, article states, “Mrs Abbott is the dependent mother of a chief petty-officer who has 
become insane in consequence of privations endured”- MS 1453/40 
112 Illustrated London News, 15 February 1913, MS 1453/40 
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strongest who died first”113 The Morning Post; “the strong man…whose 
unaccountable breakdown was the first symptom”114. One article from The Daily 
Mirror, 12 February 1913 entitled “The Strong Man Who Fell”, proclaims,  “It is 
one of the paradoxes of Nature a London physician stated yesterday, “that 
splendidly developed, huge-framed stand adverse conditions, such as extreme 
cold, starvation, or prolonged thirst, much worse than smaller men of infinitely 
inferior physique. That it is a fact, however has been proven again and again in 
wars, where the little, more or less scrawny, underdeveloped men stand the 
rigours and hardships of a campaign much better than their so called stronger 
fellows.”115 
 
These are clearly attacks on Evans, stemming from his physique, which here has 
been rendered unsuitable for exploration. To be pronounced as a ‘paradox of 
nature’, or be put forward as having had an ‘unaccountable breakdown’ is 
obviously not a representation of an ideal. The Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch 
were newspapers aimed towards the lower classes, inferring that it was not 
solely an attack on Evans’ class, for it is unlikely a newspaper whose audience 
was generally made up of the working classes116 would attack those of a similar 
socio-financial state. This then questions the claim that Evans’ class can function 
as an unproblematic explanation for the derogatory comments put forward by 
the press. The quote also shows that the press had again sought out a ‘physician’ 
to put forward opinions on Evans’ failure, showing the willingness of the press to 
find an official to authenticate, and not disprove, Scott’s ‘message’. Evans was 
yet again officially labelled unsuitable for exploration. 
 
However, one must question the reliability of the evidence of the ‘experts’ who 
were asked by the press to comment upon the photographs of Evans and give 
reasons for Evans’ ‘failure’. This is because from 11 February until 13 February 
the photographs used in most newspapers of Petty Officer Evans were actually 
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that of Petty Officer Johnson117.   Although no scholars or biographers have 
brought up this issue before, there is affirmative evidence that the photographs 
do not match. Underneath a small portrait Edgar Evans in The Daily Sketch, an 
article states that the portrait “sent out by a photographic agency as that of 
Evans, and published in the Daily Sketch and other newspapers, was in reality a 
picture of Petty Officer Johnson, another member of the expedition, who is alive 
and well.’118 This raises doubts over the evidence of ‘experts’ such as the 
‘London physician’ who declared, “Seaman Evans, from his photograph, must 
have been a tremendously powerful man as far as bone and muscle are 
concerned.”119 Although it is common consensus that Evans was a strong man, if 
the experts’ sole interpretation of Evans’ was based upon one photograph of the 
wrong man, it does suggest that some of their inferences may be erroneous. 
 
This case of mistaken identity could have been due to the fact that Henry 
Robertson Bowers stated in a letter to his sister, that Johnson was “the strongest 
seaman”120.  And so in trying to find photos of Evans, the photographic agency 
simply saw the photograph and assumed it was Evans, who, after all was well 
recorded by Scott and every paper in the nation as the ‘strong man’.  Though 
perhaps it is most likely it was simply mislabelled in the first place, for 
underneath one photograph in The Daily Mirror in May 1910, Evans was labelled 
as Johnson, and Johnson as Evans121. To add insult to injury, Bowers also states, 
“we also got rid of our strongest seaman Johnson who exchanged with a man on 
the ‘Powerful.’ He was the champion Boxer man and had begun to threaten and 
bully his mess-mates”122. So, not only was the wrong photograph used, it was 
also a photograph of a man who had been removed from his position for bullying 
his fellows.  
 
Mark Jackson’s research has shown that during the Victorian and Edwardian 
period in the medical, anthropological and educational field, links between mind 
                                                 
117 Including, The Daily Sketch 11and 12 February, (MS 1958/1) The Daily Mirror, 11 and 12 February, The 
Graphic 15 February, and The Daily Mail 11 February 1913.   
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and body were, “neither novel or isolated.”123 In consequence this infers that the 
theories put forward about the failure of the ‘strongest man’ were actually 
comments about his mental state. However, these links between mind and body 
were affected by fears of degeneration and fears of “imperial decline.”124 So the 
links were caused by insecurities. Additionally some press reports distinguish 
between the two; mind and body were seen as separate. For example The Daily 
Express and The South Wales Echo, ran the same article, “Did Seaman Evans the 
cheery giant of the party fail physically or mentally?”125 So it appears that when 
Evans was presented as failing physically this was not necessarily an assault on 
his mental state.  
 
Because of the limited probing by the press that hid or ignored the image of 
Evans as a man of skill, Evans was presented as being defined by his physicality. 
Therefore the loss of Evans’ strength could also be seen as a loss of his masculine 
identity. It appears that Evans did also view his physical stature as part of his 
masculine identity. For although Colville states, “uniform was of crucial 
significance in defining the understandings of class and masculinity held by 
servicemen.”126 Apsley Cherry-Garrard has recalled that, “[Captain] Oates hated 
swank – so much so that he erred on the other side almost perversely, and was 
rough and ready to the last degree. Taff [Edgar] Evans nearly had a fight with a 
sailor on the quay at Dunedin, because they spoke disrespectfully of Oates 
slovenly dress and slouching gait.”127 Taking Judith Butler’s theory that gender is 
performed, that “stylisation of the body, is a set of repeated acts within a highly 
regulatory framework”128, Oates was clearly pushing the limits of the gender 
identity of a man of the landed gentry. Or, perhaps Oates harboured a resistance 
to the effeminacy associated with the gentleman travellers.  Cherry-Garrard’s 
recollection also shows the framework of manliness Evans worked within, 
attempting to defend Oates’ honour with a physical brawl. Implying Evans 
viewed his physical stature as part of his masculine identity.  
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Figure 8 (This a section from a larger photograph)129 Oates can be seen here ‘slouching’ on 
the side ship whilst Lieutenant Rennick leads one of the ponies out.  
 
There has though been little scholarly research on lower class occupation defined 
masculinity, as J.D Glasco proclaims, “little research has been done to examine 
the seamen’s definitions of their masculine identities”130. Although Glasco’s 
observations that, “in the seaman’s world, a man’s position in the gendered 
hierarchy, his manliness, depended primarily on his maritime skill”131, were 
based upon the mutinies of 1793. If masculinity was occupation defined, it is 
possible the late nineteenth and twentieth century mariners would have 
maintained the view. Seeing that Evans was proclaimed as the “most useful man 
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we have down here”132, his maritime skill level was high, and expectably so from 
a Petty Officer 1st class. This would imply that he was respected for his abilities, 
and as such there were no doubts about his manliness. Confirming the theory 
that it was only the press, set-up by Scott’s ‘message’, who questioned Evans’ 
manliness, whilst greatly ignoring, or not looking for, any contradictory 
evidence. 
 
One wonders if the projection of the failure of the ‘strong man’ was a means of 
reclaiming a sense of masculinity for the upper classes. However, physical 
strength was also a trait the upper classes strived to achieve during this period, 
since the movement Muscular Christianity came into prominence. Muscular 
Christianity emphasised strength of body not just the strength of mind. It was a 
belief sported by those of the upper classes for it was prominent in the public 
schools during this time. This implies that the ‘failure’ of a strong man would not 
necessarily be an attack on his social standing.  
 
However, it should be acknowledged that the emphasis on Evans’ physicality in 
his representation was also a product of a tradition of viewing sailors as strong 
men. It was a state of his occupation not his socio-financial status. The image of 
the tough Jack Tar had been present for centuries, for example Fulford states of 
the eighteenth century sailors, “British sailors, like British ships, exemplified the 
national virtue of oaklike strength.”133 This can be complemented by Thirgood’s 
research into oak, he has shown that the ‘hearts of oak’ traditional view of 
sailors is a link to the qualities of oak itself, for oak was a metaphor for strength, 
“the open-grown character of English oak contributed to the vaunted superiority 
of the ‘hearts of oak’, used in British men-of-war. Throughout the wooden ship 
era, English oak was strongly held to be more durable than French or Baltic 
(largely German) oak.”134 The muscular seaman was a national stereotype, and 
Evans needed no adaptation to fit the bill.  
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A hero within the Antarctic Five 
One wonders if Evans’ presentation goes further than not being a hero, if it 
descends into anti-hero, if he did essentially become a Judas-type-figure. 
However, Evans is not presented as wanting to cause the deaths of his comrades, 
it was not a calculated move, and as such he was more of a failed hero than an 
anti-hero. Additionally, Evans was still presented as a hero by some of the press 
reports when he was presented as part of the Antarctic five. 
 
As part of the group, Evans was frequently offered as a hero. For example, The 
Daily Mirror had a centrefold photograph and above it the headline read, “5 
heroes at the pole” 135. The Standard proclaimed, “Britain may well be proud of 
these sons of hers who are the latest to add their names to the long roll of 
heroes and the martyrs of Polar Exploration.”136 The Daily Graphic, “The strong 
man of Scott’s band of heroes”137. The Daily Telegraph, “The heroes of the South 
Pole”138, The Little Paper, “How five heroes left the world”139 Evans could be 
seen as a hero when the press wanted to present the men as one entity. 
However, as an individual Evans was rarely presented in the same light as his 
comrades. 
  
It is possible that when Evans was presented as a hero, this was a measure to 
protect the image of the strength of the nation. Evans’ presentation by Scott and 
the articles that accepted Scott’s views on Evans’ role in the disaster, 
contradicted the stereotypical image of early twentieth century Royal Navy 
sailors. These were used to show the strength of the nation, and were presented 
as “exemplars of Britishness and manliness”140. Therefore, if sailors within the 
Royal Navy were viewed as the ultimate of masculinity, by presenting Evans as 
failing, either physically, and or, mentally this was not a representation of the 
model of a sailor that had been sold to the population. This could imply that not 
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all articles were derogatory, for if sailors represented imperial power, a failing 
sailor was potentially a failing nation.  
 
Conclusion 
Evans’ legacy was vulnerable having come under attack in Scott’s ‘message’.  
The press took up Scott’s claims resulting in a portrayal that questioned Evans’ 
mental stability and physicality. The inadequacy of the press to offer Evans as a 
man of skill should not be viewed as a genuine reflection of Evans’ character and 
image. Historians should judge it as editorial bias. This resulted in Evans 
becoming, “the strongest man whom we least expected to fail.”141  
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Chapter 2 
“It was the act of a brave man and an English gentleman”142- the heroic ideal. 
 
Oates and Evans were the only two out of the five who did not die alongside 
their leader and both slowed the party down. By comparing the presentation of 
Evans’ death with that of Oates’, this chapter will build upon the theory that 
Evans’ class was not the only factor involved in his presentation. I contend that 
just as Scott had a key role in Evans’ subsequent presentation, he also had a 
critical a role in Oates’ heroic status, whilst the manner of Oates’ and Evans’ 
deaths had a major impact on the ability of the press to establish their 
reputations. Using the accounts of their fellow travellers, and the press reports I 
assert that Oates’ death was seen as the model upon which to base reports of 
other deaths. Additionally, it will be clear that the manner of Scott’s, Wilson’s, 
Bowers’ and Oates’ death all fitted within an already established heroic ideal. 
 
According to Lisa Bloom, “in the years following Scott’s death a myth of 
gentleman-hero was erected on the foundation of the letters Scott wrote to 
explain the causes of his expedition’s misfortunes.”143 This statement of Bloom’s 
is misleading as it suggests that the gentleman-hero’s foundation began with 
Scott, when in fact the gentleman hero had been presented and promoted in the 
Victorian period144.  Additionally, Bloom asserts Scott’s last letters caused him to 
be seen as a gentleman-hero. Contemporary press reports reveal however that it 
was not Scott, but Captain Oates who was presented as the gentleman-hero. He 
was an old Etonian and Cavalry officer who had earned the nickname “No 
Surrender Oates whilst fighting in the second Boer war.”145 If Scott took the 
initial plaudits when the news was widely published on 10 February 1913, Oates 
was the figure who soon overtook him. For example The Daily Chronicle 
proclaimed, ‘THE HERO OATES’146, Everybody’s Weekly proclaimed Oates as the, 
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“MOST HEROIC ENGLISHMAN EVER”147. Whilst The Daily Mail 12 February 1913, 
declared, “if there was a contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his 
comrades, Captain Scott, Dr Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers. The final honour lies 
with Captain Oates.”148 Oates was offered as the quintessential hero, not just 
the gentleman hero.  
 
As the previous chapter has shown, those accusations of Evans failing put forward 
by the press, were initiated by the damning criticism from his leader. Yet Oates 
was also criticised in Scott’s ‘message’, and slowed down the party. Therefore I 
will re-visit the same question proposed by Barczewski, “Why has Oates never 
come in for the same criticism as Evans? Why was his ‘breakdown’ not regarded 
as an indication of weakness or failure in the same way?”149 Barczewski’s 
response is, “the answer is obvious: Oates was an officer and a gentleman, a 
member of the landed gentry from Essex. Because of his class status, he was 
regarded as a hero for his silent suffering and self-sacrifice. What he did was to 
‘play up, play up and play the game’ according to the expectations of the time 
for a man of his rank.”150 
 
It is understandable why there are those who claim that class was the major 
difference in Oates’ and Evans’ projections, for there were instances when their 
socio-economic status did enter their presentation. For example, an article in 
The Pall Mall Gazette, from 11 February 1913, states, “Captain L.E.G. Oates was 
the elder son of the late Mr W.E. Oates, of Gestingthorpe Hall, Essex, Lord of the 
manor of Over Hall, and of Mrs Caroline Oates, now lady of the manor of Over 
Hall, second daughter of the late Mr Joshua Buckton of West Lea, Meanswood 
near Leeds. In addition to being heir to his mother’s estates, Captain Oates was 
joint owner with his brother, of the estate of his uncle, the late Mr C.G. Oates, 
of Meanswood, Yorkshire. He was unmarried as was Lieutenant Bowers. Petty 
Officer Evans was a married man.”151 
 
                                                 
147 Everybody’s Weekly, 22 February, 1930, MS 1453/41 
148 The Daily Mail, 12 February 1913, MS 1453/39/2 
149 S. Barczewski, Antarctic Destinies, p.177 
150 S. Barczewski, Antarctic Destinies, p.177 
151 Pall Mall Gazette, 11 February 1913, MS 1453/40 
 39 
Evidently being a member of the landed gentry was of more importance to The 
Pall Mall Gazette than the dependents left by the Petty Officer. There were 
though no accusations about Evans possessing ‘bad blood’, or his socio-financial 
status rendering him unfit for exploration. Also, the article cited above, was 
printed on 11 February, thus before the widespread accusations of Evans had 
begun, the emphasis of this magazine was already on Oates. However, The Pall 
Mall Gazette was aimed towards the upper classes of society, being priced at 
double the cost of The Daily Mirror and Daily Sketch. Thus the attention was 
with Oates and interest was directed towards his estate, it is also possible that 
some of the readers knew of Oates’ family and estate. 
 
However, there are problems with Barczewski’s interpretation of events. Firstly, 
I do not believe that coming from Essex had anything to do with Oates’ 
representation. Additionally as Barczewski had questioned Jones for not 
appreciating the significance of the criticism of Evans152, Barczewski herself 
could have gone further by looking beyond class which is too sweeping, and 
suggests that no other factors were involved.  The answer to the question 
Barczewski proposed concerning the difference in presentation between Oates 
and Evans is three-fold. Firstly, Scott did not perceive Oates’ as having as 
significant a role in the disaster as Evans, nor did Scott believe Evans’ rank was a 
cause of his ‘failure’. Secondly, the manner of Oates and Evans’ deaths as 
offered in Scott’s assessment, allowed their deaths to be seen as, and presented 
contrastingly by his fellow travellers and the press. And lastly, Evans’ death did 
not fit within an already established heroic framework.  
 
Scott’s ‘message’ 
Scott did not put forward Oates as having as significant a factor in their fate as 
he had done with Evans. Scott states, “we should have got through in spite of the 
weather were it not for the sickening of another companion, Captain Oates, and 
a shortage of fuel in our depots.”153There was clearly a difference in the way 
Oates and Evans were treated; Oates’ decline was not called an “astonishing 
                                                 
152 S. Barczewski, Antarctic Destinies, p.177  
153 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
 40 
failure”154. In addition to Scott’s ‘message’, Lieutenant Evans had also sent to 
the press agencies Scott’s comments from the 17 March concerning Oates’ self-
sacrifice, Scott’s comments included, “it was an act of a brave man and English 
gentleman”155.  Thus from the very beginning of the presentation of their 
images, there was the impression that because of the manner of Oates’ death, 
Oates deserved greater acclaim than Evans. The leader that had damned Evans 
had helped to establish Oates’ heroic image. As with Evans’ demise, there was a 
clear enthusiasm by the press to accept and promote Scott’s view of Oates’ 
demise, with limited probing.   
 
In Scott’s ‘message’, the fact that Scott does not mention the rank of Evans, who 
is referred to as “Edgar Evans” implies that Scott did not deem Evans’ class as an 
explicit factor that contributed to his fate. Yet when the ‘message’ was printed, 
newspapers such as, The Daily Mirror, Daily Sketch and Daily Graphic, Evans’ 
rank was given, though it was incorrect; he is called “Seaman Evans”156 and not 
Petty Officer, his proper rank.157  Commander Evans could have added ‘Seaman’ 
when he cabled the message, or the Central News Agency could have added it in. 
It is generally claimed that Scott’s ‘message’ along with Scott’s account of 
Oates’ death were the only sections of Scott’s diary “quoted verbatim”158 in the 
report Edward Evans sent back to the Central News Agency, this statement is 
thus erroneous.  
 
The demise of Oates and Evans, the opinions of their fellow travellers 
It was not just the press and Scott that presented Oates’ death as more heroic 
than Evans’. Evans and Oates’ fellow travellers had the same opinion, although 
their judgements, like the newspaper articles, were based upon Scott’s account. 
One can see the effect that Scott’s words had on the individual’s perception of 
the events. Petty Officer Patrick Keohane, a member of the supporting Southern 
Party who turned back from the Pole, with Apsley Cherry-Garrard, Charles 
Wright and Edward Atkinson, declared: 
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“[Scott’s] Diary said that Evans P.O Died at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier he 
died of concussion of the brain caused by a fall on blue ice and Captain Oats 
[Oates] had hands and feet frostbitten and could not keep up he new he was 
preventing his companions from getting on so he walked out to his death in a 
blizzard about 18miles south of where we found the tent so as to give his 
companions a chance to get home it was one of the bravest deeds ever history 
has known”159. 
 
 
Figure 9 Petty Officer Patrick Keohane poses for Ponting. Keohane had previously served 
under Lieutenant Evans on HMS Talbot, along with P.O Forde, Dickason and Browning, all of 
whom went on this expedition. 
 
Similarly, Petty Officer Thomas Williamson, who had also been part of Scott’s 
first expedition, declared: 
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“Evans P.O.1. died at the foot of the Beardmore Glacier. Capt Oates 20 miles 
south of this place, this brave fellow sacrificing his life by walking out of the tent 
in a heavy blizzard so that he could no longer be a drag on the remainder of the 
party, he had become badly frost-bitten in both feet and they had been pulling 
him along on the sledge; as the party got down on the Barrier from the 
Beardmore Glacier they experienced very low temperatures…. The whole world 
will soon know, the deeds that were done were equally as great as any 
committed on Battlefields and have won the respect of honour of every true 
Britisher.”160 
 
Figure 10 Thomas Williamson sits smoking his pipe. Williamson wrote four journals of his 
daily exploits from both the Discovery and the Terra Nova Expeditions. He often ends the 
day’s comments with the words ‘alls well’, even the day when one of dogs got loose and 
killed the Boatswain’s cat. 
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The extracts show Oates’ death as a model; he is no longer a drag and commits 
an act of self-sacrifice. However Evans’ demise was not viewed or presented as 
an example of any of those traits.  The critical factor appears to be that Oates 
made a conscious decision whereas Evans did not. It was an act, a calculated 
move, versus a mental and physical breakdown.  A breakdown is not a decision, 
and in the context of early twentieth century beliefs, Evans’ death showed a lack 
of self-discipline and self-control.   
 
Max Jones, George Mosse and Elaine Showalter all declare that suffering without 
complaint was the basis for early twentieth century codes of masculinity.161  
Although masculinity is much more complex than the statement implies, it is 
apparent that other nations were aware that self-control was distinguished as a 
trait ‘Britishers’ predominantly admired. For in an article headed ‘Un 
Gentleman’ the French newspaper the Temps states, “His [Oates’] self-sacrifice 
bears the mark of that absolute self-control which an Englishman prizes above all 
else in the world. When the question is asked, what is the true gentleman? Our 
neighbours will have no need to search their history, or Shakespeare. It will 
suffice to reply that he is the man who behaves like Oates.”162 Additionally, self-
control was clearly admired throughout the social scale as Williamson and 
Keohane’s records demonstrate.   
 
Essentially the model of bodily comportment represented by Oates was deemed 
heroic. For as Valentine says, “a hegemonic masculine style of bodily 
comportment is about having the freedom to move freely in space and to 
appropriate it both through physical displays of competence and force”163. Oates’ 
movement was restricted whilst man hauling, it was when Oates walked to his 
death, free from the sledge, that he became a representation of the ‘masculine 
style of bodily comportment’, and could be presented as showing the masculine 
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and heroic ideal. The sledge holds back Oates, and yet it is also a show of 
manliness, using bodily force to conquer space.  
 
Thomas Williamson’s record has added significance, for he states that Oates had 
to be carried on the sledge. He makes no mention that Evans had to be carried 
on the sledge, which was one of the original accusations the press aimed at 
Evans. Yet none of the newspapers ever claimed that Oates had to carried, when 
one would have thought that if Williamson made that inference, others would 
have done so too. One reason that would explain why the press did not lay at 
accusation at Oates is that from 11 February the press had Scott’s presentation 
of Oates as a hero. And as presented in the first chapter, there was a willingness 
to eagerly accept Scott’s claims. For although articles do confirm Oates slowed 
down the party, his death on its own was deemed heroic enough to effectively 
dismiss the slowing down he had caused.  For example, The Daily Graphic 
declares, “Captain Scott himself says that but for the sickness of Seaman Evans 
and Captain Oates the party would have reached safety”. One would be forgiven 
for thinking that this newspaper regarded Oates and Evans in a similar light. 
However, on the front-page of the Graphic, in the same issue as the above 
quote, there was a full-page portrait of Oates under the heading “a very gallant 
gentleman”164. Oates’ slowing down the party was thus not promoted as readily 
as the fact he had behaved so gallantly.  
 
Those of officer status had similar views to those of the lower ranks. Physicist 
Charles Wright stated, “Found the Owner [Scott], Bill [Wilson] and Birdie 
[Bowers] in the tent. Evans went mentally first then physically at foot of 
Glacier… Titus got a bad frostbitten foot but struggled on till Mar 17. Knowing he 
had no hope & realizing that he was a drag on the party, he walked out into a 
blizzard… A damn fine finish.”165 Whilst Debenham, the man who had written so 
favourably of Evans, declared, “Taff Evans – already a little weak – had a bad fall 
and got concussion. He delayed the party and they were late for each depot. At 
the bottom of the glacier he failed and died before they reached the depot… 
Soldier failed next. He knew he was delaying them and in one blizzard walked 
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out and away and he was never seen again. He did it intentionally to save his 
comrades – a fitting death for a real hero.”166  
 
It is not known if Debenham’s comments were affected by the claims that Evans 
had been “rather disappointing in the winter being given to hectoring amongst 
his mates”167 and whether this had altered his previous opinion. Though it is 
plain to see that Oates’ death was presented as a deliberate act of heroic self-
sacrifice, whilst Evans represented a burden, a man who lacked the moral 
decisiveness and selflessness to save his comrades. The approval and awe shown 
for Oates by his fellow travellers can be seen at the very start of his image 
construction. The high regard bestowed on to Oates’ deed by his fellow-
travellers indicates that the press would not have to perform any adaptation on 
Oates’ image to offer him as a hero, they just had to use and promote Scott’s 
comments.  
 
Heroic models 
Scott’s comments on Oates’ death, “it was the act of a brave man and English 
gentlemen”, is effectively presenting Oates’ self-sacrifice as one moment that 
defined his entire life and future legacy, judging one deed as a representative of 
an entire existence. This has clear links to Geoffrey Cubitt’s theory that heroism 
can be constructed when, ‘the essential message to be derived from a life is 
encapsulated in a particularly dramatic moment.”168 Cubitt points to the heroics 
of Grace Darling and Brutus’ decision to order the death of his sons as primary 
examples.169 Oates’ death can be viewed in the same vein, one dramatic 
moment that defined his life and legacy though perhaps it is best seen as one 
dramatic image that will forever define the moment. 
 
Neither the press nor Scott presented Evans as having a dramatic heroic moment. 
Additionally Oates’ death fitted within the ideals of heroism being advocated at 
this time, for self-sacrifice was seen as a heroic ideal. It has been suggested by 
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MacDonald that self-sacrifice was seen purely as a gentlemanly deed170, but it is 
worth considering other texts. In Ireland in 1913, Patrick Pearse, Joseph Plunkett 
and Thomas MacDonagh were all advocating self-sacrifice. Additionally self-
sacrifice is one of the key factors in the understanding of the objectives for Irish 
uprising, the Easter Rising of 1916. The suffragettes in England too viewed self-
sacrifice as the ultimate act of heroism, for Emily Davidson threw herself in front 
of a horse in 1913. This challenges the claim that self-sacrifice was purely 
viewed as a gentlemanly action; it was a heroic model that was not dependent 
on, or could descend class or gender.  One must remember that suicide at this 
time was illegal, so there was a fine line between self-sacrifice and suicide. 
Suicide was essentially seen as the easy and prohibited way out, self-sacrifice 
was death for the benefit of the lives of others it was a calculated decision.  
 
Although Scott, Wilson and Bowers did not have a unique single dramatic 
moment at the end, their deaths were still in keeping with a heroic model. A 
year before the news of Scott’s disaster reached England the sinking of the 
Titanic was a leading story and the presentation of acts of heroism link the two 
events. J.E Geller’s research into the titanic disaster has uncovered that 54% of 
third class passenger children were lost, compared to 1% of the 1st Class 
passenger children and 0% of the 2nd class passengers.171 This is a scandalous 
statistic, but in Return to Camelot Mark Girouard assesses the public reaction 
and distortion of facts declaring, “the redeeming feature of the [titanic] disaster 
it was generally agreed, was the chivalry shown by the men, both passengers and 
crew.”172 It was promoted that, “all gentlemen knew that they must be brave, 
show no sign of panic or cowardice… be loyal to their comrades and meet death 
without flinching”173 Here Girouard writes in reference to the Titanic disaster, 
but, the same principles were praised for Oates, Scott, Wilson and Bowers. The 
fact that Evans’ death did not fit in within an already established heroic ideal, 
shows a further reason why there was resistance to promoting Evans as a heroic 
individual.  
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One wonders if ‘meeting death without flinching’, redeemed the titanic disaster 
in the eyes of the working classes. If it did not, it would suggest that the working 
classes would not have viewed the deaths of the Antarctic five as being heroic, 
particularly Oates, Scott, Bowers and Wilson. However, Barczewski’s research 
has discovered that Louis Heren, [an East ’ender] recalled his childhood opinions 
of the expedition, “I did not much like Scott and most of his brother officers and 
gentlemen after reading the socially superior explanation of Petty Officer Evans 
collapse, but ironically admired Captain Oates. He especially provided an aura of 
high endeavour, gallantry and tragedy to what was a splendid ship and 
quarters.”174 Clearly for some of the working classes they saw class as the core 
component to explain Evans’ presentation, yet still admired Oates. However, it 
is unknown if it was his act and decision, or, his social standing that was the 
cause of Oates’ admiration. Additionally, this is one man’s recollection, and thus 
may be the popular working-class consensus.     
 
The manner of Evans’ death aided the ability of the press to present his 
comrades in a heroic manner, for several articles present Scott, Wilson and 
Bowers as committing acts of self-sacrifice.  The Daily Mirror printed an 
interview with a Mr. J. Foster Stackhouse, Scott’s secretary in 1910 during 
Scott’s tour to raise funds for the expedition. Stackhouse declared, “I am sure 
that if he had not felt bound to stand by that poor fellow Evans after he became 
helpless he would be alive today.”175 Scott here is shown as sacrificing his life 
and by implication his companions’ lives for the sake of Evans. Similarly, The 
Times states, “When seaman EVANS became incapacitated the others knew full 
well that his breakdown was endangering the safety of them all. Yet stood by 
him till death released him from his sufferings.”176 Likewise, The Daily Mirror, 
“they stood by him till the last, thereby certainly imperilling their lives”177 
Evans’ un-heroic demise essentially aided the ability of the mediators to present 
Evans’ comrades as heroic individuals. Additionally projections such as these, 
with Evans effectively causing the death of his companions, limited the 
likelihood of his achieving a heroic status in the same league as his companions, 
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consequently lessening the likelihood of a “collective emotional investment”178 
towards Evans.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 Captain ‘Titus’ Oates posses for Herbert Ponting. 
 
Traits of heroism 
Character traits were not integral to the creation of a heroic image, for the press 
attributed the same character traits; a ‘great raconteur’ and ‘man of few words’ 
on both Evans and Oates. One newspaper declared, “Captain Oates was one of 
the most popular men of the expedition. He was witty and a gifted 
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raconteur.”179 Whilst Ponting commented to the press that, “Evans is a great 
raconteur…I venture to say he will spin many a good yarn on the long, arduous 
journey as he smokes his pipe in the tent”180. Evans was also described as a, 
“Man of few words” in The Sphere 24 May 1913181, as was Oates in The Times182. 
Evans was certainly was not a man of few words, Frank Debenhams’s diary shows 
he was constantly telling stories, and putting forward his opinions, such as why 
“90% of the men in the Navy would leave if they could”183, exploits from his 
school days184, how to propose185 and how to tie different knots186. This shows 
there were certain attributes the newspapers liked to bestow, and as the traits 
were used to describe Oates, were seen as virtuous. It also shows that those 
particular traits were not class-defined, nor did they define heroism, they were 
just admirable traits at the time.  
 
There was a precedent for promoting the last words of those deemed to be 
heroes. Captain Oates’ last words, and the last written words of Captain Scott 
were heavily publicised, as were Henry Lawrence’s last words, ‘No Surrender’, 
along with the epitaph he himself composed, “Here lies Henry Lawrence, who 
tried to do his duty”187. This leads one to believe that last words were a trope 
for the upper classes. However, as Alice Ayres, a “general assistant and 
nursemaid”188, who died having saved the lives of three of her nieces and 
nephews in a house fire, had her last words recorded, the notion of class 
distinction is debateable. Ayres’ supposed last words were reported as being, “I 
tried my best and could try no more.”189 If these were her last words it is 
understandable why these were promoted, it is fitting with the ideal that the 
upper and middling classes hoped the lower class would adhere to, self-
improvement and doing one’s best. It is not recorded what Evans’ last words 
were, and this lack of last words may have affected the ability of the press to 
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construct him into a hero. However, last words could have been made-up190. 
There was a precedent for adaptation to enhance heroic reputations.  
Horace Waller, editor of Livingstone’s diaries, “carefully, selected from the 
journals and in some instances almost rewrote them”191.   
 
It should be acknowledged that the manner of death and the cause of death are 
two separate factors. Two of the men projected as heroes of imperial Britain, 
David Livingstone and Henry Havelock, had un-heroic causes of death. Sir Henry 
Havelock died from dysentery, whilst Livingstone died of dysentery and malaria. 
Yet the manners of Havelock and Livingstone’s deaths were still projected as 
heroic. Even though Mackenzie suggests that the image of Livingstone kneeling at 
prayer was also greatly inferred by Waller192, that image of Livingstone was the 
one readily accepted and promoted. Whilst Havelock was presenting as dying “at 
his most glorious moment after a relief of Lucknow.”193 This suggests that the 
cause of Evans’ death, whether brain haemorrhage, scurvy or starvation, was not 
as important as the manner of it. Similarly the press reports did not emphasise 
that Oates would have frozen to death, they reported that Oates walked out to 
his death.194 Oates’ death was not seen as heroic because of the cause of his 
demise just as Evans was not seen as un-heroic because of the cause of his 
demise. Therefore the cause of death was clearly not a cornerstone to the 
construction of a heroic status.  
  
It is possible that as Evans was Welsh, his nationality played a part in his 
presentation, that the press wanted to emphasis the role of the Englishmen. 
However, there were three different nationalities present as Bowers was from 
Scotland, and Scott, Wilson and Oates were from England. This would limit the 
likelihood of attacking Evans because of his place of birth. I have not found any 
evidence of comments surrounding his nationality causing his breakdown, unlike 
the comments about his education and physicality as mentioned in the previous 
chapter. It was also a time in history when there was no trouble with Anglo-
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Welsh relations. The domestic troubles within the UK at his time were in Ireland, 
with talk of uprising with claims that “nationhood is not achieved otherwise than 
in arms”195. 
 
It has been suggested that the Victorian and Edwardian men who were presented 
and raised as mythic heroes were displays of national strength, legitimising 
imperialism196. These men represented the greatness of the empire, men such as 
Livingstone and General Gordon. Although Jones has argued that Scott and his 
companions were not used as heroes of the empire197, the Antarctic five were 
used to present the strength of national character, which does infer they were 
representations of the strength of the nation, which has clear links to 
imperialism. The Daily Mail pronounced, “The story of Captain Scott’s last 
expedition is an epic worthy of the British race”198 The Daily Sketch published 
Douglas Freshfield’s comment, “Farewell to a band of heroes whose names will 
shine as examples of the courage and noble evidence of the qualities of 
Englishmen”199, the Daily Chronicle quoted Peary “they died as Englishmen”200. 
The Daily Graphic quoted Mr Asquith, “Their splendid example will be an 
inspiration to Englishmen throughout time”201. And the Observer stated, “They 
have proved, indeed, that “the spirit, the pluck, the power to endure have not 
gone out of the race.”202  The comments do not directly mention ‘empire’, but 
they clearly conjure up an image of the men as examples of the strength of the 
nation and race, which implies strength of the imperial power.  This has an 
effect on the construction of Evans’ image, for Oates, Wilson, Bowers and Scott 
were presented as showing the strength of the British race, and clearly Evans’ 
presentation in Scott’s ‘message’ made him unsuitable for a model of the British 
race as superior individuals.  Which could therefore question notions of cultural 
supremacy, and Social Darwinism, which played a part in legitimising 
colonialism. 
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Conclusion 
Oates’ death was the model and Evans was presented as falling short of Oates’ 
example. Evans’ un-heroic state was not a state solely caused by his class, but 
because Scott, the press and Evans’ fellow travellers did not present Evans’ 
death as a heroic demise in the same vein as Oates’. Nor did it fit within an 
already established heroic frame. Evans’ image could have been adapted. There 
was a precedent for adaptation, whereby traits and, or, experiences are added 
to help enforce the heroic status, but this opportunity was very rarely taken by 
Evans’ mediators. Though perhaps the most significant factor is that Oates’ 
death along with Wilson’s, Scott’s and Bowers’ did not need altering from how 
Scott had presented their deaths in his journal to be deemed heroic by the press 
and fellow travellers.  
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Chapter 3.  “the four men history will never forget”203 
Memorials in stone and ink 
 
This chapter will examine how Evans was presented through the decades. I will 
use memorials, scrapbooks, cigarette cards, biographies and published accounts 
about the expedition to present Evans’ marginalisation. I will argue against 
Jones’ claim that Evans “became increasingly marginalised”204, contending that 
he had always occupied a negligible place in the representation of Scott’s last 
expedition. I will analyse Evans’ commemoration in memorials, whereby 
memorials and commemoration will be viewed as a mark of heroism displayed, as 
part of a “collective emotional investment”205. It will become clear that 
memorials are not just stone blocks, but also scrapbooks and memorial editions 
of newspapers.  
 
Marginalisation 
Max Jones, writing in reference to the 1930s believes that as the years went on 
Evans was “increasingly marginalised, forgotten, or blamed”206. However, Evans 
had always been a marginalised figure, there was not a major change in the way 
Evans was presented from 11 February 1913, through till the 1930s. Evidence for 
this claim lays in the fact that some newspapers in the1930s saw Evans as a hero 
in the group, “Five of the bravest Britons ever”207, “Five Heroes”208, just as 
articles had in 1913, “Five Heroes at the Pole”. Equally, some newspapers in 
1937 omitted Evans, The Children’s Newspaper proclaimed, “the four men 
history will never forget”209 just as newspapers had done in 1913, “there was a 
contest in heroism between Captain Oates and his comrades, Captain Scott, Dr 
Wilson, and Lieutenant Bowers.”210Furthermore, there were still accusations that 
Evans was the main cause of the disaster, “when Evans fell by the wayside they 
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stayed with him to the end. Had they left him to die they would have saved their 
own lives.”211 
 
Max Jones also argues, that seen in context, “the extent of the criticism of Edgar 
Evans should not, however, be exaggerated. Most commentators did not single 
out Evans as especially culpable but rather noted his collapse as one among a 
catalogue of factors which contributed to the disaster.”212 Barczewski disagrees, 
contending, that the fact that Evans was put forward as a scapegoat when the 
other four were raised to saint-like status is of more significance than the 
number of press reports.213 Although I agree with Barczewski, I would go a step 
further and proclaim that it is not quite as simple as appealing to the 
significance of the articles that presented Evans’ as a ‘failure’. One must look 
further and investigate other factors and instances, for there are indirect factors 
that show there was reluctance to portray Evans as a heroic individual.  
 
For example, consider the layout from The Daily Mirror 12 February 1913, the 
‘Memorial Edition’: 
Front Page – A full-page photograph of Captain Scott. 
Third page - two photographs of Peter Scott, and one photograph of Kathleen 
and Captain Scott. 
Fourth Page - the story of the expedition. 
Fifth Page - various articles about the expedition. 
Sixth Page - Photograph of Wilson and a photograph of Bowers.  
Thirteenth Page – A full-page portrait of Oates. 
Seventeenth Page - A full-page photograph of Evans.214 
 
Evans’ portrait was the last photograph in the newspaper, and in some of the 
editions, one assumes the early ones, the photograph of P.O Johnson was printed 
and not that of P.O Evans. Additionally, there were photographs of Kathleen and 
Peter Scott, yet there were no photographs of Evans’ widow and children. As this 
was a memorial edition, one can assume there was a belief that the readers may 
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want to keep the newspaper. It was therefore suggesting that Evans’ role in the 
perceived heroic expedition should be remembered as less significant than the 
roles of comrades’. In The Daily Mirror, 21 May 1913, when the photographs of 
the men at the Pole were first published, there were photographs of Peter Scott 
on page three, whilst photographs of Evans’ three children were on page twenty-
two. And if one wonders about the size of readership, this particular issue sold 
1,342,000 copies, the widest circulation for 1912 and 1913.215 Presenting Evans 
and his family last, was clearly not a unique representation, which essentially 
infers that images of Evans were not needed to sell stories. The images of his 
companions and Peter Scott were the key representations of Scott’s last 
expedition. Perhaps the press did not need to blame Evans once conventions had 
been established. 
 
It was not just the cheaper dailies that attempted to deem Evans’ role 
insignificant. An article in The Observer, 9 November 1913, states, “It rests with 
us, their fellow-countrymen, whether Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers have died 
in vain or no.”216 Similarly in The Daily Graphic on 13 February 1913, the front 
page is a photograph of Peter Scott and Kathleen, along with a separate photo of 
Captain Scott, whilst photographs of Evans’ children are on page 11217. However, 
the most telling exclusion is the centrefold of The Daily Mirror, 15 February 
1913. This is a photograph of ten members of the expedition, which the readers 
are informed, “should be kept in memory of these splendid men, and should be 
shown to children to illustrate the story that will never die”218. The photograph 
is very similar to one shown below in figure 12 and evidently Evans is not 
present. So in this memorial in paper form, that had been made to 
commemorate the disaster, and as such attempt to form part of societies 
memory of the expedition, one of the five men who died after reaching the Pole 
was not included. As it was a photograph people were told to keep ‘in memory’ 
of the men, it is insinuating that people should forget about Evans, that he is not 
worth remembering.  
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Figure 12 Scott can be seen in the middle of the shot, facing away from the camera. [In the 
version in The Daily Mirror, Scott is looking at the camera]. Wilson and Bowers can be seen 
sitting on the sledge, whilst Tom Crean who later accompanied Shackleton on the Endurance 
expedition is standing furthest left, with pipe in mouth. Oates is second from the right, 
wearing a bobble hat. 
 
Evans’ role in the expedition and the qualities he brought continued to be 
ignored. One article from The Times in September 1913, reports on Commander 
Evans talk at the Albert Hall the previous night.  The article ends, “but, to judge 
from Commander Evans’s language… All were devoted to CAPTAIN SCOTT: they 
loved and reverenced DR.WILSON “the peacemaker”, “the Solomon” of the 
party; they found infinite pleasure in the society of “little Bowers”, and they 
regarded CAPTAIN OATES as what indeed he was, “a magnificent man” That all 
these four died at the moment of achievement is one of the great tragedies of 
Arctic and nautical history”. Although they did not die ‘at the moment of 
achievement’, Evans was not mentioned and they did not even see fit to give him 
a numerical value, it was only ‘these four died’. Although the daily readership of 
The Times in 1913 was not close to the readership of the cheaper dailies, selling 
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“a mere 45,227”219, the article does show that there was a want to hide and, or, 
loose Evans’ role. Whatever the size of readership, one could be sure that if 
Evans was seen as a key image for the presentation of Scott’s last expedition and 
was crucial to selling the newspapers, proprietors would have ensured Evans was 
not forgotten.  
 
Although the statements do not directly attack Evans’, the mere fact that his 
name is not mentioned alongside his companions is significant. They are indirect 
digs at Evans, and a show that his contribution to the expedition was seen as 
insignificant. Or, perhaps, it was because his death was seen as having a major 
impact on the fate of the other four. It is also noteworthy that he occupied a 
similar place in ‘Memorial Editions’ that are, effectively, the commemoration of 
an event or individual. Though it debatable if Evans presentation was how the 
press wanted Evans to be remembered, or, if it was a genuine reflection of what 
the public believed, the fact remains that there was clearly the opinion that 
Evans and his dependants should occupy the space behind his comrades. 
 
Even though Evans’ role in the expedition was habitually ignored, other members 
of the five were also forgotten. For example, in an article in The Daily Mail from 
1928, Wilfred Bruce, Scott’s brother-in-law, rather intriguingly recalled, “he was 
introduced one day to a member of a shooting party who was an important man 
in the city. ‘Scott? Scott?’ Muttered an individual, obviously puzzled...’Oh yes, of 
course – explorer, wasn’t he?’ ‘Yes’ said Captain Bruce briefly. ‘North Pole 
wasn’t it?’ ‘South’ was the grim reply. ‘Of course,’ said the man. ‘By the way, 
what’s happened to Scott? We never seem to hear of him nowadays.’”220 Though 
obviously this is more forgetfulness that blatant ignoring. 
 
Memory 
Scrapbooks kept by individuals or families, must represent a form of memorial, 
for they are one person’s wanted recollection of the events. Scrapbooks have not 
been given the scholarly analysis and attention they deserve, for they are 
extremely valuable sources, scrapbook makers are active participants in the 
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construction of the culture and representation of exploration. One can see the 
effect of Scott’s ‘message’ and the press’ negative promotion of Evans creep 
into the scrapbooks. For example, one scrapbook has 2 pages dedicated to 
Wilson, Scott, Oates and Bowers and Evans. Out of a 140-page book, Scott, 
Wilson, Oates and Bowers occupy the pages 19 to 26, whilst Evans occupies the 
last 2 pages, 139 and 140221. The scrapbook maker kept several articles and 
photographs about each one of the five; Evans’ articles were the shortest, and 
he was the subject of the least number of photographs kept. See figure 13 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13 shows a table of the number of individual articles and photographs dedicated to 
the five in one scrapbook. 
 
However, Apsley Cherry-Garrard had compiled this scrapbook, which would 
explain the bias for Bowers and Wilson. Cherry-Garrard had accompanied Bowers 
and Wilson on the Journey to collect Emperor penguin eggs from Cape Crozier in 
Antarctic Winter 1911. Thus Cherry-Garrard had a particular bond with Wilson 
and Bowers, and as such one could expect more attention to be paid to those 
two. I have not uncovered any evidence that suggests Cherry-Garrard housed any 
feelings of contempt towards Evans. So it is possible that the scrapbook is a 
genuine reflection of the press’ presentation of Evans. However, Cherry-Garrard 
must have made a decision where to place Evans in the scrapbook, and the gap 
                                                 
221 2014/BPC - Evans’ 2 pages are pages 139 + 140, though the pages themselves are labelled as p.118 + 119 
as the first 28 pages have no pages numbers. 
Name Number of 
photographs 
Number of 
articles 
Longest 
article 
(lines)  
Shortest 
article 
(lines) 
Scott 1 full page 
photo of 
Scott, 1 of 
Kathleen 
and Peter 
5 129 22  
Wilson 4 9 60 16 
Bowers 4 9 30 6 
Oates 3 8 102 19 
Evans 1 (full page) 5 46 3 
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in between Scott, Oates, Wilson and Bowers and that of Evans is over a hundred 
pages, so that will remain unaccountable. This is the only scrapbook that has 
individual pages dedicated to each of the Antarctic five, the other scrapbooks 
are mainly a hundred pages long, containing scores of press clippings, so the 
same criteria cannot be investigated.   
 
However, other criteria can be investigated. In another scrapbook, where 
predominantly portraits had been cut out of the newspapers to commemorate 
the disaster, Evans had the fewest individual photographs.222 See figure 14 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14, a table to show the number of portraits kept by the scrapbook maker.  
 
It is possible that the results are a reflection of the press’s limited use of Evans’ 
portrait, rather than the scrapbook maker having a limited interest in Evans.  
 
The vast majority of scrapbooks viewed, that contained articles from 1913, held 
at least one of the articles that accused Evans of failing physically and mentally, 
and, or, reports that left out Evans. Therefore, it was clearly not one scrapbook 
or one scrapbook maker; there were a number of individuals who either wanted 
reports of Evans failing to form part of their individual memory of the 
representation of the expedition. Or, wanted to keep a genuine reflection of the 
press’ presentation of Scott’s last expedition, and any future references to it.  
Whatever the individuals’ reasons were for including those specific articles, it is 
a clear reflection of Evans’ marginalised status in print culture.  
                                                 
222 MS 2018 BPC 
Name Individual 
portraits / 
photographs  
Photographs 
in the group  
Scott 5 2 
Oates 2 1 
Bowers  2 1 
Evans  1 2 
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Figure 15 J.C Dollman’s painting, ‘A very Gallant Gentleman’ shows Oates leaving the tent 
into the blizzard.  
 
Figure 13, Dollman’s painting is not simply an image showing Oates’ moment of 
self-sacrifice, for it represents Oates’ apotheosis. It looks as though Oates is 
averting his eyes, cowering from the strength of light shining from above that is 
hitting his back. The painting is a representation of the moment Oates dies, one 
knows that is to come, linking it to paintings of the sublime, “where the disaster 
is safely distanced”223. It could be argued that the image of Oates forms a 
triangle, from the top of his back to the ground and from his head to his hand to 
the ground, this is significant for triangles in art have long been associated with 
Christ-like images, ever since El Greco’s Pietà. Triangles were also used to show 
the apotheosis of General Wolfe and Horatio Nelson in Benjamin West’s The 
Death of General Wolfe, and Death of Nelson. Dollman’s painting must therefore 
have played a part in enhancing of Oates’ heroic status. 
 
Portraits of Scott’s demise were also produced, The Sphere Memorial Number, 
included a full-page image of an Angel receiving the ‘message to the public’ 
                                                 
223 M. Paley, Apocalyptic Sublime, p.4 
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from a dying Scott.224 And in Punch, or the London Charivari, there is a full-page 
illustration by Bernard Partridge of an angel looking down upon the names of the 
Antarctic five. Even though Punch was a satirical magazine, the image was not in 
jest, it was entitled, “In Honour of Brave Dead Men.”225 As no painting or image 
was produced of Evans, this implies that the manner of his death was not 
deemed heroic enough, people had no wish to commission or view a painting 
showing Evans’ decline as they did with his comrades. Thus resulting in a 
reduced iconography of Evans, indicating a lack of perceived heroic status, for 
iconography is key in establishing and confirming a reputation, as shown by 
MacKenzie’s analysis of the paintings of Livingstone.226 
 
The cigarette company, John Players & Sons devoted a series of cards to polar 
exploration. The cards included portraits of, Scott, Oates, Wilson, Bowers, 
Edward Evans, Dimitri (the dog-driver) and Commander Evans’ flag. Yet “not one 
of the twenty-five cards issued mentioned Petty Officer Edgar Evans”.227  See 
figure 16 below. As the cards were printed in 1915-16, it reinforces my 
contestation that Evans had continuously occupied a ‘marginalised’ status. This 
is bolstered by the notion that individuals often kept cigarette cards, thus the 
cards have the potential to become a memory of the representation of the 
expedition, without Evans. John Players & Sons obviously made a decision not to 
include Evans, again implying that Evans was not deemed a necessity in the 
representation of the expedition. The cards also illustrate the deficiency in 
iconography of Evans in comparison to his comrades. 
 
                                                 
224 The Sphere, Memorial Number of the Scott Antarctic Expedition, 24 May 1913 
225 Punch, or the London Charivari, 19 February 1913 
226 J. MacKenzie, ‘The iconography of David Livingstone’, within G. Cubitt (ed), Heroic reputations and 
Exemplary Lives 
227 M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.261 
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Figure 16 shows the 25 cigarette cards issued by John Player in 1915-16 on the topic of Polar 
Exploration. Children often collected and kept cigarette cards, and as such this was 
effectively installing in a generation the notion Evans should be forgotten. (Image taken from 
Antarcticcircle.org) 
 
In Antarctica one of the two Cairns erected by the search party was dedicated 
with the words: 
“This cross and cairn erected over the remains of: 
Captain R. F. Scott  
Dr. E. A. Wilson,  
Lieutenant H. R. Bowers  
As a slight token to perpetuate their gallant and successful attempt to reach the 
goal…Also to commemorate their two gallant comrades, Captain L.E. G. Oates, 
of the Inniskilling Dragoons, who walked to his death in a blizzard willingly, 
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about twenty miles south of this place, to try and save his comrades beset by 
hardship; also of Petty- Officer Edgar Evans, who died at the foot of Beardmore 
Glacier.” 
 
Near this cairn the second cairn was erected with the record: 
“Hereabouts died a very Gallant Gentleman.”228 
 
No such cairn was dedicated solely to Evans. Additionally, when Evans was 
mentioned in the first dedication, his death was not viewed or presented by his 
comrades in the same heroic style as Oates’ demise was offered. Evans’ death 
appears as almost an anti-climax after the tale of Oates’ death. One can again 
see the stress on Oates committing a deliberate act, his ‘willingness’ to offer his 
life. The dedication over the Cairns should be viewed as setting the standard for 
Evans’ future commemoration.  
 
 
Figure 17, a close up of the wooden cross that was erected over the grave of Scott, Wilson 
and Bowers. Neither Oates’ nor Evans’ body was ever found.   
                                                 
228 The dedication was quoted verbatim in The Daily Graphic 14 February 1913, MS 1958/1  
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As the decades passed, Evans remained marginalised. There were many 
memorials to honour the heroic dead, often publicised by the press. Yet, Evans’ 
wife Lois died in 1952 and “during her lifetime… the only initiative to honour her 
husband was taken by herself.229 Additionally Evans had the least number of 
memorials solely commemorating him, and if memorials are society’s memory230, 
this suggests that there was a lack of popular interest in Evans. Society was not 
keen to commemorate Evans as an individual.  And the only individual who 
actively sought to commemorate Evans, had an already established, “emotional 
investment”231.  This leads on to the question posed in Contested Sites, “whose 
memory is it?”232 This question infers that it was one locality, one class or, one 
institution responsible for the commemoration. Evidently for Evans, only his 
family saw Evans as someone who should occupy a place in societies memory.  
 
Although there was a precedent for not commemorating the lower ranks of the 
Royal Navy as individuals, it seems unlikely that solely his social standing was the 
cause of Evans’ lack of memorialisation. Seymour and Calvocoressi state, 
“despite their inclusion in the Naval Thanksgiving procession of 1797, there were 
no monuments to ordinary sailors in St Paul’s”233. Similarly, in Nelson’s Seat, [a 
memorial to Nelson] “ordinary sailors are listed as numbers working in each 
ship’s crew… They are not identified or commemorated as individuals as are the 
ships captains.”234. And although it could be argued that Evans’ commemoration 
was based around his numerical value as one of the five, for there were far more 
memorials dedicated to the group (17) than Evans as an individual (2)235. That 
though was also the case with the rest of the five, suggesting that Evans’ lack of 
memorialisation cannot be deemed as being solely caused by his naval rank and 
naval tradition of commemoration. 
 
                                                 
229 G. C. Gregor, Swansea’s Antarctic Explorer, p.77  
230 C. W. J. Withers ‘Memory and the history of geographical knowledge: the commemoration of Mungo 
Park’ p.3, taken from Hutton, History as an Art of Memory, p.161 
231 G. Cubitt, Heroic Reputations and Exemplary Lives, p.3 
232 P. Pickering and A. Tyrrell, Contested Sites, p. xii 
233 S. Seymour and Rupert Calvocoressi, ‘Landscape Parks and the Memorialisation’ p.97 from Hoock, 2003 
234 S. Seymour and Rupert Calvocoressi, ‘Landscape Parks’ p.108 
235 The figures have been taken from M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.295 
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However, Nicholas Penny’s research has shown that during the nineteenth 
century there were a number of memorials that contained an image of Jack 
Tar.236 He declares, the memorials were not commemorating the individual 
sailor’s life or deeds; the image of Jack Tar was used to show that their leader 
had devoted followers. Furthermore, Penny argues the images of sailors were 
used to represent an example, “to reinforce the hope that such people would 
behave piously, loyally, and soberly as the representations of them in bronze and 
marble”237. This suggests that the authorities were concerned about the 
behaviour of some of the lower classes. If the same feelings and insecurities 
about the lower orders were present in the 1910s, this represents another reason 
why Evans was not massively commemorated. For Evans was rarely presented as 
displaying the perfect example. This is significant for examples were seen as a 
critical method of influence, for as Victorian reformer Samuel Smiles’ claims, 
“example is one of the most potent instructors, though it teachers without 
tongue.”238 As previously shown Evans had been presented as having a mental 
and physical breakdown, and had been called a ‘failure’ by his leader, this was 
clearly not a representation of an example that society wished to promote 
additionally some memorials in paper form had already implied that Evans’ role 
was one to forget.  
 
By the late nineteenth century there were memorials to commemorate the deeds 
of members of the working classes, and the memorials were not just used to 
highlight the heroic image of a leader. As John Price’s research has shown, Alice 
Ayres, a “general assistant and nursemaid”239 was presented as a heroine with a 
place on Watt’s Self-Sacrifice Memorial along with sixty other people, who lost 
their lives while attempting to save others.240 This does suggest that there was a 
precedent, even if it was somewhat minor for commemorating and praising 
‘heroes’ regardless of their socio-economic situation. Particularly if viewed in 
conjunction with the memorials to advocates of social improvement, as Pickering 
and Tyrrell state in reference to the Reformers’ Memorial, “Middle and working-
                                                 
236 N. Penny, ‘Monuments for the people’ p.797 
237 N. Penny, ‘Monuments for the People’ p.800 
238 S. Smiles, Self-Help, p.297 
239 J. Price, ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’: the Watts Memorial for Heroic Self Sacrifice,’ p. 265 
240 J. Price, ‘Heroism in Everyday Life’: the Watts Memorial for Heroic Self Sacrifice,’ p.256 
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class reformers predominate, but all classes are included.”241 Therefore, it 
appears that there were a number of factors that explain Evans’ limited 
memorialisation. His class was a factor, for he was not linked to any notable 
institutions like Oates, who had been schooled at Eton, and Wilson who had 
attended Gonville and Cauis College, thus restricting the scope for 
commemoration. Additionally, because of his social circumstances it is likely his 
friends and family were not figures who had positions of significant authority to 
influence public perception. Secondly, there was also a precedent for ignoring 
Evans as shown by the articles in the press and lack of iconography. And finally, 
the presented manner of his death lessened the likelihood of a mass public 
appeal for a memorial of Evans. 
 
Evans in literature 
Most scholars agree that the number of biographies is often a show of iconic and 
generally heroic status.  MacKenzie declares that over an 80-year period there 
were at least 100 biographies of David Livingstone and 70 for General Gordon.242 
Additionally C.I. Hamilton’s research has shown that, “in the catalogue of the 
National Maritime museum there are listed some 135 biographies of British naval 
men – sailors and officers – plus 28 of Nelson, published in Britain between 1830 
and 1914.”243 There was clearly an interest in those in the naval profession, for 
otherwise publishers would not have been interested in printing a book which 
would not make a profit. This interest in the maritime life was perhaps one 
reason why there was so much public interest in the expedition and aftermath. 
However, within this time of naval fascination, no biography of Evans was 
produced. In fact he has only one biography to his name, G.C. Gregor’s 
Swansea’s Antarctic Explorer, it is less than 100 pages long and was only 
published in 1995. 66 years after the first biography of Scott, 62 years after 
Wilson’s, 62 years after Oates’ and 57 years after the first biography of Bowers.  
As biographies are one of the indicators that must be present to generate a 
heroic reputation and status244, Evans again falls short. 
 
                                                 
241 P. Pickering and A. Tyrrell (ed), Contested Sites, p.4 
242 J. MacKenzie, ‘Heroic Myths of Empire’ p.115 
243 C.I. Hamilton, ‘Naval Hagiography’ p.382 
244 M. Jones, ‘What Should Historians Do With Heroes?’ p.441 
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Texts about the events of the expedition have been in print since 1914. And it is 
in one of the accounts that Evans comes in for some of the harshest comments 
ever published about his rank and role in the disaster. Max Jones and Stephanie 
Barczewski both make reference to Evans’ presentation in the small booklet, 
Like English Gentlemen, (1915), by J.E Hodder Williams, with Jones believing the 
“scrapegoating of Evans reached in apogee”245 within the text. Hodder Williams 
proclaims: 
 
“If Evans could not walk alone, he must be helped, dragged, carried along 
somehow...It was their lifeblood the heroes gave for this simple seaman… 
If they had left him he would die just a few hours sooner and they would be safe. 
But they were English gentlemen these four, the hero, and Dr Wilson and Captain 
Oates and Lieutenant Bowers…Poor Evans! If he had not fallen. If his strength 
had not failed. If only they could have left him where he fell. Poor heroes! But 
they were four English gentlemen.”246 
 
What seems very explicit is the fact that Scott, Wilson, Oates and Bowers were 
the ‘heroes’, whereas Evans was just a ‘simple seaman’.  There is a definite 
barrier. Here it appears that the manner of his death and his class were 
prominent in this interpretation. However, it should not be viewed as the 
popular consensus for the pamphlet was produced for Peter Scott, as stated in 
the acknowledgements, “to Peter Scott From the author of ‘Where’s Master?”247 
It was in essence a show to Peter Scott what a brave gentleman his father, 
Captain Scott had been. It did though put another nail in the coffin of Evans’ 
reputation, in an effort to enhance that of Scott’s. This was by no means a 
unique occurrence for Evans’ image was later adapted to suit the purpose of an 
individual’s objective.  
 
George Seaver’s, Scott of the Antarctic (1948) promotes Evans as, “a man of 
giant physique, of intelligence, resources and inventiveness, calmness and 
                                                 
245 M. Jones, The Last Great Quest, p.111 
246 Like English Gentlemen, pp 39-44 
247J.E Hodder Williams, Like English Gentleman, preface 
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presence of mind, in everyway a man of his hands, and a tower of strength.”248 
One would be forgiven for thinking the book represented a new representation 
that would henceforth become the common consensus. However, Roland 
Huntford adapted Evans’ image back, in order to support suit his own individual 
philosophy. 
 
Roland Huntford declares, “Over the years, P.O Evans, a Welshman from 
Glamorgan, had turned into a beery womanizer, exposed to the risk of venereal 
disease, and running a bit to fat.”249  This is a very incriminating statement, but 
Huntford provides no evidence for this claim, (though it is popular consensus that 
Evans would often get drunk whilst on shore leave.250) Evans has been used as a 
pawn to present a view that Scott was a poor leader, just like fifty years 
previously when he was used to present the notion that strong, uneducated men 
were a liability on expeditions. Although one could assert that Huntford is merely 
presenting the stereotypical image of Jack Tar, Mary Conley’s recent study, From 
Jack Tar to Union Jack (2009) has shown that by the late Victorian period, 
“newer images emerged that valorised the modern bluejacket, who was cast as a 
manly ideal, virtuous both afloat and ashore.”251 Conley’s research infers that 
Huntford’s accusation does not even reflect contemporary reflections of Jack 
Tar.  
 
In the first chapter it was revealed that Edgar Evans and Frank Debenham had a 
great rapport. However, in the published version of Debenham’s dairy, The Quiet 
Land, (1992), the vast majority of the comments about how well Evans and 
Debenham got on have been taken out. The removed comments include; “Evans 
and I have started a feud…Ripping chap!”252 
“Evans and I whirled away the time singing and generally acting the giddy ox. 
Amongst other things he proposed to me.”253 
 
                                                 
248 G. Seaver, Scott of the Antarctic, p.142 
249 R. Huntford, Scott and Amundsen, pp.314 –15. For a full discussion of the bigger man being a hindrance 
on an expedition, see R. Fiennes, Captain Scott, pp.335-336 
250 Evans was thrown off the expedition for a drinking escapade in New Zealand, though Scott later allowed 
him to return.  
251 M. Conley, From Jack Tar to Union Jack, p.193 
252 F. Debenham, Diary, 18 February 1911, MS 1654;D 
253 ibid, 26 February 1911 
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Additionally, in his published diary Debenham states, “the nails have come out of 
my boots and the crampons have raised me a blister on the heel so I did not wear 
them yesterday. The consequence was that on the lakes and rivers of ice I 
slipped & skidded in all directions with many falls, much to the amusement of 
others,254 [This is where this date’s entry stops in The Quiet Land, however, his 
original diary continues,] specially Evans. Whenever Evans got mean he would 
give me a shove + we were sparring across the traces half the day.”255 It seems 
somewhat unjust that these comments were cut and I have been unable to find a 
conclusive reason, the introduction to the ‘Autumn journeys 1911’ section simply 
states, “Here follows an account of out autumn sledging trip in the Western Mts, 
being almost a copy of the pencil diary I kept while on the trip, but with 
occasional additions and explanations.”256 There have been deletions and few 
additions. 
 
Perhaps as Debenham’s opinion of Evans changed, this affected how he wanted 
his relationship with Evans on that journey to be seen. As he states later in The 
Quiet Land, “Taff Evans… was simply splendid on that trip and we were very 
chummy. He was rather disappointing in the winter being given to hectoring 
amongst his mates, but he’s the most useful man down here and a treasure to 
Capt. Scott.”257 It is possible that these later events may have affected how he 
wanted to remember Evans. Though one should remember that Evans was a Petty 
Officer and according to Christopher McKee’s research on the lives and views of 
sailors from 1900-45, “the word most frequently used in describing petty officers 
was bastard.”258 So perhaps Debenham was judging Evans on his occupational 
role as a naval rating. Debenham’s daughter was the editor of The Quiet Land, 
and it is possible that quotes concerning Evans were deemed of no significance, 
with the belief that the focus should solely be on Frank Debenham. However, 
having contacted Debenham’s family, there appears to have been no specific 
reason for the omission, besides a lack of space. Had the comments about Evans 
been left in it would have shown the crossing of social boundaries a man of 
                                                 
254 F. Debenham, The Quiet Land, p.80 
255 F. Debenham, Diary, MS 1654;D 
256 F. Debenham, The Quiet Land, p.43 
257 F. Debenham, The Quiet Land, p.127 
258 C. McKee, Sober Men, Brave and True, p.128 
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science and a sailor. There is also the chance that there is a skeleton in Evans’ 
closet that Debenham later discovered and this altered his opinions, a skeleton 
which is still waiting to be discovered by historians.  
 
Conclusion 
Evans held a state of marginalised heroism throughout the twentieth century. 
There was a lack of interest in his story, with fewer biographies, memorials and 
images in scrapbooks than his companions. Similarly the illustrators and painters 
had no wish to portray the moment before Evans’ death as they had done with 
Evans’ companions, resulting in a reduced iconography. There was clearly a lack 
of ‘collective emotional investment’ towards Evans, and the actions of an 
individual, Lois Evans, was not enough to elevate Evans into a popular heroic 
individual. 
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Conclusion 
As the decades passed, the story of the Antarctic five moved into projection by 
feature film. Ponting had some footage of the Antarctic five in his film, 90° 
South, and this was widely viewed throughout the nation, though there was 
actually no footage of the Southern Journey itself. In 1948 the feature film Scott 
of the Antarctic was released, a film had been proposed in the 1930s though 
Kathleen Scott had announced, “NOT WHILE I’M ALIVE.”259 Scott of the Antarctic 
starred John Mills as Captain Scott and James Robertson Justice portrayed a 
rather large and jolly Edgar Evans. There was no real blame attached to any of 
the men and there was no animosity shown towards Evans. Although, Oates’ 
death, like Scott’s, Wilson’s and Bowers’ comes across as more heroic due to the 
nature and manner of their deaths. In the descent into television drama Evans 
was once again used as a means to convey popular beliefs. In the drama, Last 
Place on Earth, which was based upon Huntford’s Scott and Amundsen, it was 
important to make Evans out to be an irresponsible drunk as it was one of ways 
used to present Scott as a completely incompetent leader. One must though bear 
in mind that Trevor Griffiths, the author of the script, has strong left wing 
sentiments, and thus harboured feelings of resentment towards imperialistic 
ventures. Evans was a pawn of an image to be manipulated to support specific 
philosophies at any given time, whilst his comrades’ depiction of him before his 
demise was frequently ignored.    
 
Wide samples of press clippings have been analysed from The Globe to The 
Sheffield Telegraph to John Bull to the Birmingham Gazette whilst the entire 
newspapers examined include; The Daily Mirror, Pall Mall Gazette, Daily Graphic 
and The Daily Sketch. However, to take this investigation further, larger samples 
of newspapers could be viewed, such as a bigger range of regional newspapers 
and newspapers and magazines aimed towards women and children, thereby 
investigating if Evans’ presentation altered between region, class, gender and 
age.  
 
                                                 
259 This was reported in many newspapers on 4 March 1938, including, Daily Sketch, 4 March 1938, MS 
1453/41, The Sheffield Telegraph, 4 March 1938, The Daily Independent, Daily Despatch and The Star    
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Evans’ presentation was affected by the contemporary thoughts and beliefs at 
the time, for as MacDonald states, a hero is a product of society’s virtues260, and 
if one turns this on its head, Evans was sometimes representative of the 
weaknesses society feared, such as degeneration, effeminacy and insanity. 
The accounts written by his fellows’ show Evans was a skilled craftsman, thus 
fitting the masculine ideal of self-control and, the masculine ideal of the 
mariner, assuming the latter was based around maritime skill. However, Scott’s 
‘message’ essentially set the standard for criticising Evans, with the claim of an 
“astonishing failure”261, Scott’s accusation was fuel for the press. Evans’ family 
attempted to keep Evans in the public memory, however, the many articles and 
the lack of iconography show that some of the population wanted to forget his 
role in the expedition. Thus Evans’ fellow travellers, his family, the press, (who 
worked within contemporary beliefs concerning masculinity), constructed Evans’ 
image.  
 
The sailors sculpted in nineteenth century memorials had a function; they were 
there to present the perfect example, what men should strive to be. Similarly 
Oates’ death was the model, and Evans’ was frequently presented as falling 
short of Oates’ example. This allowed the Antarctic five to become, “the four 
men history will never forget”262. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
260 MacDonald, The Language of Empire, p.82 
261 R.F. Scott, Journals, p.421 
262 Children’s Newspaper, 20 November 1937, MS 1453/41 
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Appendix 
Message to the public 
 
“The causes of the disaster are not due to faulty organisation, but to misfortune 
in all risks which had to be undertaken. 
1. The loss of the pony transport in March 1911 obliged me to start later than 
I had intended, and obliged the limits of stuff transported to be narrowed. 
2. The weather throughout the outward journey, and especially the long gale 
in 83° S., stopped us. 
3. The soft snow in lower reaches of glacier again reduced pace. We fought 
these untoward events with a will and conquered, but it cut into our 
provision reserve. 
Every detail of our food supplies, clothing and depôts made on the interior ice-
sheet and over that long stretch of 700 miles to the Pole and back, worked out to 
perfection. The advance party would have returned to the glacier in fine form 
and wish surplus food were it not for the astonishing failure of the man whom we 
had least expected to fail. Edgar Evans was thought the strongest man of the 
party.  
 The Beardmore Glacier is difficult in fine weather, but on our return we 
did not get a single completely fine day; this with a sick companion enormously 
increased our anxieties. 
 As I have said elsewhere we got into frightfully rough ice and Edgar Evans 
received a concussion of the brain we think – he died a natural death, but left us 
a shaken party with the season duly advanced. 
 But all the facts above enumerated were as nothing to the surprise that 
awaited us on the Barrier. I maintain that our arrangements for returning were 
quite adequate, and that no one in the world would have expected the 
temperatures and surfaces which we encountered at this time of year. On the 
summit in lat. 85° 86° we had -20°, -30°. On the Barrier lat. 82°, 10,000 feet 
lower, we had -30° in the day, -47° at night pretty regularly, with continuous 
head wind during our day marches. It is clear that these circumstances come on 
very suddenly, and our wreck is certainly due to this sudden advent of severe 
weather, which does not seem to have any satisfactory cause. I do not think 
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human beings ever came though such a month as we have come through, and we 
should have got through in spite of the weather had it not been for the sickening 
of a second companion, Captain Oates, and a shortage of fuel in our depôts for 
which I cannot account, and finally, but for the storm which has fallen on us 
within 11 miles of the depot at which we hoped to secure our final supplies. 
Surely misfortune could scarcely have exceeded this last blow. We arrived within 
11 miles of our old One Ton Camp with fuel for one last meal and food for two 
days. For four days we have been unable to leave the tent – the gale howling 
about us. We are weak, writing is difficult, but for my own sake I do not regret 
this journey, which has shown that Englishmen can endure hardships, help one 
another, and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past. We took 
risks, we know we took them; things have come out against us, and therefore we 
have no cause for complaint, but bow to the will of Providence, determined still 
to do our best to the last. But if willing to give our lives to this enterprise, which 
is the honour of the country, I appeal to our countrymen to see that those who 
depend upon us are properly cared for. 
 Had we lived I would have a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance, and 
courage of my companions which would have stirred the heart of every 
Englishman. These rough notes and our dead bodied must tell the tale, but 
surely, surely, a great rich country like ours will see that those who are 
dependent on us are properly provided for.263 
      
                                                 
263 R.F. Scott, Journals, pp.421-422 
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Figure 18 this is the entire photograph that I cropped and enlarged for of figure 5. From right 
to left Petty Officer Forde and Crean can be seen working on the rear of the sledge. 
 
 
Figure 19 this is the entire photograph that I cropped and enlarged for figure 8.  
 
